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ABSTRACT 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND TRADE 
POLICY ISSUES: ESSAYS ON BARBADOS 
Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy, October 2002. 
Louis St. Elmo Woodroffe 
The objective of this study is to examine a series of trade policy issues 
related to Barbados' participation in multilateral, hemispheric and regional trade 
agreements. The three trade policy issues examined are (1) WTO Agreements 
and the trade policy preferences of firms, (2) preferential trade agreements and 
the export performance of firms, and (3) the selection of sensitive sectors to be 
excluded from free trade under international trade agreements. 
The first essay investigates support of manufacturers in Barbados for 
WTO rules. Based on the results of a trade policy survey, the study revealed 
that in general, there is support for multilateral trade rules. OLS and ordered 
probit regression found that there is evidence that export performance, 
competitiveness perceptions, and to a lesser extent external association, 
influence firms to support liberalisation. Capacity under-utilisation, and 
surprisingly diversification, lower firm's support for liberalisation. The second 
study examines the importance of preferential trade agreements to the export 
performance of firms in Barbados. The trade policy survey found that 91% of 
exporting firms, and 80% of exports benefit from trade preferences. OLS and 
tobit regression show that factor endowments, economies of scale and 
technology are important in fashioning export performance. The analysis also 
show that while trade preferences and external association have a positive 
impact on export performance, wage costs and protection in both local and 
foreign markets have a negative impact. The third essay examines the factors 
influencing the sensitivity of sectors and their exclusion from free trade under 
the provisions of hemispheric trade agreements. OLS and probit regression 
analysis suggest that maintenance of the status quo, adjustment costs 
minimisation, and considerations about fair trade influenced the selection 
process. 
Overall, the findings of the studies support theoretical and empirical work 
in the respective areas, thereby indicating that similar models developed within 
the context of industrial economies, are applicable in large measure to 
developing and small developing economies. In terms of policy implications, the 
studies pointed to the need for government to focus more on international trade 
competitiveness strategies in order to fully benefit from the opportunities offered 
by international trade agreements. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES 
One of the major features of the world trading system is the existence of an 
unprecedented number of international trade agreements. These agreements 
which define trade relations between countries at the multilateral, hemispheric 
and regional levels are designed to remove barriers between parties to the 
agreements, and to "reduce the uncertainty and unpredictability of the 
international trade regime, and to promote stability" (Winham, 1992 p. 21). 
At the multilateral level, the World Trade Organization (WTO), which was 
established on January 1,1995 as a replacement for the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), has a membership of over 140 countries which are 
obligated to implement the over 28 agreements, decisions and declarations 
created at the end of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. 
Membership of that organisation requires a commitment to liberalise trade in both 
goods and services in accordance with established rules (WTO, 1995a). 
At the hemispheric and regional levels, there are over 200 trade agreements, 
covering customs unions, free trade areas and other preferential arrangements. 
Most countries are now party to one or more of these groupings (WTO, 2001 a). 
These agreements, which seek to liberalise trade among member countries, 
account for a substantial portion of world trade. It is estimated that trade within 
NAFTA, the EU, EFTA, CEFTA and MERCOSUR amount to over 70 per cent of 
world exports overall (WTO, 1998a). 
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In addition, there are a number of one-way or unilateral trade arrangements 
between developed and developing countries. These agreements, the origins of 
which can be traced back to the second UNCTAD conference of 1968, are 
considered a means of providing special and differential treatment to developing 
countries (Onguglo, 2000). They provide tariff concessions to developing 
countries, without a requirement for reciprocity. 
Barbados is a member of the WTO, a member of the regional integration 
arrangement CARICOM, and traditionally has benefited from a number of one- 
way preferential trade arrangements including GSP, CBI, CARIBCAN and the 
LOME Convention. It is currently involved in negotiations under the aegis of the 
WTO to further liberalise trade, in negotiations to create the Free Trade Area of 
the Americas (FTAA), and in talks to create a reciprocal trade relationship with 
Europe under the Cotonou Agreement which replaced the LOME Convention 2. 
In undertaking those negotiations, it has joined other small economies in arguing 
that the assumptions of standard trade models which inform the creation of free 
trade agreements are often violated in practice. Market failure; subsidies; 
differences in market size; limited access to information and financing; barriers to 
entry; and other imperfect competition factors, may cause asymmetries between 
developing and industrialised economies. Given these factors, adjustment costs 
in developing countries in general, and small economies in particular3 may often 
be higher than in developed countries (WTO, 1999). These countries have 
therefore requested a number of concessions in negotiations to forge new 
international trade agreements. These include: 
i. derogations and longer time periods for implementing 
agreements; 
2 
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ii. the continuation of one-way preferential trade 
arrangements or special concessions for countries 
transitioning from such arrangements; and 
iii. greater flexibility to protect sensitive industries. 
It is possible, that resistance to more comprehensive or speedier lowering of 
trade barriers may also be driven, in these countries, by sector interests and 
protection pressures. In seeking to investigate the relative influence of such 
factors on the concessions sought above, the study will describe the political 
economy models of trade policy often constructed and applied in the context of 
industrial countries. 
1.2 AIMS OF THE THESIS 
The aim of this thesis is to examine three trade policy issues related to 
international trade agreements and the concessions requested by small 
economies including Barbados. The three trade policy issues, which will be 
examined in the context of Barbados are: (1) the support of manufacturing firms 
for WTO Agreements, (2) the importance of preferential trade agreements to 
Barbados' export performance, and (3) the factors determining the selection of 
sectors by Barbados, to be excluded from free trade under new international 
trade agreements. 
The first study will examine the support of manufacturers for specific provisions 
of WTO Agreements all of which seek to liberalise trade. An assessment of this 
support is important, because it affects the implementation of trade policy and 
informs the positions taken by government in trade negotiations. In Barbados, 
manufacturers lobby government on various WTO issues through participation in 
committees and working groups established to implement WTO Agreements. 
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This chapter will seek to assess the factors fashioning the views of this sector. 
The literature on the political economy of protection suggests that two broad 
factors influence producer preferences. These include competitiveness 
perceptions (Scheerlinck, Hens and S'Jegers, 1996a and 1996b), and the 
characteristics of firms (Pugel and Walter, 1985). The study will test for the 
significance of those factors in the context of Barbados. 
The second study will investigate the factors influencing the level of Barbados' 
exports. Barbados currently benefits from a number of preferential agreements 
offered by developed and developing countries. Many of these agreements are 
regarded as being under threat as countries liberalise their economies in 
accordance with WTO Agreements, and as a result of the creation of a number of 
hemispheric trade agreements. Small economies and other developing countries 
have therefore requested concessions in international trade negotiations for 
countries which are expected to be negatively affected by the eventual 
elimination of trade preferences. The study will examine the characteristics of 
firms which influence export performance, including concessions provided 
through preferential trade agreements. Three factors are usually investigated in 
the literature on the determination of export performance of firms 
- 
factor 
endowments, economies of scale, and technological variables (Conlon, 1992; 
Courakis and Roque, 1988). The study will test for the importance of these 
factors in determining the export performance of firms in Barbados. Other factors 
which policy studies indicate impact on Barbados' export competitiveness will 
also be tested including wage costs, government protection, and the association 
of local firms with foreign firms. 
Finally, the third study will examine the factors which influenced government to 
classify some sectors as being sensitive and therefore subject to protection from 
import competition under free trade agreements. Barbados is currently 
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participating in a number of hemispheric trade negotiations aimed at the 
liberalisation of trade among all parties. It has identified a number of products to 
be excluded from free trade when the agreements are implemented. WTO rules 
however place constraints on the type and quantum of protection which 
countries can offer to industries under such arrangements (WTO, 1995b). 
Countries are therefore forced to be judicious in their selection of sensitive 
sectors. This study will examine a number of political economy factors which the 
literature suggests influence the selection of industries for protection. Included in 
these are, lobbying pressures from interest groups (Pincus, 1975), the need to 
maintain equity (Cheh, 1974) and to minimise the cost of adjustment to the 
economy (Caves, 1976). The study also examines whether a need to maintain 
some similarity between the sectors protected in its major trading partners, and 
those protected in Barbados is a determining factor. Milner and Yoffie (1989) 
suggest that such "strategic" positions by firms are important in determining the 
outcomes of international trade negotiations. 
In the three studies, the research will focus on manufacturing. In Barbados, this 
sector is regarded as being very vulnerable since trade in manufactured goods is 
being liberalised at a more rapid rate than the services sector. In addition, this 
sector does not benefit from the same safeguard provisions as the agricultural 
sector under WTO Agreements. The structure and available data on this sector 
also allows for a relatively more rigorous examination of the issues under 
consideration. 
To date, research in the literature in the three areas to be investigated 
- 
the 
determination of trade policy preferences, export performance of firms and 
selection of sensitive industries 
- 
has primarily focussed on developed countries 
with significantly less research on developing countries. The results of each 
5 
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study will contribute to an understanding of these trade policy issues in the 
context of developing countries. 
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The study contains seven chapters, three of which are introductory in nature, 
three will investigate trade policy issues, and a concluding chapter will 
consolidate the discussion over the areas of research. 
Chapter 2 is an introduction to Barbados' trade policies. It provides the historical 
and contemporary macro-economic context within which Barbados' trade policies 
are fashioned. It also highlights the regional, hemispheric and multilateral factors 
influencing the development of trade policies in Barbados. Finally, it outlines 
efforts being made by Barbados and other small economies to gain special and 
differential treatment in international trade negotiations. 
Chapter 3 describes the characteristics of the manufacturing sector given that 
studies in this thesis will focus on that sector. It first discusses the structure and 
performance of the manufacturing sector. It then outlines the different phases of 
protection granted to the that sector. Finally, it describes the support of the sector 
for trade liberalisation as required under WTO rules. 
Chapter 4 analyses the support of manufacturing firms for WTO disciplines. A 
review of the literature on factors influencing the behaviour of firms in relation to 
trade policy is undertaken. A model is developed for Barbados, and regression 
analysis is used to assess manufacturing support for a number of WTO principles 
and agreements, as well as some issues on which negotiations have been 
mandated, by the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference (WTO, 2001 b). 
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Chapter 5 investigates the role of trade preferences in determining the export 
performance of manufacturing firms in Barbados. A review of the literature on the 
determinants of the export performance of firms in both developed and 
developing countries is presented. A model is developed for Barbados, and 
regression analysis is used to examine how firm specific factors and the 
existence of preferential trade arrangements influence export performance. 
In chapter 6, an examination is undertaken of factors which influenced 
government to identify certain sectors as being sensitive and therefore worthy of 
exemption from free trade by Barbados under new international trade 
agreements. A brief review of the political economy literature on protection is 
presented, outlining the major political economy models of protection. A model is 
developed for Barbados, and regression analysis is employed to assess the 
factors which led to the identification of industries proposed for exclusion from 
free trade. 
Chapter 7 reviews the findings of the three studies, and examines the trade 
policy implications of the findings for Barbados. It also discusses some areas for 
further research. 
7 
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END NOTES 
1 Negotiations under the WTO Built-In Agenda in the areas of agriculture and 
services commenced in 2000. In addition the Fourth Ministerial Conference held 
in Doha held in 2001, Qatar agreed to launch negotiations in a number of areas 
including, trade and the environment, trade and competition policy, trade and 
Investment, transparency in government procurement, industrial tariffs, and trade 
facilitation. 
2 Partnership Agreement between ACP States and the EU signed in Cotonou, 
Benin in 2000. 
3 Small economies have been making a case for special and differential 
treatment quite apart from the concessions requested by other developing 
countries. Barbados has been playing a leading role in this regard. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BARBADOS' TRADE POLICIES 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
2.1.1 Background 
Barbados is one of the small island developing states in the Caribbean. The most 
easterly of the Caribbean islands, it is approximately 166 square miles with a 
population of about 267,000 making it one of the most densely populated countries 
in the western hemisphere. The island has no natural resources apart from small 
deposits of petroleum and natural gas, which presently satisfy less than a third of 
its energy requirements. Barbados has a relatively high per capita income of over 
US $7,000 making it a middle income developing country'. The 1999 United 
Nations Human Development Report which ranks countries on such factors as per 
capita income, life expectancy, and adult literacy, placed Barbados as 29th among 
all countries, and 1st among developing countries2. Country data on Barbados is at 
Appendix 1. 
Since the attainment of self-government in 1961, government has sought to 
diversify the production base of the economy. Given its soil, topography and 
rainfall patterns, sugar manufactured from the sugar cane, has traditionally been 
the island's most significant export crop. Within recent years tourism, 
manufacturing and offshore financial services have emerged as significant foreign 
exchange earners. 
In terms of external relations, Barbados is a member of the major international 
organisations such as the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary 
Chapter 2 Barbados' Trade Policies 
Fund (IMF), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). 
Within the Caribbean, Barbados has been active in the regional integration 
movement. It held the first and only Premiership of the ill-fated West Indies 
Federation, which was a political union formed in 1958 among former British 
colonies in the English speaking Caribbean. The Union collapsed in 1962. In 1968, 
Barbados and other Caribbean countries formed the Caribbean Free Trade 
Association (CARIFTA). In an effort to deepen regional integration and to expand 
co-operation in other areas of development, members of CARIFTA signed the 
Treaty of Chaguaramas in July 1973 to create the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM). Currently, countries in the CARICOM region are taking steps to 
deepen the integration movement through the creation of the CARICOM Single 
Market and Economy (CSME). Within the Community, Barbados has been 
assigned responsibility for overseeing the implementation of the CSME. 
2.1.2 Objectives of the Chapter 
The purpose of this Chapter is to describe major features of Barbados' trade 
policies. It will focus on domestic issues as well as issues related to Barbados' 
participation in international trade agreements. It will also outline efforts being 
made by Barbados and other small economies to gain special and differential 
treatment in international trade negotiations. These negotiations will set the 
parameters of Barbados' trade polices in the future. 
2.1.3 Structure of the Chapter 
Section 2.2 of this chapter highlights the objectives of, and economic factors 
influencing Barbados' trade policy. Those factors are both domestic and 
international in nature. In section 2.3, efforts of small economies to gain special 
and differential treatment in current international trade negotiations and therefore 
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flexibility in applying trade policy, are described. Section 2.4, the conclusion, 
outlines the future challenges facing the development of trade policy in Barbados. 
2.2 TRADE POLICY DEVELOPMENT 
2.2.1 Background 
Trade policy refers to any measure implemented by government which impacts on 
the international trade in goods and services. In keeping with the mandate of the 
GATT, import taxes, import restrictions, and anti-dumping and subsidy measures 
were traditionally regarded as the main instruments of trade policy. With the 
creation of the WTO, trade policy has adopted a wider meaning. It now includes 
trade-related instruments falling under such areas as intellectual property rights, 
the environment, competition policy, trade facilitation and labour issues. It also 
includes polices affecting trade in services. 
Barbados' trade policies as broadly defined, are influenced by developments on 
the domestic economy, by regional and hemispheric trade arrangements and by 
multilateral trade rules. The overall goal of Barbados' trade policies, as spelt out in 
the Barbados Strategic Plan 2001 
- 
2010, is to earn the maximum foreign 
exchange from the export of Barbados' goods and services3. They have the 
following broad objectives: 
1. produce goods and services on an internationally competitive basis; 
2. secure and maintain effective market access for Barbados' goods 
and services abroad; 
3. promote and facilitate a viable and vibrant export trade for Barbados; 
4. vigorously promote and defend Barbados' trade interests at the 
regional, hemispheric and global levels; and 
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5. implement on a timely basis Barbados' regional, hemispheric and 
global trade obligations. 
The goal and objectives of Barbados' trade policies are reflective of government's 
efforts to transition the productive sectors from reliance on protection to open 
trade, given changes in the world trading economy. 
At the domestic level, Barbados relied significantly on trade to promote its 
economic development after gaining independence from Britain in 1966. Its early 
trade strategy focused on the development of agricultural exports, particularly 
sugar to earn foreign exchange. The primary strategy pursued by Barbados was 
import substitution under which local agricultural and industrial production was 
protected from competing imports. This strategy was pursued until the early 1990s, 
when economic difficulties led to the commencement of a trade liberalisation 
programme. 
Barbados' trade policy is also influenced by the provisions of CARICOM, which 
emphasise mainly trade in goods4. These provisions include a Common External 
Tariff (CET) and Rules of Origin, which stipulate how trade within the region is to 
be conducted and the level of tariffs to be maintained on goods from countries 
outside of the Community. Efforts are now underway to deepen the CARICOM 
integration movement through the creation of the CARICOM Single Market and 
Economy (CSME). 
In terms of extra-CARICOM trade arrangements, Barbados has benefited from a 
number of non-reciprocal or one-way trade concessions since the early 1970s. 
They include the GSP, CBI, CARIBCAN, LOME, CARICOMNenezuela and 
CARICOM/Colombia Agreements. As a member of CARICOM also, it is currently 
finalising a number of free trade and partial scope agreements with other 
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Caribbean countries including the Dominican Republic and Cuba. 
At the hemispheric level, Barbados is participating in negotiations to create the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and to design a new trading relationship 
with Europe under the Cotonou Agreement. Finalisation of these negotiations will 
lead to a revision of trade relations with the EU, USA and Canada. It is expected 
that the non-reciprocal trade arrangements with these countries will be replaced 
with reciprocal trade arrangements. 
Regarding multilateral arrangements, Barbados is in the process of implementing 
the provisions of WTO Agreements, and is also participating in negotiations to 
deepen and expand the coverage of multilateral trade rules. 
2.2.2 Domestic Policy Issues 
In terms of trade policy, two distinct periods can be identified in Barbados' 
economic history. These are the 1966-1990 period when the economy performed 
relatively well, and the post 1990 period when Barbados' trade policies were 
significantly revised as a result of an economic crisis. 
2.2.2.1 Growth and Decline 
Building upon the social and economic infrastructure inherited from the British, 
Barbados launched itself into a period of economic growth after independence. In 
1966, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was BDS $ 170 million. By 1970, GDP 
stood at BDS $ 331 million, nearly twice the 1966 figure. This growth was 
attributed to the production of sugar, a growing manufacturing sector, and the rapid 
expansion of the tourism sector. 
During the 1970s, the island experienced two years of negative growth 
- 
1974 and 
1975 
- 
but recovered to achieve real GDP growth of 7.9 % by 1979 (Figure 2.1). 
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FIGURE 2.1 
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During that decade also, the composition of GDP underwent some structural 
changes (Table 2.1). In 1973, manufacturing replaced sugar as the main 
contributor to GDP among the tradable sectors, and by 1987, tourism firmly 
replaced manufacturing. 
In the early 1980s, the export earning sectors declined rapidly, causing 
government in 1982 to enter into a standby arrangement with the IMF for the first 
times. The main conditions for accessing funds under the programme were a 
reduction in government expenditure including the public investment programme 
and a down sizing of the pubic service. 
Improved performance of the main tradable sectors in 1983 however, enabled the 
economy to expand during that year, and also enabled government to successfully 
end IMF assistance in 1984. The economy continued to expand, albeit erratically, 
up to the end of that decade. 
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TABLE 2.1 
CONTRIBUTION OF TRADABLE SECTORS 
TO BARBADOS' GDP AT FACTOR COST 1974 
- 
2000 
(RnS S MIT. i 
. 
inNS 
YEAR GDP SUGAR CONTRIBUTION 
TO GDP 
MANUFACTURING 
CONTRIBUTION TO 
GDP 
TOURISM 
CONTRIBUTION TO 
GDP 
1974 640,000 7.3% 9.7% 10% 
1980 1,535.8 6.2% 11.9% 11.8% 
1985 2,180.8 2.6% 10.6% 10.3% 
1990 2,965.2 1.9% 7.8% 11.4% 
1991 2,893.6 1.8% 7.9% 10.8% 
1992 2,703.4 1.8% 7.5% 11.7% 
1995 3,147.5 1.6% 6.7% 13.3% 
2000 4,309.1 1.4% 6.2% 11.3% 
Source: Central Bank of Barbados (2000) Annual Statistical Digest. 
TABLE 2.2 
BARBADOS' VISIBLE TRADE 1966-2000 (BDS S MILLIONS) 
YEAR IMPORTS DOMESTIC EXPORTS VISIBLE TRADE DEFICIT 
1966 131,111 50,056 (81,055) 
1970 235,005 62,106 (172,899) 
1975 437,239 178,218 (259,021) 
1980 1,080,126 300,220 (779,906) 
1990 1,406,865 253,916 (1,152,949) 
1995 1,541,819 338,811 (1,203,008) 
2000 2,132,076 379,268 (1,752,808) 
Source: Barbados Statistical Service (1999) Annual Statistical Data. 
In terms of foreign trade, in 1966, domestic exports which stood at some BDS $50 
million (Table 2.2), were 38 % of imports which stood at BDS $ 131 million. By 
1990 exports which stood at BDS $ 253 million had fallen to 18% of imports which 
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had a value of BDS $ 1.4 billion. Overall, towards the end of the 1980s, there was 
an acceleration in the size of the trade deficit (Figure 2.2). 
The poor performance of the visible trade sector, was partially offset by income 
from services, mainly the tourism sector. However, the outflow of funds to service 
foreign debt placed the Balance of Payments position of the country in peril6. 
Perhaps the most telling story of Barbados' economic performance were changes 
in international reserves. During the latter half of the 1980s, the foreign reserves 
position of Barbados became very erratic. International reserves reached a high 
of BDS $363 million in June of 1987, before falling to a ten year low of BDS $210 
million in 1990. Government took no corrective action to halt the decline, and in 
September 1991 reserves fell to BDS $12 million, the lowest on record. 
FIGURE 2.2 
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2.2.2.2 IMF Stabilisation Programme 
Faced with a situation of virtually no foreign reserves, the Barbados government 
finalised a Stabilisation Programme with the IMF in January 19927. As a condition 
for its financial support, government agreed to streamline the size of the public 
sector, undertake a reform of the taxation system, and implement policy reforms 
on export activity. These reforms were to improve international cost 
competitiveness, strengthen the regulatory environment, and remove barriers to 
international trade and other disincentives to export activity. In order to avoid a 
devaluation of the Barbados dollar, government reduced wages in the public 
sector by 8% to reduce demand for imports. 
2.2.2.3 Studies on the Economy 
During the period Barbados was experiencing an economic crisis, a number of 
studies were submitted to government which made recommendations for reversing 
the decline8. Essentially, the studies identified the following as causes of the 
decline in the economy: 
- 
falling investment, savings and an increase in consumption 
expenditure; 
- 
lack of attractive investment opportunities and high operating 
costs; 
- 
too heavy a dependence on foot-loose offshore industries; 
- 
too heavy a dependence on regional markets (which were 
contracting); and 
- 
anti-export bias in the trade policy regime which favoured production 
for the domestic market. 
The studies and reports made recommendations which called for trade reform, tax 
reform and other policy initiatives to make the economy more open and to reduce 
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the anti-export bias which resulted in manufacturing firms and agricultural 
enterprises producing for the domestic market. 
2.2.2.4 Programme for Structural Adjustment 
In February of 1993, government finalised the components of a structural 
adjustment programme. The trade elements included: 
- 
undertaking trade policy reform centred around replacing import 
restrictions with a surtax, and reducing the surtax overtime; 
- 
replacing a complex system of consumption taxes and stamp duties 
with a broad based value-added tax (VAT) on goods and services at 
a rate of 15%, with exemptions for the inputs of the agricultural, 
manufacturing and tourism sectors. 
- 
reducing the level of import tariffs to a range of 0% - 20%; 
- 
providing technical assistance for manufacturers to exploit export 
opportunities; and 
- 
restructuring the management of the sugar industry. 
The structural adjustment programme was designed for presentation to the IMF to 
acquire funding under a Structural Adjustment Programme. However, during 1993 
the performance of the Barbados economy improved led by a recovery in the 
tourism sector. GDP which had fallen by 3.5%, 3.9% and 5.7% for 1990,1991, 
and 1992 respectively, showed a positive growth of 0.8 percent for 1993 and 
continued to show positive growth in subsequent years. 
The growth of the economy from 1993 gave government sufficient confidence to 
pursue reforms without the assistance of the IMF. In 1994 government instituted a 
limited trade reform programme through the removal of manufactured goods from 
licence and applying a temporary surtax. The surtax was to be phased out over a 
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five year period. In 1995, it lifted the wage freeze but continued a prices and 
incomes protocol with the private sector and trade unions. In 1997, a value added 
tax at a rate of 15% was introduced. Collections from the VAT have significantly 
reduced government's dependence on trade taxes. In April 2000, government 
completed its domestic trade reform programme with the removal of the final 
tranche of the surtax. 
2.2.3 Regional and Hemispheric Trade Arrangements 
Barbados is a beneficiary of one multi-lateral preferential arrangement, four non- 
reciprocal bilateral arrangements, one regional agreement which involves partial- 
reciprocity, and a customs union. These arrangements are: 
1. CARICOM 
2. CARICOMNenezuela Agreement 
3. CARICOM/Colombia Agreement 
4. GSP (Generalized System of Preferences) 
5. Cotonou Agreement (which replace the LOME Convention)9 
6. Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) 
7. CARIBCAN 
Under all of these arrangements some or all of Barbados' exports receive partial 
or total duty exemption in the market of donor countries. Details on these 
arrangements are in Appendices 6 and 7. A summary of some key elements of 
these agreements is presented in Table 2.3. 
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TABLE 2.3 
SUMMARY OF TRADE AGREEMENTS TO WHICH RARRADOS IS A PARTY 
TRADE START COMMENTS 
AGREEMENT DATE 
CARICOM 1973 Customs Union. Offers duty free access for all products 
meeting rules of origin. 
CARICOM/ 1993 Non-reciprocal agreement. Offers duty free access for 
Venezuela 315 product categories only (five and six digit level). 
CARICOMI 1994 Partial reciprocity. Offers duty free access for about 
Colombia 1463 product categories (five and six digit level). 
GSP 1971a Multilateral arrangement. Duty free access varies 
according to donor countries. Access is free for the USA 
GSP while duties vary from 0 to an 85% reduction in the 
case of the EC GSP depending on the sensitivity of the 
product. 
LOME 1975 Non-reciprocal agreement. Generally duties are 
eliminated on exports from ACP countries except for a 
few agricultural products 
CBI 1983 Non-reciprocal agreement. Full duty free access except 
for some product including garments and footwear. 
CARIBCAN 1986 Non-reciprocal agreement. Full duty free access except 
for some products including garments and footwear. 
a. There are a number of GSP schemes. The scheme offered by the European Community was the first to be 
introduced in 1971. 
Of these arrangements, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has the greatest 
influence on fashioning Barbados' trade policies. Traditionally, the most important 
instrument in the Community were the Common External Tariff (CET) and Rules 
of Origin as the integration movement focused on trade in goods. Prior to 1992, 
CET rates varied considerably across the range of products produced in the 
CARICOM region. In 1992 a decision was taken by the CARICOM Heads of 
Governments to reduce the rates for agricultural and industrial goods to a range of 
between 0- 20% by 1998. After lobbying on the part of the agricultural sector, a 
decision was subsequently taken to apply a maximum rate of 40% for agricultural 
goods. With the exception of a few OECS10 countries, Barbados and other 
CARICOM members have fully implemented the new rates. 
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Historically, no rules existed in the Community with respect to the application of 
non-tariff barriers. In addition, no rules existed regarding trade in services. In these 
areas, member states were allowed to develop and apply their own trade policies. 
In terms of institutional arrangements, disputes among countries in the integration 
movement were settled through consultation only. No formal process existed for 
resolving disputes. 
The lack of co-ordination of policies across the range of trade policies instruments 
led to CARICOM member states ratifying the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the WTO as individual countries. This means that CARICOM member states 
incurred different obligations as members of the WTO 
- 
for example, Barbados' 
bound tariff levels are higher than other CARICOM members (Chapter 3). These 
countries have also agreed to liberalise different areas of service activities. This is 
unlike the case of the European Communities where member states of that union 
submitted common schedules for the liberalisation of goods and services. 
Given the disparity in trade policies within the region, and the need to coordinate 
those policies in the light of globalisation and trade liberalisation, CARICOM Heads 
of Governments decided to strengthen the regional integration movement through 
the creation of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME), and to 
develop an institutional arrangement to coordinate the participation of the region in 
international trade negotiations. 
The CSME is aimed at deepening the regional integration movement to benefit 
from synergies among CARICOM economies as these economies integrate into 
the emerging global trading system. It will allow for the free movement of goods, 
services, capital and labour among member states. Nine Protocols have been 
developed to give effect to the CSME. They can be summarised as follows: 
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" Management of the integration process 
- 
Protocols dealing with 
institutional arrangements (Protocol I), dispute settlement (Protocol 
IX) and assistance to disadvantaged countries sectors and regions 
(Protocol VII). 
" Movement of goods (Protocol IV) and services and factors of 
production (Protocol II). 
0 Conduct of relations in transport (Protocol VI), agriculture (Protocol 
V) and industry (Protocol III). 
" 
Behaviour of businesses 
- 
competition policy and consumer 
protection (Protocol VIII). 
Some of the Protocols of the CSME are currently being applied provisionally in 
some member states including Barbados. CARICOM Heads of Governments have 
agreed that the CSME would be implemented by 2005. At present, member states 
still determine their own trade policies apart from the CET and rules of origin 
criteria. However, when created, the rules of this union will have a significant 
impact in terms of determining trade policies of countries in the region. 
Regarding the decision to negotiate as a group, CARICOM Heads of Governments 
established the CARICOM Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM) to coordinate 
the negotiating position of member states. This approach to the negotiations 
allows member states to develop their own negotiating positions and to channel 
these through the CRNM to ensure that member states do not submit conflicting 
negotiating positions. It also seeks to strengthen the negotiating effectiveness of 
the region through a strategy of "speaking with one voice". 
Apart from CARICOM arrangements, only the CARICOM/Colombia Agreement is 
reciprocal in nature. It requires MDCs in CARICOM (Barbados, Trinidad and 
Tobago and Jamaica) to allow an agreed list of products from Colombia duty free 
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access into their markets in exchange for similar access to the Colombian market. 
The other preferential agreements highlighted above do not require reciprocity. It 
should however be noted that countries offering those agreements require MFN 
treatment for their products in CARICOM markets. 
All of the trade arrangements in which Barbados is involved vary in terms of the 
access they offer to the markets of donor countries. They can be compared using 
some of the key provisions of international trade agreements including; margin of 
preference, depth of tariff cuts, product coverage, products exclusions, provisions 
on non-tariff measures, rules of origin, and safeguards provisions. 
2.2.3.1 Margin of Preference 
Table 2.4 shows the average dutiable tariffs on the agricultural and industrial 
sectors for CARICOM, EU, USA, Canada and Colombia". Using these average 
tariffs as a guide, it appears that the greatest margin of preference 
- 
the difference 
between the MFN rate and a preferential rate of zero 
- 
exist in the case of 
agricultural goods12, for CARICOM, the EU, Colombia, USA, and Canada in that 
order. For industrial products, again using dutiable tariffs as a guide, the greatest 
margin of preference are offered by CARICOM, Colombia, Canada, USA and EU 
in order of the height of the tariff. 
Two caveats must however be made regarding the use of aggregated tariffs to 
comment on the margin of preference. The first is that, in those cases where 
countries offer zero duty on products, the margin of preference can be overstated. 
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TABLE 2.4 
AVERAGE DUTIABLE TARIFFS ON AGRICULTURAL 
AND INDUSTRIAL SECTORS BY AGREEMENT 
AGREEMENT/SECTOR AGRICULTURE INDUSTRIAL 
CARICOM 
Dutiable tariff 30.1 17.9 
% Du free tariff lines 35.2 64.1 
EU (LOME and GSP) 
Dutiable tariff 20.5 5.3 
% Du free tariff lines 11.2 20.5 
USA (CBI and GSP) 
Dutiable tariff 14.0 6.3 
% Duty free tariff lines 38.0 32.6 
Canada (CARIBCAN and GPT) 
Dutiable tariff 9.9 8.6 
% Duty free tariff lines 53.8 47.7 
Colombia (CARICOM/ Colombia 
Agreement) 
Dutiable tariff 15.7 11.2 
% Du free tariff lines 11.6 2.5 
Source: WTO Integrated Data Base. Release 5 
The second is that aggregation across sectors can mask information about the 
usefulness of preferences to a particular country. A more useful approach is to 
examine tariffs on specific products which are of interest to a country. Table 2.5 
shows the average dutiable tariffs for a sample of major export products for 
Barbados. For these products, the preferential rate in the various schemes is zero. 
The MFN rate listed is what would apply if Barbados was not receiving the 
preferential rate. The information suggests that given the relatively high level of 
MFN tariffs in CARICOM, the EU and Colombia, there would be a large margin of 
preference. Tariff concessions for sugar, Barbados' main export product, are 
especially important in the case of the EU. 
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TABLE 2.5 
AVERAGE DUTIABLE TARIFFS ON SELECTED PRODUCTS 
BY AREA / AGREEMENT13 
PRODUCTS CARICOM LOME CBI CARIBCAN CARICOM/ 
COLOMBIA 
15.0710 Crude soybean oil 40 6.6 19.7 7.5 20 
16.0100 Sausages 20 20.6 3.8 10.8 20 
17.0111 Cane Sugar 40 66.8 0 0 20 
17.0410 Sugar Confectionary 40 66.8 0 0 20 
20.0490 Preserved vegetables 20 17.5 7.8 14.6 20 
20.0791 Jams Jellies 16.6 28.2 6.9 8.5 20 
21.0500 Ice cream 20 21.2 19.5 9.2 20 
22.0710 Spirits 30 64.7 2.6 0 15 
25.2321 Portland Cement 0 1.7 0 0 10 
32.08 10 Paints & Varnishes 15 6.5 3.7 6.5 15 
48.1011 Uncoated paper 0 4.6 0 0 15 
85.3400 Printed Circuits 0 1.3 0 0 10 
The conclusion which can be drawn is that for some products exported to some 
markets 
- 
especially agricultural products 
- 
there is a relatively large margin of 
preference. 
2.2.3.2 Depth of Tariff Cuts 
Regarding the depth of tariff cuts, the most liberal schemes are offered under 
CARICOM, the USA CBI and GSP programmes, the LOME Convention, 
CARIBCAN, CARICOM\Venezuela and CARICOM\Colombia. All of those 
schemes offer total duty free programmes. The GSP schemes of Canada and 
the EU include a mix of duty free concessions and reduction in the relevant MFN 
rate. 
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2.2.3.3 Product Coverage 
In terms of coverage, none of the one-way trade agreements allows for total duty 
free access to the markets of the country granting the concession. Agreements 
with developed countries are extensive in their coverage, while those with other 
developing countries 
- 
Venezuela and Colombia 
- 
are much more restricted. In 
fact, the most restrictive agreement given the number of product categories 
involved is the CARICOM\Venezuela Agreement (Table 2.3). It should be noted 
however that, unlike the case of preferential arrangements with developed 
countries, the terms of the CARICOM\Venezuela and CARICOM\Colombia 
Agreements were negotiated. The concessions of developed countries through 
GSP, CBI and CARIBCAN, which were granted unilaterally, include a vast 
number of products not produced in the Caribbean region and particularly not in 
Barbados. The LOME Convention was developed through negotiations and is 
wide in its product coverage. As a non-reciprocal trade agreement, the 
Convention has the widest scope for conferring benefits on donor countries. The 
CARICOM Agreement has wider products coverage than any of the non- 
preferential trade agreements, as all products produced in the region are eligible 
for tariff reductions provided they meet the rules of origin criteria 
2.2.3.4 Product Exclusions 
CBI and CARIBCAN both exclude similar products from receiving duty free 
concessions, chief among which are textiles, clothing and footwear14. In the case 
of Europe, textile and garment industries are also regarded as being very 
sensitive, but trade in these products is treated differently. In the case of the EU 
GSP, trade is restricted through the application of high tariff levels 
- 
85% of the 
MFN rate. Under the LOME Convention, trade in these items is restricted 
through rules of origin requirements where manufacture must be from basic 
materials such as yarn. 
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Many of the items excluded or restricted under non-preferential trade 
arrangements 
- 
textiles, clothing and footwear 
- 
although not restricted under the 
CARICOM Treaty, are still regarded as sensitive and carry relatively high rules of 
origin requirements. These include a local value added content of at least 60%. 
There are also stipulations such as production from specific materials. 
2.2.3.5 Provisions on Non-Tariff Barriers 
On the issue of non-tariff barriers which could negate market access for products 
through tariff reductions, only the CARICOM\Venezuela and the 
CARICOM\Colombia Agreements contain specific provisions regarding an 
intention to examine the broad range of standards, and sanitary and phyto- 
sanitary measures to ensure that these do not become an obstacle to trade. The 
LOME Convention only speaks to quantitative restrictions, while CARIBCAN 
speaks only to the labeling of rum. There are no specific rules in the CARICOM 
Treaty regarding standards and sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures15. 
2.2.3.6 Rules of Origin Requirements 
The rules of origin requirements under the various non-reciprocal schemes vary 
across products, and include a mix of wholly produced and substantial 
transformation requirements. A broad comparison is therefore very difficult. 
Taking the value-added requirement only as a benchmark, it would appear that 
the USA offers the more liberal schemes, in that the local value added 
requirement under the GSP and CBI programmes is only 35%. Under the 
CARICOM, and CARICOM\Venezuela and Colombia Agreements the 
requirement is generally 50%, while under the Canadian GSP and CARIBCAN 
schemes the requirement is 60%. The requirement in LOME and the EU GSP 
are more varied, but are in some cases considerably higher (in the region of 60% 
on average) than the other arrangements. However, it must be noted that the 
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schemes provide for various forms of "cumulation" either from the donor country, 
other beneficiary countries or regional countries (and sometimes non-beneficiary 
state as in the case of LOMI=). In addition, the LOME rules generally include only 
the materials used in production in computing value added, while the other 
schemes include other costs such as the cost of labour. As a consequence of 
the various definitions used in computing value added, precise comparisons 
should only be undertaken on a product specific basis. 
2.2.3.7 Safeguard Provisions 
All non-reciprocal trade arrangements include, safeguard provisions which allow 
emergency action to be taken if there is injury or threat of injury to domestic 
production. In addition, product or country graduation is possible under the US 
and EU GSP schemes based mainly on import penetration. 
As expected, the CARICOM arrangement also has safeguard provisions. The 
major difference between the CARICOM provisions and the provisions of one- 
way preferential trade arrangements however, is that in most cases ' 6, the 
measures are of a specific duration. In most cases also, consultation with other 
CARICOM member countries is required before safeguard action is taken. This 
is not the case with the non-reciprocal trade arrangements. 
2.2.4 Multilateral Trade Rules 
The provisions of the CARICOM Treaty govern Barbados' trade policies in 
relation to other CARICOM member states. The provisions of other reciprocal 
and non-reciprocal trade arrangements to which Barbados is party govern its 
trade policies in relation to other parties to those arrangements. At the global 
level, Barbados' trade policies are governed by WTO rules. 
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The Final Act of the WTO contains over 28 agreements as well as Ministerial, 
Decisions and Declarations which state how trade polices are to be implemented 
in respect of other WTO members. Attached to the Final Act, are the market 
access schedules for goods and services submitted by each member state of the 
WTO. 
WTO Agreements are built on three principles". These are, most favoured nation 
(MFN) treatment, national treatment, and transparency. The objective of these 
principles is to ensure consistency and fairness in the multilateral system. These 
principles can be summarised as follows: 
i. The MFN principle or the non-discrimination principle requires that 
any concession granted by one member state to another member 
state should be granted immediately and unconditionally to all other 
member states18. 
ii. The principle of national treatment requires member states not to 
discriminate between domestic products or services, and foreign 
products or services after they have entered the domestic market19. 
ii. The transparency principle requires that the policies implemented by 
member states which directly or indirectly affect the flow of 
international trade be available for the scrutiny of all member states. 
The Final Act contains agreements related to trade in goods, services, intellectual 
property and dispute settlement. There are also a number of Plurilateral 
Agreements on civil aircraft, and government procurement. The agreements on 
which research is undertaken in this paper are summarised in Appendix 5. A major 
point which should be highlighted is the high degree of inter-relationship between 
the various agreements, since in any one dispute matter before the WTO a 
number of agreements are frequently involved. For example, the complaint by 
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Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the United States against the EU 
preferential banana regime for ACP states was brought under GATT Articles I, II, 
III, X, XIII as well as provisions of the Import Licensing Agreement, the agreement 
on Agriculture, the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), 
and the Agreement on Services. This serves to highlight the fact that WTO rules 
governing free trade are interrelated and complex. 
The objective of the WTO is to liberalise trade, and all of its agreements can be 
considered to be in keeping with that objective. However, they allow for some 
action on the part of government which can be construed to be protectionist. Such 
action include; applying high rates of tariffs to replace quantitative restrictions, use 
of countervailing duties in the case of dumping and subsidisation of goods, and 
safeguard provisions which allow for temporary emergency action if domestic 
industries are being negatively affected by surges in imports. On closer 
examination, these provisions and other WTO disciplines on the conduct of 
international trade, can be regarded as supporting the long term promotion of trade 
liberalisation rather than protection. 
Higher tariffs in the form of bound rates do allow for protection. However given that 
import bans and quantitative restrictions, which are being replaced by tariffs, are in 
fact the most restrictive form of protection then tariffs 
- 
even high tariffs 
- 
can be 
viewed as trade liberalisation. Protection offered through anti-dumping action, 
countervailing action in the case of subsidies, and temporary safeguard action 
must follow WTO provisions including proof of injury and consultation. Countries 
are obligated not to take unilateral action in trade dispute matters. 
2.2.4.1 Barbados in the WTO 
Barbados became a member of the WTO when that organization was established 
on January 1,1995. Assuming membership meant that Barbados, like all other 
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WTO member countries, incurred three main obligations: 
(a). implementation of market access commitments made in the areas of 
goods and services; 
(b). adjusting all of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures to 
make them compatible with WTO Agreements; and 
(c). making regular notifications to the WTO regarding aspects of policies 
affecting trade. 
2.2.4.2 Implementation of Market Access Schedules 
As indicated earlier, the primary business of the WTO is the liberalisation of trade 
among its member countries. In order to become a member of this organization, all 
countries are required to submit schedules for the liberalisation of trade in both 
goods and services. 
2.2.4.2.1 Market Access Schedule 
- 
Trade In Goods 
In relation to goods, Barbados undertook not to quantitatively restrict or prohibit the 
importation of goods except for health and safety reasons or to protect public 
morals. 
While imports are generally to be allowed into Barbados, WTO rules do allow for 
the tariffication of QRs. For Barbados, the highest tariffs which can be applied on 
imported goods to protect local production are generally fixed at 70% in the case of 
manufactured goods, and at 100% in the case of agricultural goods. For 
particularly sensitive goods, the rates are bound at higher levels (WTO, 1994a). 
It must be re-emphasised that the focus of the WTO is on openness and 
international competitiveness. Developing countries are required to reduce the 
level of their tariffs by 33 1/3 % on average for each tariff line over a five-year 
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period in the case of manufactured goods, and by 24 % on average for each tariff 
line over a ten-year period in the case of agricultural goods20. In both instances, 
the period commenced on 1st January 1995. 
In addition to tariffs, local industries can also be protected through use of the Anti- 
dumping or Subsidies Agreement if dumping or subsidisation can be proved, or 
through the use of the Agreement on Safeguards21. However in the latter case, to 
invoke the safeguard mechanism in the case of manufactured goods may require 
compensating the affected country for export earnings loss. It should be noted that 
this is not the case if either the special safeguard provisions under the Agreement 
on Agriculture or the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing are invoked. 
2.2.4.2.2 Market Access Schedule 
- 
Trade In Services 
Regarding trade in services, all WTO members are obligated to liberalise trade in a 
service sector or sub-sector. The sectors liberalised by Barbados include aspects 
of legal and medical services, computer implementation services, courier services, 
reinsurance, and entertainment services (WTO, 1994b). In addition, at the close of 
negotiations on basic telecommunications, Barbados undertook to liberalise some 
aspects of this area. 
With respect to these services, the island has generally undertaken not to: 
- 
limit the number of service suppliers; 
- 
limit the total value of service transactions; 
- 
limit the total number of service transactions; 
- 
limit the total number of persons employed; 
- 
restrict or require specific types of legal entity or joint ventures 
through which a service supplier may conduct business; nor 
- 
limit the participation of foreign capital or foreign shareholding. 
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It should be noted, that Barbados has not undertaken to liberalise those services 
sectors which would impact most heavily on the manufacturing sector such as 
distribution services. 
2.2.4.3 Implementation of WTO Agreements 
Barbados is required to adjust all of its laws, regulations and administrative 
procedures where necessary to bring them into conformity with WTO principles 
and agreements. Major pieces of legislation to be implemented or adjusted are in 
the areas of: 
- 
import licensing: 
- 
to give effect to the removal of quantitative 
restrictions; 
- 
customs revenue collection: 
- 
to give effect to the application of 
bound rates, where these are being applied; 
- 
customs valuation: 
- 
to implement WTO codes for determining the 
value of goods; 
- 
anti-dumping and subsidies: 
- 
to recognise WTO procedures for 
determining dumping and actionable subsidies, injury or threat of 
injury, periods for consultation and remedies; and 
- 
intellectual property rights: 
- 
to give protection to foreign products and 
services by way of legislation covering such areas as copyrights, 
trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, 
layout-designs of integrated circuits, protection of undisclosed 
information, and control of anti-competitive practices in contractual 
licenses. 
2.2.4.4 Notifications to the WTO 
In keeping with the principle of transparency, all WTO member states are required 
to make notifications regarding their trade policies on a periodic basis. While there 
are no penalties for non-reporting, member states which do not notify are in a 
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weak position when requesting information from other countries. The impact of this 
would be particularly telling on a product or service company experiencing difficulty 
in accessing another market due to a lack of information. The WTO also has a 
Trade Policy Review Mechanism which require members to undergo a review of 
their trade. In the case of Barbados' this review is to be undertaken every six 
years. 
2.2.4.5 WTO Review of Barbados' Trade Policies 
In keeping with its WTO obligations, Barbados agreed to undergo a review of its 
trade policies by the WTO in July 2002. The Report by the WTO Secretariat22 
noted that Barbados had made significant efforts to liberalise its import regime 
(WTO 2002a). While exports are assisted through a number of subsidies, 
Barbados has applied to the WTO for permission to continue use of these 
subsidies (WTO 2001c). In the area of services, Barbados has not restricted trade 
in services sectors listed in its schedule of commitments to the WT023. 
Regarding the issue of compatibility with WTO rules, the report however noted that 
the anti-dumping and subsidies legislation required updating, and some elements 
of Trade Related Intellectual Property legislation were still to be put in place. It also 
noted that Barbados was not up-to-date in making notifications to the WTO on its 
trade policies. 
In its report (WTO 2002b), Barbados noted that it is fully committed to the 
liberalisation process as demonstrated by the reforms undertaken since 1993 
(before the creation of the WTO). It also noted that it will continue to pursue its 
development objectives within the context of an open market for goods and 
services. It however noted that it will take all steps necessary to ensure that trade 
liberalisation is undertaken at a pace which does not precipitate a collapse of the 
economy. Regarding the fulfilment of WTO commitments, Barbados noted that it 
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had made considerable progress in meeting most of its obligations. The fulfilment 
of remaining obligations is being pursued within the context of its limited human, 
technical and financial resources. 
2.3 INTERNATIONAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 
With a population of 267,000 persons, a GDP of less than one billion US 
dollars, and a world trade share of 0.00% (WTO 2001 c), Barbados is defined as 
a small economy by such institutions as the World Bank, and the United Nations. 
In its report to the WTO as part of the Trade Policy Review exercise, Barbados 
noted that it shares many of the classical features of small economies including: 
-a high dependence on trade making it very susceptible to the 
vagaries of the international economic environment; 
- 
high dependence on the successful performance of a very limited 
number of sectors (in the case of Barbados tourism) to promote its 
economic development; 
- 
relatively small production levels which preclude firms from 
benefiting from economies of scale; 
- 
relatively high unit transport cost given that small volumes are 
exported; 
-a narrow production base which severely limits the opportunities for 
persons to gain re-employment during periods of economic 
downturn; and 
- 
high vulnerability to natural disasters and environmental change as 
such occurrences impact negatively on the entire economy given 
the size of the country. 
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Based on these characteristics, Barbados and other small economies participating 
in negotiations in the WTO, and in negotiations to create the FTAA have raised a 
number of specific concerns about the impact which trade liberalisation will have 
on their economies. Firstly, they argue that adjustment costs in these economies 
will be higher than in larger economies. This will be so given the existence of fewer 
firms in small economies and therefore limited opportunities for displaced labour to 
move between firms and sectors as some economic activities decline. 
Secondly, firms in these economies are encouraged to look outward and to 
develop niche markets overseas. However, they are hindered in seeking to do so 
by the fact that to tap into such markets require specific skills and technology 
which are not abundant in small economies. Considerable financial resources will 
therefore be needed to develop niche markets. 
Thirdly, most of these economies currently benefit from preferential trade 
arrangements. A rapid reduction in trade preferences will undermine the survival of 
firms which were established during the era of preferences, and which currently 
lack the management systems to compete effectively. New management expertise 
will have to be attracted from other countries to assist these firms. 
Fourthly, small firms in these economies face the challenge of high 
transportation costs as a result of the small volumes exported. These firms are 
therefore inherently at a disadvantage in competing in export markets. This is 
compounded by the fact that these firms do not benefit from the levels of 
financial and other support often given by governments in industrial countries to 
their industries. 
Fifthly, because of the narrow base for taxation existing in these countries, the 
loss of government revenue will be difficult to replace. This will result in a 
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reduction in the services provided by the public sector such as health and 
education services, and conconmitently to a derailment of development efforts. 
Given the anticipated difficulties, Barbados and other small economies have 
been seeking the inclusion of provisions in international trade agreements which 
will mitigate the negative effects of trade liberalisation. The provisions which 
these economies are requesting include: 
- 
the setting of relatively high trigger levels which must be reached 
before action can be taken to restrict import from smaller 
economies for example under Safeguard, Anti-dumping and 
Subsidies agreements; 
- 
allowing governments greater flexibility to assist domestic industries 
without breaching domestic support provisions; 
- 
granting relatively longer transitional periods to implement 
particularly complex provisions, for example in the area of 
intellectual property rights; 
- 
reducing the burden on smaller economies of complying with 
changes in sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures implemented by 
developed countries; 
- 
setting thresholds below which small economies would not be 
required to make commitments, for example, in the area of 
government procurement; 
- 
providing technical assistance for smaller economies, as well as 
financial resources; 
- 
developing dispute settlement procedures which are accessible to 
smaller economies given their lack of human and financial 
resources; and 
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- 
allowing greater flexibility regarding rules on the formulation of 
regional trade agreements among developing and small 
economies. 
To date, the lobbing efforts of these countries have met with some success in 
both the WTO and in FTAA negotiations. For small economies, an important 
outcome of the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference held in Doha in 2001 was 
the establishment of a Work Programme on Small Economies (WTO 2001b). 
The objective of the Work Programme is to examine the trade related concerns 
of small economies and to make recommendations for further action to the next 
WTO Ministerial Conference. In the FTAA, a Consultative Group on Small 
Economies was established in 1998. The Group is intended to be a reservoir for 
the concerns of small economies, and a catalyst for ensuring that the various 
components of the proposed FTAA agreement take the concerns and 
suggestions of small economies fully into account (Appendix 7). 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
Barbados' trade policies are influenced by developments on the domestic 
economy, and by its participation in regional, hemispheric and multilateral trade 
agreements. 
At the domestic level, government has been pursuing a trade policy based on 
greater openness. In its trade policy statement submitted to the WTO as part of 
its Trade Policy Review exercise, Barbados indicated that it will implement 
policies to enable its tradable sectors to be competitive in regional and extra- 
regional markets. It also emphasised that it will seek to ensure that liberalisation 
does not precipitate the type of decline which Barbados experienced in the early 
1980s and 1990s. In keeping with those objectives, government has put in place 
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a number of financial programmes to assist the agricultural, manufacturing and 
tourism sectors. In the case of the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, it has 
also applied relatively high rates of customs duties. These measures are 
consistent with its obligations under the international trade agreements to which 
it is a party. 
At the regional and extra-regional levels, the establishment of the CSME, FTAA, 
a new trading relationship with Europe and expanded WTO rules will require a 
number of adjustments to its trade policies and in some cases will present some 
challenges for Barbados. A major change will be that the autonomy of government 
to develop and implement trade and trade-related policies will be diminished. 
Government will only be able to create trade policies which do not breach the 
provisions of the various agreements. 
In the case of CARICOM, Barbados has generally applied the provisions of the 
CARICOM Treaty which historically focussed on trade in goods through the 
application of a CET and Rules of Origin. This component of the CSME should 
therefore not affect Barbados' trade policies as far as these issues are concerned. 
Other components related to trade in goods will however require adjustments to 
policies to recognise regional accords. These include antidumping and subsidies 
measures and the mechanism for taking safeguard action to protect domestic 
industries. Once the CSME is created, Barbados will be required follow the 
procedures outlined in its Protocols for protecting and assisting domestic 
industries. 
Given that trade in services was previously not included in the CARICOM Treaty 
some changes to Barbados' trade policies will have to be undertaken in this area. 
The CSME will require Barbados to remove restrictions on a number of service 
activities currently reserved for Barbadians. Among these are specific activities in 
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the tourism and distribution sectors. In addition, Barbados will be required to 
develop trade policies in a number of other areas which were unregulated. These 
include competition policy and consumer protection. It will also be required to 
follow the provisions of the CSME for settling trade disputes. These provisions go 
beyond the simple consultation process now followed in CARICOM. It will entail 
consultation, arbitration and appeal to the Caribbean Court of Justice. 
The FTAA will require Barbados to liberalise its trade in goods and services to the 
benefit of the other thirty three parties to that agreement. It will be required to 
recognise the provisions of the FTAA in designing and implementing trade policies. 
The provisions of the agreement will go beyond what is required by the WTO. One 
significant change is that Barbados and other FTAA members will be required to 
grant full duty free access to substantially all trade with FTAA countries. 
As in the case of the CSME, restrictions on trade in services will have to be 
removed. New legislation acknowledging the rights of FTAA members beyond 
those currently in the WTO will have to be implemented. This legislation will cover 
such areas as competition policy, investment, dispute settlement, technical barriers 
to trade, sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures, as well as anti-dumping and 
subsidies measures. 
In the case of negotiations under the Cotonou Agreement it has already been 
agreed that the new trading relationship between ACP countries and the EU will be 
reciprocal in nature. However, the elements of the new trade component of the 
agreement are not yet known. It is however likely that those elements will be 
similar to the those in the FTAA, and therefore the implications for Barbados' trade 
policy will be similar to those in the FTAA. 
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Unlike the CSME and the FTAA which are in the process of being created, the 
WTO already impose a number of obligations on Barbados which define the 
parameters of its trade policies. Negotiations to further liberalise trade in goods 
and services, and to create new obligations in such areas as competition policy, 
investment and trade and the environment will add new parameters. The work of 
the WTO will eventually result in Barbados' trade policies being similar in nature to 
those of its other members, in particularly other developing members. 
In defending its trade polices, in the WTO, Barbados noted that the range of policy 
options at its disposal to promote its economic development are not as large as for 
developed countries. It is therefore necessary to allow Barbados and other small 
economies some flexibility to use trade and trade related policies to assist 
important productive sectors of its economy without breaching international trade 
rules. This has been echoed in negotiations in the FTAA and in preparing for 
negotiations under the Cotonou Agreement. The architecture of the new 
agreements in these negotiating fora and the extent to which Barbados can gain 
special and differential treatment will determine the nature of Barbados' trade 
policies in the future. 
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END NOTES 
1 Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank Report "Small States: Meeting the 
Challenges In The Global Economy" March 2000. 
2 United Nations Development Programme (1999). Human Development Report. 
3 Government of Barbados (2000) Barbados Strategic Plan 2001 
- 
2010. 
4 The CARICOM Single Market and Economy which will also include the free 
movement of services, labour and capital is not yet in effect (Caribbean 
Community Secretariat, (2000)). 
5 The amounts obtained were the equivalent of SDR 31.9 million under a Stand-by 
Arrangement, and SDR 12.6 million under the Compensatory and Contingency 
Financing Facility. 
6 In addition, large negative provisions were made under "Errors and Omissions" a 
situation which is normally associated with capital flight. 
7 The programme consisted of an 18 month Stand-by-Arrangement in an amount 
equivalent to SDR 14.9 million, and SDR 22.2 million under the Compensatory 
and Contingency Financing Facility. 
8 The studies included: 
- 
Inter-American Development Bank (1989) Socio-Economic Report 
on Barbados; 
- 
World Bank (1989) Barbados Industrial Sector Report; 
- 
Maxwell Stamp Plc (1991) Export Competitiveness and Marketing 
Study In Barbados; and 
- 
Loehr, W. & Emery, J (1992) Competitiveness and Structural 
Adjustment In Barbados. Prepared for the IDB. 
A general study which examined Barbados' trade policy in the context of 
CARICOM was "The Caribbean Common Market: Trade Policies and regional 
integration in the 1990s". World Bank (1990). 
9 Discussion in this section refer to the LOME Convention, as this was in effect at 
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the time it was written. 
10 OECS countries include Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, 
Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent. 
" Data for Venezuela was not available. 
12 Agricultural products in the classification of the WTO refer to Chapters 1- 24 
of the Customs Tariff, excluding a few sectors such as fish and fish products. 
13 Calculated from the WTO Data Base Release 5. Average is for the HS Head 
identified. 
14 A recently passed US Trade and Development Act lifted restrictions somewhat 
for garments. 
15 There are however new Protocols on these issues to be implemented as part 
of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (Caribbean Community 
Secretariat, 2000). 
16 Article 56 of the CARICOM Treaty being the exception. 
17 There are in fact no fixed number of principles. The binding of tariffs for 
example is sometimes also included as a principle (WTO, 1996). 
18 Some exceptions to this principle are allowed under the Enabling Clause and 
Article XXIV of GATTS and Article V of GATS. 
19 The principle also applies to investors under the TRIMS agreement. 
20 This does not apply to products for which there is a ceiling bind. For these 
tariffs, rates are not reduced. 
21 Two other provisions exist under GATT 1994. These are Article XII relating to 
restrictions to safeguard the balance of payments and Article XVIII on 
government assistance to economic development. 
22 It should be noted that the Government of Barbados has pointed out a number 
of errors in the July report issued by the WTO Secretariat, and has requested 
corrections to that report. The Secretariat agreed to amend its report. 
23 In the area of telecommunications, Barbados has commenced the 
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liberalisation of this sector. It is to liberalised in three phased commencing in 
October 2002 and ending in August 2003. 
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BARBADOS' MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Barbados shares an economic history with most countries which developed 
from an agricultural base. Early economic activity in Barbados centred around 
the growing of tobacco and then cotton which was followed by sugar 
production. Recognised manufacturing production commenced in the early 
1950s mainly in the areas of food production including margarine, lard, bread 
and biscuits. The garments and furniture industries were developed through 
foreign investment. 
From 1951, a number of incentives were granted to these sectors to facilitate 
their development. These included the Pioneer Industries (Encouragement) 
Act 1951, the Pioneer Industries Act 1958, the Industrial Incentives Act 1963, 
the Industrial Development (Export Industries) Act 1969, and the Fiscal 
Incentives Act 1974. The current incentives available to manufacturing 
production include; tax holiday of up to fifteen years from payment of taxes on 
corporate profits, a low rate of tax (2.5 %), exemption from import duties on 
parts, raw materials and production machinery, and subsidized factory space. 
As early as 1950 also, government embarked fully on an import substitution 
model which entailed the protection of domestic industries through the 
imposition of quantitative restrictions. Those industries already in existence 
benefited from high levels of protection as government sought to increase 
employment. The industries protected focussed mainly on producing for the 
domestic market. 
Aided by incentives and protection, the manufacturing sector expanded 
rapidly from the 1950s. The number of garment factories increased from one 
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in 1951 to three by 1957. The processing and packaging of condiments 
commenced in 1958, the local brewery was established in 1961, and a dairy 
plant in 1964. The manufacturing sector continued to grow both in terms of 
the number of firms and size of output, and by 1973 its contribution to GDP 
surpassed that of sugar. Of the tradable sectors, manufacturing is now 
second to the tourism industry in terms of its contribution to GDP. It currently 
still makes a significant contribution to the economy through foreign exchange 
earnings, employment and output. 
3.1.1 Objectives of the Chapter 
The objective of this chapter is to highlight key features of the manufacturing 
sector which will form the background for the analysis to be undertaken in 
chapters 4,5 and 6. It will focus on its structure and performance, as well as 
on the level of protection granted by government to the sector over the years. 
It will also examine the support of the sector for trade liberalisation. The 
chapter will draw heavily on the results of a Trade Policy Survey (Appendix 
2) which was conducted on the sector in 1998 for the purpose of undertaking 
analysis for studies in this thesis. 
3.1.2 Structure of the Chapter 
This chapter is divided into six sections. Section 3.2 examines the structure 
and economic performance of the sector. Section 3.3 reviews the phases of 
protection offered to the sector and proposals for future protection in light of 
new international trade agreements. In section 3.4, a brief comparison is 
made of protection patterns in Barbados and protection patterns in developed 
trading partners. Using the results of the Trade Policy Survey, section 3.5 
examines the support of the manufacturing sector for WTO rules which are 
aimed at the liberalisation of trade. Section 3.6, the conclusion, highlights 
future challenges facing the manufacturing sector. 
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3.2 STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE OF THE SECTOR 
3.2.1 Structure of the Sector 
The most recent survey covering a range of economic indicators on the 
manufacturing sector is the Trade Policy Survey which was undertaken for the 
purpose of conducting the research in this thesis. The survey involved ALL 435 
manufactured enterprises registered with the Barbados Investment and 
Development Corporation (BIDC) at September 1998. Of that number, 152 
questionnaires were returned, but not all were complete with usable information. 
After further telephone interviews and factory visits, 117 completed 
questionnaires were available for analysis. The sample is representative of the 
population over the number of firms in manufacturing sub-sectors, as well as 
employment in each sub-sector (Appendix 3). Information from that survey on 
firms and employment by sectors is presented in Table 3.1. A copy of the 
questionnaire is at Appendix 2. 
TABLE 3.1 
TRADE POLICY SURVEY RESULTS: NUMBER OF 
COMPANIES RESPONDING AND EMPLOYMENT 
SECTORS COMPANIES EMPLOYMENT 
Food, beverage & Tobacco 35 1930 
Textiles, apparel & leather 12 493 
Wood, wooden products & fittings 12 274 
Paper products, print & publishing 10 569 
Chemicals & chemical products 11 260 
Fabricated metal products 12 405 
Handicraft 8 51 
Other Manufacturing 17 1210 
source: iraae roncy purvey 
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The survey data revealed that the largest sub-sector in the manufacturing 
industry in terms of employment is food, beverage and tobacco. The smallest 
industry is handicraft2. The average number of persons employed in each firm is 
44 persons. Some of the other features of the manufacturing sector revealed by 
results of the survey are: 
- 
The majority of manufacturing firms have been established within 
recent years. The average age of firms is 18 years. This is an 
indication that many firms were established during the period of 
protection and non-reciprocal trade preferences. 
- 
Most firms are locally owned and do not have any external 
association by way of joint venture, joint marketing or franchising. 
Only 36 of the 117 firms reporting have any form of external 
association by way of ownership or franchising. The major form of 
association is franchising. 
- 
Products for final consumer consumption are mainly produced. 
Some 77.7% of firms produce final consumer goods. These 
goods are mainly in the food and textile sectors. 
- 
The average capacity under-utilization is around 27%. The food, 
garment and miscellaneous categories have considerably higher 
levels of under-utilisation ranging from 35% to 75%. 
- 
Out of the 117 firms reporting, 79 are exporters, accounting for 
total export sales (CARICOM and extra-regional) of BDS$ 176 
million. This represented 42% of Barbados' domestic exports for 
1997. Food exports account for most of exports among firms in 
the survey, and indeed in Barbados total exports. The second 
largest exporting sector is printing material, followed by metal, 
textiles, building materials, and chemicals. This is largely in 
keeping with the pattern of Barbados' export data 
- 
however, 
textiles rank higher in the trade data. 
- 
Sixty or 51.2% of firms benefited from protection. These firms are 
mainly in the food sector. However, firm in the textiles and 
chemical industries also benefited heavily from protection. This is 
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in keeping with the pattern of protection outlined in section 3.3. 
The major form of protection from which firms benefited was 
quantitative restrictions on imports. 
Section 3.2.4 contains details on the importance of preferences to 
manufacturing firms. Appendix 3 shows a breakdown of firm and employment by 
sub-sectors. Table 3.2 further highlights some features of the sector. 
TABLE 3.2 
SELECTED FEATURES OF THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR! 
SUB- 
SECTOR 
SALES 
($M) 
EXPORTS 
($M) 
NO. OF FIRMS 
WITH 
EXTERNAL 
ASSOCIATION 
NO. OF FIRMS 
BENEFITING 
FROM 
PREFERENCES 
NO. OF 
FIRMS 
PROTECTED 
FOOD 327.5 51.7 15 26 21 
TEXTILES 38.4 12.0 5 6 8 
WOOD 
PRODUCTS 
14.1 11.6 4 4 8 
PRINTING 18.9 15.8 2 9 5 
CHEMICAL 89.3 27.7 4 10 6 
BUILDING 51.3 35.0 1 6 1 
METAL 68.4 14.4 4 7 5 
CRAFT 35.3 3.1 1 4 6 
a) Except for the number of firms protected, all data is taken from the Trade Policy Survey 
From the above information, it can be concluded that the manufacturing sector 
in Barbados is relatively small, and firms in the sector in terms of employment 
and export sales are also relatively small3. Firms have a high percentage of 
capacity under-utilisation and benefited from protection. Most firms are probably 
not benefiting from economies of scale. As a result of this firms, particularly in 
the food and garment industries, are vulnerable to import competition. Given the 
small size of the domestic market, these firms will have to consider exporting to 
survive. 
3.2.2 General Performance of the Sector 
Over the last two decades, the performance of the Barbados manufacturing 
sector has been erratic at best. Table 3.3 shows some of the major indicators of 
performance of the sector. Employment in the sector has been on the decline 
since the 1980s. At the end of 2000, employment had declined by a third of the 
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1980 level. Industrial production has been cyclical. However by 2000, production 
had fallen to its 1995 level. Despite the less than encouraging statistics on 
employment and production, the sector has shown signs of increased 
profitability. Indeed, profitability has increased some six fold during the period 
under review. The increased profitability of the sector is supported by increases 
in manufacturing exports. There has however, been some contraction of 
profitability and exports in 2000 when compared with 1999. 
TABLE 3.3 
INDICATORS OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE MANUFACTURING 
SECTOR 
YEAR PROFITABILITYa 
($000) 
MANUFACTURING 
EXPORTS ($000) 
INDEX OF 
INDUSTRIAL 
PRODUCTION 
EMPLOYMENT 
(000) 
1980 12,974 219,421 
- 
15.1 
1985 23,476 444,244 102.8 12.0 
1990 28,868 186,976 118.7 
- 
1995 25,548 281,251 110.0 11.7 
1996 40,473 356,447 115.9 10.0 
1997 35,217 349,220 125.9 10.7 
1998 40,898 322,011 128.2 10.8 
1999 74,090 340,891 119.9 10.3 
2000 63,655 327,042 110.7 10.2 
Source: Central Bank of Barbados Annual Statistical Digest 2001 
a) Deposits of the manufacturing sector with commercial banks 
3.2.3 Competitiveness of the Sector 
The competitiveness of the Barbados manufacturing sector has been debated 
since its decline in the early 1990s. Since 1990, a number of studies have 
assessed the competitiveness of the sector4. The studies identified a narrow 
range of items on which Barbados has a comparative advantage including 
processed fruit products, precious jewellery and travel goods. They also 
identified the general problems facing the sector as; high capital under- 
utilisation, lack of overseas association, shortage of working capital, 
obsolescence of machinery, lack of capital to retool, high taxation, inadequate 
factory management, lack of up-to-date technology and low productivity. 
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Data from the 1998 Trade Policy Survey shows, that most firm managers do 
not believe that they have a chance of competing on the domestic market if 
import restrictions were lowered. On the export side, most managers believe 
that they would not be competitive on the export market without preferential 
trade concessions. Firms were asked to indicate the factors limiting or 
preventing export expansion on a scale of 0 (no effect) to 10 (maximum 
effect). Table 3.4 shows a ranking of factors which impact on the export 
performance of firms. High tariffs in export markets do not feature prominently 
in the concerns of firms. Firms indicated that they are more challenged by 
production costs on the domestic market. This would suggest that firms do not 
expect to benefit greatly from the removal of tariff barriers through trade 
liberalisation. It is worth noting that most firms already benefit from substantial 
duty free market access offered through various one-way preferential trade 
agreements. 
TABLE 3.4 
FACTORS AFFECTING EXPORT PERFORMANCE OF FIRMS 
RANK FACTORS RANK FACTORS 
1 High operating costs 9 Lack of financing 
2 High transportation costs 10 High tariffs in export markets 
3 High labour costs 11 Exchange rate of the Barbados dollar 
4 High cost of raw materials 12 Inadequate marketing 
5 High Government taxes 13 Poor quality of raw materials 
6 Small scale of operation 14 In adequate research and development 
7 Non-tariff barriers in export markets 15 Outdated equipment 
8 In adequate employee skills 
Source: Trade Policy Survey 
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3.2.4 Preferential Agreements and Export Performance 
Since the EU GSP of 1971, Barbados has benefited from a number of 
preferential trade arrangements. Some indication of the importance of 
preferences to Barbados can be obtained from the percentage of preferential 
exports to total exports under each arrangement, and from the number of 
firms benefiting from the arrangements. 
In 1998, Barbados' preferential exports under non-reciprocal trade 
arrangements were 27% of total exports. In 1999 the value increased to 31 %. 
Preferences granted to Barbados' exports under the CARICOM arrangements 
amounted to BDS $186.5 million in 1998 or 47% of Barbados' exports and 
BDS $191.1 million in 1999 or 49% of exports for that year. When combined, 
one-way trade preferences and regional preferences amounted to 78% of 
exports in 1998. and 80.1 % in 1999 (Table 3.5). 
TABLE 3.5 
PREFERENTIAL EXPORT PERFORMANCE 1998-1999 (BDS $) 
YEAR TOTAL NON-CARICOM 
PREFERENTIAL EXPORTS 
TOTAL CARICOM 
PREFERENCESa 
% OF TOTAL 
EXPORTS 
1998 118,629,187 186,480,121 78% 
1999 123,959,933 191,180,763 80.1% 
Source: Certifying Authorities in Barbados 
- 
Customs and Excise Department and the BILU. 
a) These figures are for all preferential exports - both manufacturing and agricultural 
In terms of export earnings, CARICOM preferences are also the most important 
for Barbados followed by LOME, CBI, GSP, CARIBCAN, and the 
CARICOM\Venezuela Agreement (Figure 3.1). No exports were recorded under 
the CARICOM\Colombia Agreement during the period. 
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FIGURE 3.1 
LEVEL OF PREFERENTIAL EXPORTS (1999) 
PREFERENTIAL EXPORTS 
1 
I 
r 
t 
Table 3.6 summarises Barbados' export performance with each preferential 
area for 1999. The figures show that a relatively large amount of Barbados' 
exports to the Venezuelan, CARICOM, EU and Canadian markets received 
preferential access. The figures are a rudimentary indication of the 
percentage of prevailing export earnings which could be lost on each market if 
preferences were eliminated. 
TABLE 3.6 
BARBADOS' PREFERENTIAL AND NON-PREFERENTIAL EXPORTS FOR 
1999. (BDS $ MILLIONSI 
AGREEMENT PREFERENTIAL 
EXPORTS 
TOTAL EXPORTS PREFERENTIAL AS 
A% OF TOTAL 
EXPORTS TO EACH 
AREA 
CARICOM 191.6 195.3 98.2 
CARICOM/Venezuela 2.8 2.8 100 
CARICOM/Colombia 0 
. 
25 0 
GSP a 23.1 171.4 14.0 
LOME (Europe) 70.6 81.5 86.6 
CBI (USA) 24.0 76.3 30.1 
CARIBCAN (Canada) 6.7 12.1 55.3 
Source: Barbados L ustorns and Excise Department, B1ll(' and Barbados Statistical Service 
Figures are for the GSP schemes in which Barbados participates 
- 
USA, Canada, EU, New Zealand 
and Australia. 
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Data on the number of manufacturing firms benefiting from preferential trade 
arrangements can be obtained from the Trade Policy Survey (Appendix 2). 
Responses to the questionnaire used in the survey indicate that the average 
percentage of exports which receive preferences is 75.1%. Approximately 
74.6% of exporting firms receive a higher than average level of preference. 
The dollar value of domestic exports accounted for in the sample is BDS 
$176,645,538. The dollar value of preferential exports in the sample was BDS 
$139,441,971. This figure represented 78.9% of exports5. 
Table 3.7 provides a breakdown of the manufacturing firms in the survey 
which benefit from preferential trade arrangements. As shown in the table, the 
exports of 72 firms (out of 79 exporting firms) benefit from trade preferences. 
Most of those firms (69) receive preferences within CARICOM. In terms of 
exports to non-CARICOM countries, the exports of 49 firms receive 
preferences. 
The responses indicate, that 91.1% of exporting firms or 61.5% of all 
manufacturing firms would be negatively affected if ALL preferences were 
removed. If CARICOM preferences alone were removed, 87.34% of exporting 
firms or 58.9% of all manufacturing firms would be negatively affected. If 
preferences offered under LOME, CBI, CARIBCAN, GSP, 
CARICOMNenezuela and the CARICOM/Colombia Agreements were 
removed, 62.02% of exporting firms or 41.8% of all firms would be negatively 
affected. 
In terms of non-reciprocal trade arrangements, the greatest number of 
manufacturing firms would be negatively affected if CBI preferences were 
withdrawn, followed by GSP, LOME, CARIBCAN and preferences under the 
CARICOMNenezuela Agreement. As stated previously, there were no 
exports to Colombia under the preferential trade arrangement with that 
country. 
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TABLE 3.7 
NUMBER OF FIRMS BENEFITING FROM TRADE PREFERENCES6 
Total CARICOM Total Non- LOME CBI CARIBCAN GSP Venezuela 
CARICOM 
No. of 72 69 49 28 44 12 35 6 
Firms 
% of 91.1 87.34 62.02 35.4 55.6 15.18 44.30 7.59 
exporting 
firms (79) 
% of all 61.5 58.9 41.8 23.9 37.6 10.2 29.9 5.12 
firms 117 
SOURCE: Trade Policy Survey 
1. The number of firms will not sum to 117 as firms export under more than one arrangement. 
2. There were no exports under the CARICOM/Colombia Agreement 
3.3 PATTERNS OF PROTECTION IN BARBADOS 
The structure of protection in Barbados can be described with reference to 
three phases. In phase I, the historical phase, protection was granted to 
sectors as an incentive to encourage industrial and agricultural development. 
In phase II Barbados unilaterally took a decision to partially abandon its 
protection regime, and to adopt a more open trade policy. In phase III, the 
country undertook further liberalisation of its trade regime. On that occasion, 
the liberalisation programme was in keeping with Barbados' obligations under 
international trade agreements. 
3.3.1 Phase / Protection? 
As part of its development strategy of industrialisation through import 
substitution, Barbados readily offered protection to new and existing 
businesses throughout the 1970s and 1980s. By 1990, the range of products 
protected was extensive. Table 3.8 shows the number of product categories 
protected in Barbados at the 4,5 and 6 digit levels during each phase. The 
first column of the table contains the description of the 21 Sections contained 
in the Barbados Customs Tariff. Column 2 shows that at 1990, over 200 
product categories were protected. The most highly protected products were 
agricultural products, food items, textiles and clothing items, chemical 
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products (especially paints), metal products (mainly metal windows and 
doors), and paper products (mainly stationery)8. 
In this phase also, protection was reinforced by relatively high tariff rates 
under the common external tariff (CET) of CARICOM, and by stamp duties 
and consumption taxes on imported goods. In terms of the CET, the highest 
rates for agricultural goods were 45%, while manufactured goods generally 
carried rates of 20%, 30% and 45%. In some cases, for example in the case 
of precious stones, the rates were higher at 50% and 60 %. 
Milner (1994) noted that non-tariff barriers were a major source of anti-export 
bias in Barbados' trade policy regime during this period. The study also noted, 
that the manufacturing sub-sectors with high levels of effective protection 
were processed foods and drinks, garments, metal and glass products, and 
paper, printing and plastics. In terms of removing the anti-export bias, the 
study observed that in addition to the removal of quantitative restrictions, 
reforms would also have to be undertaken of the import tax regime. 
3.3.2 Phase 11 Protection9 
After the economic difficulties of the early 1990s (described in Chapter 2), 
government commenced a trade liberalisation programme aimed at correcting 
the anti-export bias in its trade policy regime. The programme which 
commenced in 1994, involved replacing quantitative restrictions on many 
items with a surtax. Restrictions on items which were no longer produced in 
Barbados were removed. As shown in column 3 of Table 3.8, the greatest 
number of quantitative restrictions remained on agricultural products and food 
items10. 
During this period also, the CET was in the process of being phased down in 
accordance with a CARICOM decision to reduce the rate structure to levels of 
between 0 to 20 %. 
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3.3.3 Phase 111 Protection" 
On April 1,2000, Barbados removed quantitative restrictions on all items 
except as allowed under WTO Agreements, and applied bound rates of tariffs 
allowed under its commitments to that organisation. This means that the 
major form of protection for domestic industries exists by way of the CET and 
bound tariffs. Table 3.9 shows the number of 4,5, and 6 digit product 
categories protected in the regime, and the rates which apply. Column 2 
shows the range for the CET. Column 3 contains that number of products on 
which bound rates apply. Column 4 shows the maximum rate which apply. 
The largest number of products protected is agricultural products. These 
products are protected by tariff rates well in excess of 100%. 
3.3.4 Proposed Protection under New Trade Arrangements 
In preparation for international trade negotiations to create the FTAA and to 
create partnership agreements with the EU12, government has devised lists of 
sensitive products to be used as a first position in international trade 
negotiations. Three lists were developed: 
i. a list of products which would be restricted for health and safety 
reasons and to protect public morals; 
ii. a list of products on which customs duties would be reduced on 
a phased basis; and 
iii. a list of products to be excluded from duty reductions because of 
their sensitive nature. 
All other products not contained in any of the lists would be traded freely 
immediately on the coming into force of the relevant agreement. 
The lists were compiled by a committee comprising officials of both the public 
and private sectors. It was undertaken against the background that developed 
countries participating in negotiations to create the FTAA and to revise the 
LOME Convention 
- 
namely the USA, Canada and the EU 
- 
are insisting that 
any new agreement must be WTO compatible (information on these 
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agreements is in Appendix 7)13. The mandate of the committee was to 
compile the three lists based on: 
1. WTO regulations that "substantially all trade" must be included in 
free trade. 
2. Economic considerations such as: 
- 
contribution of the industry to employment; 
- 
contribution to government revenue; 
- 
the vulnerability of the industry; and 
- 
the competitiveness of the industry. 
3. Such other considerations as the committee deemed relevant. 
WTO regulations under Article XXIV are unclear. The "substantially all trade" 
rule was interpreted to mean that no sector should be excluded, and that at 
least 90% of trade should be involved. The contributions of the industry to 
employment and government revenue are national interest factors. The 
vulnerability of the industry was measured through imports into the industry 
from both CARICOM and non-CARICOM sources. The higher the level of 
import penetration, the more vulnerable the industry was regarded to be. The 
competitiveness of the industry was measured by export performance. Other 
considerations included the backward and forward linkages between firms in 
the industry and other firms inside or outside of the particular industry. No 
formal statistics existed for the latter variable. On this issue, the role of 
technocrats in arguing for protection of specific industries was particularly 
important. 
During the course of consultations with the private sector, the issue of 
"unequal protection" was raised. It was argued by the manufacturing sector 
that some consideration should be given to their concern that if trade in 
certain sectors was liberalised while high protection existed in those same 
sectors in the markets of major trading partners, then access to the home 
market would be unjustly easier than market access on the export market. 
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Sectors such as agriculture and garments which are highly protected in the 
markets of the industrialised world through subsidies, prohibition and other 
forms of tariff and non-tariff barriers should also be protected in the local 
market, so as not to place local sectors at a considerable disadvantage. 
Table 3.10 contains a summary of the list of products categories selected by 
government. The table shows the number of 4,5, and 6 digit product 
categories identified for restrictions for health and safety reasons to protect 
public morals, to be included in the agreements on a phased basis, and to be 
excluded from the agreement by reason of their sensitive nature. 
In column 2 of Table 3.10 is the list of products categories to be protected in 
each sector for health or safety reasons or to protect public morals. Column 3 
contains the number of product categories for phased reduction in duty. 
Finally, column 4 shows the number of product categories to be excluded 
from the agreements. Regarding health and safety restrictions, the table 
shows that these restrictions are mainly to be retained on agricultural products 
and chemicals. The list of products for phased reduction in duty is more 
diverse. The list includes agricultural and other products which attract high 
rates of duties for revenue purposes. In terms of exclusions, some 183 
product categories have been identified for exclusion from the new 
agreements14. 
3.3.5 Compatibility with WTO Rules 
In terms of compatibility with WTO rules, only the list of products for exclusion 
(products on which MFN rates apply) would be required to meet the 
"substantially all trade rule" test. WTO rules do allow for restrictions based on 
health, safety and to protect public morals. If challenged, the country must 
however be in a position to show legitimate cause for the restriction. The rules 
also allow for products to be placed on a phased list. As noted in Appendix 7, 
the rules require that the phase-in period be no longer than 10 years unless 
good a longer period is sanctioned by that organisation. 
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As far as meeting the requirements of the disputed "substantially all trade" 
rule, the exercise partially fulfilled the perceived requirements of this rule, the 
interpretation of which is still unclear. No sector has been totally excluded 
from liberalization, and therefore the exclusion list should pass the "quality 
test" (see Appendix 7). Table 3.11 shows the value of trade in these products 
during the 1995 to 1999 for both EU and FTAA countries. Based on the 
statistics less than 10% of trade would be excluded in the case of the EU. In 
the case of the FTAA the value of trade excluded would be greater than 10%. 
It appears therefore that the list would pass the "quantity test" in the case of 
the EU but not in the case of the FTAA. This is in keeping with the view of 
Stevens et al (1998), who suggest that if the most sensitive products of 
CARICOM and the Dominican Republic were excluded from a new 
partnership arrangement with Europe, some 95% of trade would be 
unaffected15. 
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TABLE 3.8 
SYNOPSIS OF PROTECTION IN BARBADOS 
HS SECTIONS 1990 PROTECTION 1994 PROTECTION ADJUSTMENTS 
(4,5 &6 digit level) Restricted Surtax 
1. Live animals and 11 11 0 
animal products 
2. Vegetable products 22 12 1 
3. Animal or vegetable 3 10 1 
oils and fats etc 
4. Prepared foodstuffs; 28 9 5 
beverage, spints and 
5. Mineral products 6 0 3 
6. Products of the 17 5 8 
chemical or allied 
7. Plastics, rubber, and 9 1 2 
articles thereof 
8. Raw hides and skins, 1 0 1 
leather, furskins etc. 
9. Wood and Articles 3 0 0 
of wood etc. 
10. Pulp of wood or 12 0 10 
other fibrous cellulosic 
11. Textiles and textile 57 1 30 
articles 
12. Footwear, headgear, 2 0 0 
umbrellas etc. 
13. Articles of stone, 0 0 0 
plaster, cement etc. 
14. Natural or cultural 1 0 0 
pearls etc. 
15. Base metal and 13 3 3 
articles thereof 
16. Machinery and 10 0 0 
mechanical appliances 
17. Vehicles, aircraft 8 5 5 
etc. 
18. Optical equipment 5 0 0 
etc 
19. Arms, ammunition 4 4 0 
and parts 
20. Misc goods 5 2 2 
21. Works of art 2 0 0 
Sources: Barbados Government files and various Acts and Regulations. 
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TABLE 3.9 
IMPLEMENTATION OF WTO RATES OF DUTY 
HS SECTIONS CET RATE RANGE NUMBER OF SENSITIVE WTO BOUND TARIFF 
PRODUCTS (APPLIED AT APRIL 
(4,5 &6 digit level) 1st 2000 
1. Live animals and 5%-45% 48 207% 
animal products 
2. Vegetable products 5%-40% 32 243% 
3. Animal or vegetable 5%-40% 2 194% 
oils and fats etc. 
4. Prepared foodstuffs; 5%-40% 41 210% 
beverage, spirits and 
vinegar 
5. Mineral products 5%-25% 0 CET RATE 
6. Products of the 5%-25% 2 82% 
chemical or allied 
industries 
7. Plastics, rubber and 5%-25% 0 CET RATE 
articles thereof 
8. Raw hides and skins 5%-25% 0 CET RATE 
leather, furskms etc. 
9. Wood and articles of 5%-25% 0 CET RATE 
wood etc. 
10. Pulp of wood or other 5%-25% 0 CET RATE 
fibrous cellulosic material 
11. Textiles and textile 5%-25% 2 117% 
articles 
12. Footwear, headgear, 5%-25% 0 CET RATE 
umbrellas etc. 
13. Articles of stone, 5%-25% 0 CET RATE 
plaster, cement etc. 
14. Natural or cultural 5%-60% 0 CET RATE 
pearls etc. 
15. Base metal and 5%-25% 0 CET RATE 
articles thereof 
16. Machinery and 5%-45% 0 CET RATE 
mechanical appliances 
etc. 
17. Vehicles, aircraft etc. 5%-45% 0 CET RATE 
18. Optical, photographic 5%-60% 0 CET RATE 
and other apparatus 
19. Arms, ammunition 5%-70% 0 CET RATE 
and parts 
20. Misc. goods 5%-25% 0 CET RATE 
21. Works of art 25% 0 CET RATE 
Sources: Barbados Customs Tariff Amendment Order 2000 and 1998; and Barbados Market 
Access Schedules for Goods submitted to the WTO (1994a) 
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TABLE 3.10 
PROPOSED PATTERN OF PROTECTION 
(NUMBER OF 4.5. AND 6 DIGIT PRODUCTS) 
HS SECTIONS HEALTH & SAFETY PRODUCTS FOR PHASED PRODUCTS FOR 
RESTRICTIONS REDUCTION IN DUTY EXCLUSION 
1. Live animals and animal 13 3 14 
products 
2. Vegetable products 15 27 15 
3. Animal or vegetable oils 0 0 10 
and fats etc. 
4. Prepared foodstuffs; 0 5 47 
beverage, spirits and vinegar 
5. Mineral products 0 7 18 
6. Products of the chemical 14 17 10 
or allied industries 
7. Plastics, rubber and 1 7 1 
articles thereof 
8. Raw hides and skins 0 2 1 
leather, furskins etc. 
9. Wood and articles of 0 6 1 
wood etc. 
10. Pulp of wood or other 0 14 6 
fibrous cellulosic material 
11. Textiles and textile 0 13 28 
articles 
12. Footwear, headgear, 0 2 0 
umbrellas etc. 
13. Articles of stone, plaster, 0 8 1 
cement etc. 
14. Natural or cultural pearls 0 0 8 
etc. 
15. Base metal and articles 2 21 2 
thereof 
16. Machinery and 0 15 2 
mechanical appliances etc. 
17. Vehicles, aircraft etc. 0 6 6 
18. Optical, photographic 0 3 7 
and other apparatus 
19. Arms, ammunition and 3 0 0 
parts 
20. Misc. goods 2 6 6 
21. Works of art 0 2 0 
Source: Barbados Government files. 
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TABLE 3.11 
VALUE OF PRODUCTS ON BARBADOS' EXCLUSION LIST AS A 
PERCENTAGE, nF FAT AND FTAA TRADE 1995 
-1999 
YEAR PERCENTAGE OF 
DOMESTIC EXPORTS 
(TO AREA) 
PERCENTAGE OF 
IMPORTS 
(FROM AREA) 
PERCENTAGE OF 
OVERALL TRADE 
(IMPORTS PLUS 
EXPORTS) 
TRADE WITH EU COUNTRIES 
1995 8.3 4.1 5.3 
1996 7.6 4.1 5.2 
1997 7.8 3.9 5.0 
1998 9.8 5.0 6.9 
1999 10.4 4.9 6.2 
TRADE WITH FT AA COUNTRIES 
1995 29.4 16.8 19.6 
1996 27.0 16.8 19.4 
1997 27.7 16.0 18.6 
1998 34.7 20.2 23.3 
1999 36.9 19.9 23.2 
Source: Barbados Statistical Service 
3.4 COMPARISON OF PROTECTION PATTERNS 
This section briefly examines similarities and differences between the pattern 
of protection in Barbados and its major developed trading partners. 
As highlighted earlier, protection can take many forms including tariffs, 
quantitative restrictions and subsidies. Industries can also be protected 
through anti-dumping and countervailing action, through technical barriers to 
trade and through sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures. This list is of course 
not exhaustive, as countries can implement trade control measures in the 
ordinary course of trade such as quality control inspections, to frustrate the 
export efforts of partner countries. 
The traditional forms of protection tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and anti- 
dumping and countervailing duties are obvious or are easier to detect and to 
quantify. Use of the other measures highlighted above is more difficult to 
detect. 
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Tariff rates can be used to make comparisons between Barbados and its 
trading partners in the developed world, as they are more readily available. 
However, several caveats should be made regarding the use of tariffs for this 
purpose. 
Firstly, effective tariff rates which take into account tariffs on industry inputs as 
well as tariffs on industry outputs would provide a better indication of the level 
of protection available to industries. However, requests for protection are 
usually based on nominal tariffs. An analysis of such tariffs is therefore useful. 
Secondly, tariff rates do not always reflect the sensitivity of an industry, as 
tariffs may be substituted with other forms of protection. There may not be a 
one to one correspondence between the level of a tariff, and the use of other 
forms of protection. For example, Table 3.12 shows a summary of the 
products on which anti-dumping and subsidies action have been initiated or 
taken by the EU, USA and Canada during 1999. The products which are 
most consistently investigated for anti-dumping and countervailing action by 
the three countries are steel products (Chapters 72 and 73 of the Customs 
Tariff)16. This would seem to indicate that such items are regarded as being 
sensitive by these countries. 
TABLE 3.12 
MAJOR PRODUCTS INVESTIGATED FOR 
ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES 
EU USA CANADA 
Television picture tube Carbon steel wire rod Cold rolled steel sheets 
Polyethylene terephtalate Other steel products Corrosion resistant steel 
Polyester staple fibers Oil country tubular goods Hot rolled carbon steel 
Cotton-type bed linen Silicon metal plates 
Stainless steel wire Cast iron fittings 
Steel pipes and cables Ferrosilicon 
Magnetic disks Concentrated orange juice 
Personal fax machines Fresh cut flowers 
source: country nonticanons to the WIU on Anti-dumping and Countervailing action. 1995 
- 
1999 
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However, tariffs applied on steel and articles of steel are lower than the 
average applied on all manufactured goods as shown in Table 3.13. This is an 
indication that there may not always a one-to-one correspondence between 
tariff protection and non-tariff protection. Countries may use different forms of 
protection as substitutes, rather than complements. 
TABLE 3.13 
COMPARISON OF AVERAGE(*) TARIFF RATES FOR SELECTED 
COMMODITIES IN MAJOR TRADING PARTNERS (1999) 
SECTOR AVG. TARIFF 
- 
EU AVG. TARIFF 
- 
USA AVG. TARIFF 
- 
CANADA 
Iron and steel 2.4(2.6) 2.7(2.9) 2.3(3.7) 
Articles of iron and 3.1 (3.3) 2.4 (3.2) 3.8 (5.5) 
steel 
All manufactured 4.1(5.2) 4.2 (6.3) 4.5 (8.6) 
goods 
Source: Calculated from the WTO Integrated Data Base Release 4 (June 2000) 
(a). Arithmetic tariff rates are in italics. Calculated as sum of duties divided by the total number of 
tariff lines. Dutiable tariff rates are in brackets. Calculated as sum of duties divided by number of lines 
with duties higher than zero. Trade weighed tariffs were not available in the data base. 
The third point which must be made regarding tariff levels in Barbados and 
developing countries is that the Barbados rate is determined at a regional 
level by CARICOM. The rates therefore reflect the overall interests of 
CARICOM member states and not solely the interest of Barbados. Therefore, 
tariffs maybe high on some products which Barbados do not consider to be 
sensitive. 
3.4.1 Correlation between Tariff Rates 
On average, Barbados' tariff rates in 1999 were higher than those of 
developed countries. Across all sectors (agriculture and manufacturing), 
Barbados' average tariff rate was 14.7%. For Canada the average rate was 
8.8%, for the USA 7.1 %, and for the EU the rate was the lowest among the 
sample of countries at 6.3 %". 
Table 3.14 shows the correlation between average level for these countries at 
the two digit level. The matrix shows that there was low correlation between 
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the average tariff levels in Barbados and the developed countries in the 
sample period. The highest correlation value between Barbados and the 
selected countries is 0.169 with the EU. Surprisingly, the correlation between 
tariff levels in Barbados (and CARICOM) and the USA is not significantly 
different from zero. Interestingly, the matrix shows that there is not a high 
correlation between the average tariff rates of the USA, EU and Canada. The 
highest correlation exist between Canada and the EU (0.569). Given the 
involvement of these countries in negotiations to reduce tariffs under the 
GATT, it is surprising that the correlation is not higher. 
TABLE 3.14 
CORRELATION OF 1999 TARIFF RATES 
FOR SE LECTED COUNTRIES 
BAR US EU CAN 
BAR 1.000 
US 
-. 
006 1.000 
EU 
. 
169 
. 
299 1.000 
CAN 
. 
087 
. 
140 
. 
569 1.000 
Source: Calculated from the WTO Integrated Data Base 
BAR = Barbados; CAN = Canada 
US = United States of America; EU = European Union 
Table 3.15 shows the 1999 range of tariff rates for Barbados and selected 
developed countries under discussion. The table indicates that all countries 
apply relatively high tariff rates to agricultural and food items (HS Sections 1- 
4). The range of rates for prepared foodstuffs is higher in developed countries 
than Barbados. The rates are particularly high for the USA (350%), followed 
by Canada (245%). Barbados' highest tariff rates applied at April 1st 2000 are 
not as high (Table 3.9). Relatively high rates are also applied by developed 
countries in the areas of textiles and footwear, indicating that these items are 
also sensitive. The US applied the highest rates for manufactured goods on 
these items. 
Barbados charged higher than average tariff rates for natural and cultural 
pearls, optical, photographic and other apparatus, and arms and ammunitions 
principally for revenue purposes as these items are not produced in Barbados 
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(HS Sections 14,18 and 19). These however do not carry high rates in the 
case of the USA, EU nor Canada. 
The main areas of similarities are in respect of agricultural food products and 
textiles. The similarities go beyond high tariff rates, as Barbados maintained 
quantitative restrictions on agricultural and food items during 1999. 
Developed countries on the other hand, invoked the special safeguard 
mechanism under the WTO Agreement on agriculture to apply higher duties 
than those listed in Table 3.9 to protect that sector. In these countries that 
sector also benefits from production subsidies not available to firms in 
Barbados given the lack of financial resources. 
Textiles are also similar. Barbados maintained a surtax on garments during 
1999, as well as quantitative restrictions on some items. Developed countries 
on the other hand, also maintained quantitative restrictions on garment and 
textiles during 1999, as provided for under the WTO phase-out period for 
restrictions applied under the Multi-Fiber Arrangement. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that apart from similarities in the case of 
agricultural products, food items, textiles and garments, all of which carry 
relatively high rates of tariffs in all countries reviewed, a high correlation does 
not exist between the structure of the Barbados tariff, and those of the major 
developed countries 
- 
US, EU and Canada. The lack of a strong relationship 
maybe explained, in part, by differences in production structures and the state 
of development of Barbados vis-a 
-vis its developed country trading partners. 
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TABLE 3.15 
AVERAGE TARIFF RATE RANGE FOR BARBADOS AND MAJOR 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
HS SECTIONS BARBADOS EU USA CANADA 
TARIFF RATE RANGE TARIFF RATE RANGE TARIFF RATE RANGE TARIFF RATE RANGE 
(%) (%) (%) (%) 
1. Live animals and 5-45 0.3 
- 
23 0.5-27.2 2-27 
animal products 
2. Vegetable products 5-40 0.3-21.7 0.5-168.6 2- 100 
3. Animal or vegetable 5-40 0.3-17.5 2.5-19.2 2.5 
- 
12 
oils etc. 
4. Prepared foodstuffs etc 5-40 0.3-81.9 0.8 
- 
350 2- 245 
5. Mineral products 5-25 0.7-8 2.8-7 2.5-12.5 
6. Products of the 5-25 0.3 
- 
14 0.1-14.5 2- 12.5 
chemical and allied 
7. Plastics, rubber and 5-25 2- 11.3 1.9 
- 
14 3- 15.5 
articles thereof 
8. Raw hides and skins, 5-25 1.7-9.7 1.5 
- 
20 2- 15.5 
leather, furskins etc. 
9. Wood and articles of 5-25 1.7 
- 
10 1.2 
- 
18 2.5-11.0 
wood 
10. Pulp of wood or other 5-25 1.5-8 0.2-8.5 2-14 
fibrous materials etc. 
11. Textiles and textile 5-25 0.2 
- 
13 0.4-33.3 3.5-23.5 
articles 
12. Footwear, headgear, 5-25 1.7 
- 
17 2.5 
- 
48 2.5-20.5 
etc. 
13. Articles of stone, 5-25 1- 12 0.7 
- 
38 2.5-15.5 
plaster, cement etc. 
14. Natural or cultural, 5-60 2-4 2.1 
- 
13.5 2.5-8.5 
earl etc. 
15. Base metal and 5-25 1.3 
- 
10 0.2 
- 
15 2-11 
articles thereof 
16. Machinery and 5-45 0.4 
- 
14 0.5 
- 
15 2-11 
mechanical appliances 
17. Vehicles, aircraft etc. 5-45 1.7 
- 
22 0.4 
- 
25 2.5 
- 
25 
18. Optical, photographic 5-60 0.8-6.7 0.7 
- 
16 2-14 
etc 
19. Arms, ammunition 5-70 1.7-3.2 2.6-5.7 2-7.5 
etc 
20. Misc. goods 5-25 1.7-7.7 1.8 
- 
32 2.5 
- 
18 
21. Works of art 25 0 0 5.5 
-7 
Source: WTO integrated data base. Release 4.0. June 2000 
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3.5 SUPPORT FOR TRADE LIBERALISATION 
This section examines the support of the manufacturing sector for trade 
liberalisation as required by the WTO rules. Data referred to in this section 
was obtained from the Trade Policy Survey introduced in section 3.2. 
Firms were asked to provide positions on the three WTO principles, on fourteen 
agreements and on three issues being discussed in the WTO on which 
negotiations will be undertaken. A copy of the questionnaire issued to firms is at 
Appendix 2. Table 3.16 provides a summary of the percentage responses either 
in favour, against or no position. The following discussion is based mainly on 
that summary. 
As depicted by Figure 3.2, of the total respondents, 37.5% strongly agreed with 
WTO principles, agreements and specific provisions in new areas 
- 
competition 
policy, environment and investment. Approximately 21.8% agreed, while 17.3% 
and 13.3% respectively disagreed and strongly disagreed. Some 9.8% 
expressed no opinion on these issues. 
In general, firms expressed an opinion either in favour of or against WTO 
principles, rules and issues. The highest level of "no position" (19.6%) relates to 
questions on the use of standards to restrict trade, the use of sanitary and 
phyto-sanitary measures to restrict trade, and to the abandonment of local 
content requirements in the granting of incentives. It is not surprising that firms 
would want to reserve their position on the use of such non-tariff measures, as 
they may wish to call on government to use these at some point in time. In 
relation to the questions on solving trade disputes, all firms expressed opinions 
either in favour or against. Firms are in favour of approaching the WTO to settle 
trade disputes, and accepting WTO decisions as final. 
3.5.1 Support for WTO Principles 
Regarding WTO principles only, the majority of firms do not support the three 
basic WTO principles of non-discrimination, national treatment and transparency 
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(Figure 3.3). Some 54.7% of firms disagree with the MFN principle. Firms are 
especially against that principle of transparency and national treatment. In 
relation to national treatment, 60.6% of firms are not in support of this principle, 
while in the case of transparency 70.9% of firms are against the principle. 
3.5.2 Support for WTO Agreements 
Approximately 40.2% of firms strongly agree with WTO Agreements, and 24.5% 
agree. Only 14.0% and 11.5% respectively disagree and strongly disagree with 
the current agreements (Figure 3.4). 
Market access provisions form the basis for liberalisation within the WTO. The 
responses reveal that firms are not in favour of the removal of quantitative 
restrictions. They however overwhelmingly agree that if QRs are removed, they 
should be replaced with tariffs which are high enough to protect local production. 
In terms of numbers (Table 3.16), 54.7% are against the removal of QRs, while 
70% are for the use of high tariffs. By a small margin (7%), firms are in favour of 
the reductions in the tariff over time. This is somewhat of an anomaly, as it 
would be expected that firms which are against the elimination of QRs would 
oppose reductions in bound tariffs. Since most manufactured goods had already 
been removed from license under the stabilisation programme referred to 
earlier, the answers suggest that firms generally may wish to ensure that 
measures to protect them from import competition are available. 
Firms overwhelmingly support the inclusion of a safeguard clause in WTO 
disciplines (88.8%). However, they do not support the request that tariffs rather 
than non-tariff barriers be used to provide protection, nor do they support the 
temporary nature of safeguard action. In both cases 59.8 % are against these 
provisions. 
The majority of firms support recourse to anti-dumping procedures (94%), as 
well as the proof of injury requirement (49%) and consultation before action is 
taken (61.5%). This is similar to the response on the use of countervailing duties 
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in the case of subsidies (84.6%), proof of injury (49.0%) and consultation before 
action (55.5%). 
Firms overwhelmingly support the harmonisation of customs rules (89.7%), 
apparently not seeing this as an instrument of liberalisation. However, in relation 
to the rules of origin agreement a majority of firms (70.9%) do not favour the use 
of these rules as an instrument of protection. Somewhat surprisingly, a majority 
of firms (51.2%) support predictability and transparency in issuing licenses. 
The responses of firms to the agreements on technical barriers to trade and 
sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures are similar. The majority of firms (99.1%) 
favour the imposition of such measures on imports. None of the firms disagree 
with recourse to such measures. A much smaller percentage of firms (43.5%) 
agree that such measures should not be strictly used as trade control measures. 
In relation to the other agreements, the majority of firms agree with the 
establishment of a machinery for pre-shipment inspection (82%); with 
abandonment of local content requirements under the TRIMS agreement (41 %); 
with the protection of local and foreign intellectual property under the TRIPS 
agreement (94%) in both cases; with the settlement of disputes through the 
WTO system, and full acceptance of WTO decisions (93.1 %) and (78.6%) 
respectively; and with the temporary non-imposition of tariffs on electronic 
commerce (70%). 
3.5.3 Support for New Issues 
Considering all new issues, 42.0% of firms agree with WTO involvement with 
the new issues 
- 
competition policy, environment and investment. However, 
44.5% disagree, while 12.5% have no opinion. This shows that as a whole, 
there is some support for the new issues the majority of firms however disagree 
with the specific issues raised (Figure 3.5). 
Approximately (47.3%) of firms do not support a moratorium on restricting 
imports for environmental reasons until rules are developed within the WTO. 
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Regarding anti-competitive practices the majority of firms expressing an opinion 
(47.8%) favour the implementation of anti-competitive laws. On the issue of 
investment, the majority of firms (45.2%) are against MFN rules on investment 
concessions (Table 3.16). 
3.5.4 WTO Rules and Firm Characteristics 
The responses of firms categorised according to a number of profiles were also 
undertaken. These profiles included the following: 
i. production protected and production not protected; 
ii. exporter and non-exporter; 
iii. export competitiveness optimism and export competitiveness 
pessimism; 
iv. external association and non-association; 
v. small firm (less than the average of 44 workers), and large firm 
(greater than 44 workers); and 
vi. food production and non-food production. 
In general, the majority of firms in each category do not support WTO principles. 
Firms with external association and firms which are optimistic about export 
competitiveness however strongly support the principle of non-discrimination. 
These responses are expected. Firms with those characteristics would desire to 
keep markets opened for their exports, as noted in Helleiner (1977a) and Milner 
and Yoffie (1989). When categorised according to exporter or non-exporter, the 
majority of firms in both categories reject the non-discrimination principle. 
Regarding WTO provisions, the majority of firms in all categories also support or 
strongly support provisions on the use of bound tariffs and contingent protection 
- 
safeguard, anti-dumping action and the application of countervailing duties. 
They also agree with the use of technical standards and sanitary and phyto- 
sanitary measures in trade. However, only the majority of firms with external 
association disagree with the use of bound tariffs and anti-dumping action. The 
latter responses are in keeping with the literature that such firms would favour 
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free trade. The only provision which the majority of firms in all sectors are 
strongly against is that which calls for the rules of origin not to be more stringent 
than is necessary to identify the origin of goods. Firms apparently fear breaches 
in rules of origin criteria, and would prefer more flexibility in this area. The 
provisions which all firms in all categories strongly support are those on 
consultation before taking anti-dumping action, use of countervailing duties, 
transparent import licensing procedures, and no restrictions on e-commerce. 
The strong support for transparency in import licensing procedures is not in 
keeping with the tendency of firms to support measures which could be 
protectionist. 
In the case of new issues, the majority of firms in all categories disagree with a 
view that countries should refrain from restricting the importation of goods for 
environmental reasons, until WTO rules are developed in this area. This result is 
in keeping with the support by firms for provisions which can be used for 
protection purposes. Regarding the view that anti-competitive practices should 
be outlawed in Barbados, as well as the view of MFN treatment for investors, 
there are mixed results. In all categories, the majority of firms either strongly 
agree or strongly disagree with these provisions. 
In keeping with the literature, firms which did not benefit from protection, which 
export, which are optimistic about their export competitiveness, and which have 
a strong external association, agree with the provisions. Also in keeping with 
what would be expected, firms which benefited from protection and do not 
export, are against the provisions. A surprising result is that the majority of firms 
which are pessimistic about their export competitiveness support those two 
provisions. These firms may not view these provisions as impacting on their 
operations at home. 
A comparison of food and non-food categories reveals that the majority of firms 
in each sector are generally in unison in agreeing or disagreeing with WTO rules 
and provisions except in six areas namely; the elimination of import restrictions, 
reductions in tariffs overtime, proof of injury in anti-dumping and subsidy cases, 
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the introduction of competition policy laws, and MFN treatment for investors. In 
all cases, the food sector oppose those elements of liberalisation, while the non- 
food sector support the elements. The difference in responses of the two sectors 
is not totally surprising, given the fact that the food sector has, over the years, 
been the most protected sector in Barbados, while the non-food sector has been 
undergoing phased of liberalisation since the early 1990s. 
3.5.5 Summary 
Overall, firms appear to resign themselves to the fact that trade liberalisation is a 
reality, as they either agree or strongly favour most of the provisions and issues 
raised in the survey18. Of the 32 questions asked on WTO provisions or possible 
provisions, firms (in the majority) showed support for 23 or 71.8%. 
While not favouring the process as a whole as enunciated in WTO principles, 
they are willing to support those principles as embodied in agreements such as 
transparency in import licensing, protection of intellectual property for both local 
and overseas firms, and preshipment inspection. By strongly favouring 
provisions on safeguards, dumping, and subsidies they are favouring 
contingent protection. Also they are in agreement with the use of technical 
standards, and sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures which seem to suggest 
that they support the use of non-tariff barriers where possible. The areas which 
are of concern to manufacturers are: 
- 
WTO principles of MFN treatment, national treatment and 
transparency; 
- 
the elimination of quantitative restrictions; 
- 
the use of tariffs only to protect local production; 
- 
the temporary nature of safeguard action; 
- 
the provision that rules of origin should not be a trade barrier; 
- 
calls for environmental standards not to be used to restrict trade 
until a multilateral agreement is reached; and 
- 
MFN treatment for investors. 
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Again, those areas reveal a hesitation on the part of manufacturers in supporting 
key elements of liberalisation. 
In terms of the analysis according to the characteristics of firms, the most 
important outcome is that while on the whole firms disagree with WTO 
principles, the majority of firms with external association and the majority of firms 
which are optimistic about their competitiveness support the principles. The 
results for all other classifications were generally in keeping with the overall 
findings for the sector. 
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FIGURE 3.4 
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TABLE 3.16 
SUMMARY OF SURVEY RESULTS 
(PERCENTAGE OF RESPONSES) 
FOR AGAINST NO POSITION 
WTO PRINCIPLES 
Q19 MFN Treatment 34.1 54.7 11.1 
Q20 National Treatment 29.0 60.6 10.2 
Q21 Transparency 17.9 70.9 11.1 
WTO AGREEMENTS 
(A) MARKET ACCESS 
Q22 Elimination of QRs 32.1 54.7 13.6 
Q23 Replacement by 
tariffs 70.0 21.3 8.5 
Q24 Tariff reduction 
overtime 47.0 40.0 12.8 
(B) SAFEGUARD 
ACTION 
Q25 Recourse to 
safeguard action 88.8 5.9 5.1 
Q26 Safeguard 
protection by tariffs 29.0 59.8 11.1 
Q27 Safeguard action 
only temporary 21.3 59.8 18.8 
(C) ANTI-DUMPING 
ACTION 
Q28 Recourse to anti- 
dumping action 94.0 2.5 3.4 
Q29 Proof of injury 
before action 49.0 35.8 14.5 
Q30 Consultation before 
action 61.5 27.3 11.1 
NOTE: Due to rounding errors percentages may not sum to 100 
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TABLE 3.16 (CONT') 
SUMMARY OF SURVEY RESULTS 
(PERCENTAGE OF RESPONSES) 
FOR AGAINST NO POSITION 
(D) SUBSIDIES 
Q31 Recourse to 
countervailing 
duties 84.6 10.2 5.1 
Q32 Proof of injury 
before action 49.0 35.8 14.5 
Q33 Consultation before 
action 55.5 28.2 16.2 
(E) CUSTOMS 
VALUATION 
Q34 Harmonisation of 
Customs Procedures 89.7 2.5 7.6 
(F) RULES OF ORIGIN 
Q35 Origin criteria not 
to be trade barrier 24.7 70.9 4.2 
(G) IMPORT 
LICENSING 
Q36 Import licensing 
procedures to be 
predictable and 
transparent 51.2 41.2 7.6 
(H) TECHNICAL 
BARRIERS TO 
TRADE 
Q37 Recourse to technical 
regulations to ensure 
imports are of acceptable 
standard 99.1 0 0.8 
Q38 Technical regulations 
not to be a trade control 
measure 43.5 36.7 19.6 
NOTE: Due to rounding errors percentages may not sum to 100 
79 
Chapter 3 Barbados' Manufacturing Sector 
TABLE 3.16 (CONT') 
SUMMARY OF SURVEY RESULTS 
(PERCENTAGE OF RESPONSES) 
FOR AGAINST NO POSITION 
(I) SANITARY AND 
PHYTO-SANITARY 
MEASURES 
Q39 Recourse to measures 
to protect human, animal 
and plant life and health. 99.1 0 0.8 
Q40 Measures not to be a 
trade control measure. 43.5 36.7 19.6 
(J) PRESHIPMENT 
INSPECTION 
Q41 Establishment of a 
machinery to allow 
for inspection of 
goods before 
exporting 
- 
if 
required. 82.0 5.1 12.8 
(K) TRADE RELATED 
INVESTMENT 
MEASURES 
Q42 Use of local inputs 
not to be basis for 
deciding 
concessions 41.8 38.4 19.6 
(L) TRADE RELATED 
INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Q43 Protection of 
intellectual 
property of local 
companies 94.0 0.8 5.1 
Q44 Protection 
intellectual 
property of foreign 
companies 94.8 0.8 5.1 
NOTE: Due to rounding errors percentages may not sum to 100 
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TABLE 3.16 (CONT') 
SUMMARY OF SURVEY RESULTS 
(PERCENTAGE OF RESPONSES) 
FOR AGAINST NO POSITION 
(M) SETTLEMENT OF 
DISPUTES 
Q45 No unilateral action 
to be taken in 
disputes 93.1 6.8 0 
Q46 Full acceptance of 
WTO decisions in 
disputes 78.6 21.3 0 
(N) ELECTRONIC 
COMMERCE 
Q47 Tariffs not to be 
levied on 
E-Commerce 70.0 12.8 17.0 
WTO ISSUES 
(0) ENVIRONMENT 
POLICY 
Q48 No trade control 
measures in the 
area of 
environment to be 
enforced until 
WTO rules are 
developed 40.6 47.3 11.9 
(P) COMPETITION 
POLICY 
Q49 Anti-competitive or 
restrictive 
businesses 
practices should be 
eliminated 47.8 41.8 10.2 
(Q) INVESTMENT 
POLICY 
Q50 Foreign investors 
should be given 
MFN treatment. 44.4 45.2 10.2 
NOTE: Due to rounding errors percentages may not sum to 100 
81 
Chapter 3 Barbados' Manufacturing Sector 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
Barbados managed to avoid severe economic decline in the early 1990s without 
any marked structural adjustment in the economy. The new challenges are to 
successfully integrate the economy into the new global economy. In this context, 
there are import and export competitiveness challenges. 
Regarding import competitiveness challenges, WTO rules limit the options 
available to governments to restrict imports of both goods and services in the 
local economy. However, the capability of local businesses to respond to the 
import competition challenge is uncertain. The agricultural sector was heavily 
protected through import restrictions. This sector is now protected through the 
high tariff rates allowed by the WTO. In terms of manufacturing, over ten years 
after reports by the World Bank, IDB, Maxwell Stamp Plc, and the Barbados 
Institute of Management and Productivity (BIMAP) highlighted issues concerning 
the competitiveness of industries, many of the issues raised remain unresolved. 
Among them are: 
- 
Exchange Rate Policy: 
- 
the Barbados dollar has been fixed to the 
US dollar since 1975. World Bank and the IMF have advocated a 
more active exchange rate policy to improve the competitiveness 
of the economy (Woodroffe, (1992) also found evidence of 
exchange rate misalignment during the late 1980s and early 
1990s). 
- 
Manufacturing Costs: 
- 
manufacturing costs especially labour costs 
are estimated to be relatively high. 
- 
Assistance to Industries: 
- 
financial and technical support for 
industries to assist in retooling, marketing, and pre-and post 
shipment financing are limited. 
- 
Industrial Restructuring: 
- 
problems of poor management, poor 
marketing, high capacity under-utilisation and lack of adaptation to 
new technologies remain apparent. 
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Given the above, manufacturers are unlikely to cope easily with increased 
competition, and are likely to continue to lobby government for contingent 
protection, and to delay further trade liberalisation. 
In relation to export competitiveness issues, the deficiencies highlighted above 
are also relevant to the export performance of firms. It is highly unlikely that if a 
firm is not competitive in the domestic market that it will be export competitive. 
Indeed there are other considerations in exporting such as the problem of the 
small scale of production in Barbados, high transportation costs for small 
volumes and high market research costs relative to output, which firms in 
Barbados must absorb. In addition, as liberalisation proceeds and the margin of 
preference enjoyed by exports is reduced, the manufacturing sector will 
increasingly come under pressure. These issues have been highlighted by 
several studies and have been emphasised by the sector in their lobbying efforts 
to secure protection and other assistance. 
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ENDNOTES 
The survey was conducted after a public education programme was 
mounted by government to inform the general public and manufacturers about 
WTO Agreements. 
2 The figures refer to registered companies only. There are however many 
unregistered handicraft enterprises. 
3 Bernal (1998) highlights the fact that firms in Barbados and other small 
economies are significantly smaller than in the USA. 
4 These include: 
a) Maxwell Stamp (1991) 
- 
Export Competitiveness and Marketing 
Study: Comparative Advantage Report; 
b) Barbados Institute of Management and Productivity (1991) 
- 
Barbados Manufacturing Sector Survey and Recommendations; 
and 
c) Maxwell Stamp (1997) 
- 
Study on a support programme for the 
Barbados Industrial Sector. 
5 Based on responses to question 9 of the questionnaire. 
6 This breakdown does not include trade in agricultural goods, which are also 
important. For example, sugar under LOME is the single most important 
export item. 
Relevant legislation was: 
-The Miscellaneous Controls (General Open Import Licence) 
Regulations, 1983. 
- 
The Miscellaneous Controls (Sale of Licenced Goods) Regulations, 
1985 
- 
The Customs Tariff Amendment Order, 1993. 
8 In the case of agricultural items, importation was prohibited in most cases 
from both CARICOM and non-CARICOM sources. The garment industry was 
protected through the banning of similar imports, and through the requirement 
of minimum CIF values. In all cases, imports were restricted either because of 
the existence of local production, or because the product was regarded as 
being a close substitute for a locally produced good. 
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9 Relevant legislation include: 
- 
Miscellaneous Controls Regulations 1994,1995 and 1996. 
- 
Customs Tariff Amendment order 1994. 
10 Most manufactured goods were protected through the use of the temporary 
surtax. The surtax was to be reduced over a five- year period commencing in 
1995. The largest number of items which benefited from the surtax were 
garments, paper and wood articles, and chemical products. Overall, the 
structure of non-tariff protection reflected maintenance of the status quo with 
the traditional product areas agricultural and food products, garments and 
stationery receiving the greatest levels of protection. 
11 Relevant legislation is 
- 
The Customs Tariff Amendment Order. S. I. 29. 
12 This will be under the Cotonou Agreement, as a replacement for the LOME 
Convention. 
13 At the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference, it was agreed that negotiations will 
commence this year to clarify these rules. 
14 Most are agricultural and agro-processed items, and garments. Some 
traditional industries producing paints, metal windows and doors and furniture 
are also included on the list. Other items not produced in Barbados but which 
are revenue products such as precious stones, precision instruments and 
automobiles are also on the list for exclusion. For these items the MFN rate 
of customs duty will apply. 
15 They recommended among other things, that sensitive, mainly agricultural, 
sub-sectors be excluded from the agreement on the grounds of maintaining 
employment in socially desirable areas. 
16 Hansen and Prusa (1997) found that cases brought by the steel industry to 
the US International Trade Commission were more successful than those 
initiated by other industries. In January 2000, the USA increased customs 
duties on steel 30% as a safeguard measure. The EU has objected to the 
WTO 
17 Calculated from the WTO Integrated Data Base (June 2000). Average 
refers to the arithmetic average 
- 
total duties divided by the number of tariff 
lines. 
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18 There is no evidence that firms collaborated on responding to the survey. 
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CHAPTER 4 
WTO AGREEMENTS AND THE TRADE POLICY PREFERENCES 
OF FIRMS IN BARBADOS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Neo-classical economics teaches that free trade is in general advantageous to 
countries. This school of thought advances the argument that free trade will 
result in opportunities for countries to specialise in areas in which there is a 
comparative advantage, and to expand output and exports. It also teaches that 
the benefits of free trade are more particularly important for small countries. 
However, both large and small countries often use tariff and non-tariff measures 
to protect domestic industries. The political economy literature offers one 
explanation for this phenomena. It notes that protection creates "economic rent" 
which is the impetus for firms to lobby for protection (Olson, 1965). 
Whether or not firms are successful in securing protection depends on their 
ability to organise and make a case for protection (Baldwin, 1984; Pincus, 1975). 
It also depends on the predisposition of government to supply protection based 
on such factors as the need to minimise the short-run cost of liberalisation 
(Cheh, 1974), the need to protect low income earners (Ball, 1967), and other 
national interest factors (Caves, 1976). A fundamental issue, on which there is 
relatively less research in the political economy literature, is what characteristics 
influence firms to lobby for protection. This issue, as noted by Milner and Yoffie 
(1989), is important since the trade policy preferences of firms influence not only 
the pattern of protection within a country but also the stances taken by countries 
in negotiating international trade agreements. 
Chapter 4 Trade Policy Preferences 
In participating in negotiations to devise a number of international trade 
agreements (Chapter 2), Barbados has joined other small developing countries in 
making a case for special and differential treatment. The case is based primarily 
on a concern that domestic firms in these economies will be at a distinct 
disadvantage in a liberalised global environment. These countries argue that 
such imperfect competition factors, as differences in economies of scale, 
relatively high transport costs, and a technological gap, make it difficult for small 
firms to respond to the challenges of competing in a liberalised world market. In 
keeping with the political economy literature, they further argue that special and 
differential treatment is in the national interest as it is important that adjustment 
costs are minimised, and that low income workers are protected. 
Following the lobbying theories of protection, it can be expected that the 
arguments put forward by these countries are in part, the outcome of the 
lobbying efforts of firms, and in fact reflect their trade policy preferences. The 
issue of what factors influence firms to support or not support trade liberalisation 
as provided for in international trade agreements is therefore an important one. 
Previous studies including Prugel and Walter (1985), and Scheerlinck, Hens and 
S'Jergers (1996b) examined the support of firms for various provisions in GATT 
Agreements, and broadly identified firm performance and management 
perceptions as the major factors influencing the stances taken by firms. 
4.1.1 Objective of the Study 
The objective of this study is to examine the factors which influence firms in 
Barbados to support or not support WTO Agreements aimed at the liberalisation 
of trade globally. It will investigate the hypothesis that both firm characteristics 
and the competitiveness perceptions of management influence the trade policy 
preferences of firms. 
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The research is important for two reasons. First, only limited research has been 
undertaken in the literature in assessing the trade policy preferences of firms. In 
the case of Barbados a small developing economy, none has been undertaken. 
The study will therefore contribute to knowledge in this area by extending this 
research within a developing country context. Secondly, unlike previous work in 
this area which focused on a few aspects of international trade agreements, the 
research will be conducted over a range of WTO principles, agreements and new 
issues on which negotiations are to be undertaken. 
4.1.2 Structure of the Study 
This study is divided into six sections. Section 4.2 provides a review of the 
theoretical and empirical literature on the trade policy preferences of firms. In 
Section 4.3 a model is developed to analyse the traded policy preferences of 
manufacturing firms in Barbados based on the literature review. In section 4.4 
cross-section econometric analysis is used to examine the factors determining 
firm behaviour in supporting or not supporting WTO provisions and issues. 
Section 4.5 the conclusion, summarises the finding of the study. 
4.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
4.2.1 Theoretical Framework 
Milner and Yoffie (1989) note that the political economy literature focuses mainly 
on the demand for protection 
- 
how and why firms organize to lobby for 
protection. Within that context, corporate preferences are generally explained in 
terms of the rent seeking behaviour of firms and the economic factors which 
benefit or lose from protection. It is assumed that firms will seek protection to 
earn economic rent. Those factors which will benefit from protection will support 
protection, and those factors which will lose, will oppose liberalisation. 
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Krueger (1974) considered rent seeking within the context of import quotas. Rent 
seeking is regarded as a contest in which firms compete for scarce import 
licenses. The resources exhausted in the rent seeking activity is generally 
regarded as being wasted, because their generation do not create wealth, but 
only transfers existing wealth between groups and/or individuals. The contest for 
rents can take various forms, including lobbying of politicians, over-investment in 
physical plant (to qualify for a greater part of the quota), bribery and other forms 
of corruption. Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980) note that when the instrument of 
import restriction is a tariff, a contest will also take place among firms for the tariff 
revenue. In the case of a quota however, rent seeking is usually conducted 
among a small number of importers, each expecting to obtain a certain number 
of import licences, and therefore market share. Vousden (1990) suggests that in 
the case of tariffs, the return from the tariff revenue will be spread among a larger 
number of persons than for a quota (the usual practice is for interest groups to 
engage in campaigns to secure government funding for projects). Individual firms 
may therefore not incur the cost of entering the contest. He notes: 
"lt seems more likely, that the revenue seeking contest takes place in a broader 
sphere, the object being a share of total government revenue. If this is the case, 
then we are faced with the problem that the lobbying for revenue may occur 
whether the tariff is there or not and so cannot be counted as a specific cost of 
the tariff" (Vousden, 1990 p. 75). 
Lobbying theories speak to the rationale for lobbying, and which industries or 
firms are more likely to be successful in their lobbying efforts for part of the rent 
created by protection. Magee, Brock and Young (1989) present a graphical 
depiction of endogenous lobbing theory, as shown in Figure 4.1. 
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FIGURE 4.1 
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF LOBBYING 
Total 
Benefits 
and Total Costs (C) of Lobbying 
Costs of 
Lobbying C 
EB 
Total Benefits (B) 
F 
0 Lobby Contributions 
The vertical axis measures the benefits of lobbying to the protectionist political 
party, and the dollar cost of lobbying to that industry. The horizontal axis 
measures the dollar value of the protectionist lobby contributions. Assuming 
organizational costs are zero (or negligible), then the cost of lobbying will be 
equal to the contributions given to the protectionist political party, as depicted by 
the 450 line OC. With high lobbying costs, the OC line would be steeper than 
450. 
The benefits derived by the protectionist party, from the lobbying contributions 
are depicted by the curve OB. It is assumed that there is a curve OB associated 
with any given tariff rate, and that the higher the tariff supported by the 
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protectionist party, the higher will be the benefits curve. If the protectionist party 
increased the tariff rate it supported, the OB curve would shift up to the left. The 
benefits curve is positively sloped because the lobby contributions increase the 
expected number of votes for the protectionist party (it is assumed that the 
expected number of votes will reach a maximum and then decline). 
Equilibrium is achieved where the difference between the benefits to the 
protectionist party and the cost to the protectionist lobby is at a maximum. That is 
at the point Le. The area EF represents the greatest distance between the 
benefits and costs, and is regarded as being the rational choice of the lobby. At 
point E, the marginal cost of lobbying is equal to the marginal benefits derived 
which means that an additional dollar contribution to the protectionist party 
generates a dollar worth of additional benefit to the lobby. 
The cost of lobbying is represented by FLe, while the total producers' surplus 
created by the tariff is ELe. In equilibrium, the proportion of total producers' 
surplus spent on lobbying is FLe/ELB. 
The most frequently cited models which seek to explain the demand for protection 
are the interest-group model, and the adding-machine model (Baldwin 1984). Both 
models assert that the pattern of protection of industries is determined by the 
lobbying efforts of industries. Consumer groups generally do not organise to resist 
protection given imperfect knowledge about the benefits to be derived, and the cost 
of lobbying. On the other hand, producers are more adept as to the rents to be 
derived from protection and are more likely to organise. 
In relation to the interest-group model, Olson (1965) postulates that if the group in 
the industry is small (seller concentration) and benefits of lobbying are more evenly 
distributed, a lobbying group is likely to be established. Pincus (1975) goes a step 
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further and argues that an industry's lobbying effort will be greater the more 
geographically concentrated the industry since coordination of lobbying efforts will 
be more efficient, and activities of the group can be more easily monitored. 
The adding-machine model developed by Caves (1976) also views lobbying as a 
key determinant in the outcome of the patterns of protection. However, it is argued 
that government officials seek to maximize their chances of re-election, and what 
matters is the number of votes an industry commands. Caves argues that an 
industry's voting strength is determined by its labour-output ratio, and the degree of 
decentralisation and geographic dispersion. The higher the degree of labour 
intensity and geographical dispersion, the greater is the strength of the industry to 
argue for protection. 
The interest-group model and the adding-machine models both seek to capture the 
lobbying efforts of producers in explaining patterns of protection. The major 
difference between the two models is that in the interest-group model lobby 
pressures influence governments to supply protection. On the other hand, with the 
adding-machine model, it is government's own self interest to be re-elected which 
enables firms to receive protection. 
The one important point which must be made in relation to these two models in the 
context of this review, is that both models regard the position of firms as a given 
- 
firms organise and approach government for protection 
. 
The models use as their 
point of departure, the decision of the firm to lobby for protection. Limited 
information can be derived from these models about the factors which influence 
firms to pursue the issue of protection with government. That is, what industry 
characteristics will influence firms to approach government for protection. Both the 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem and the specific factors model provide some insight 
into the industries which would lobby government for protection. The Stolper- 
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Samuelson theorem suggests that lobbying activity will occur along factor lines 
(capital against labour), while the specific factors model suggests that it will occur 
along industry lines (import-competing against exporting firms). 
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem states that a rise in the relative price of a 
commodity leads to a rise in the real return of the factor used intensively in 
producing that commodity and to a fall in the real return to the other factor. An 
implication of the theorem is that a higher tariff 
- 
which would raise the price of the 
imported product 
- 
would benefit factors used intensively in the importable sector 
and would lead to a fall in the real return to the other factor. This would suggest that 
labour and capital would take opposite sides in lobbying government for protection, 
as a protected product would be intensive in one of these two factors. This however 
is generally not what in observed (Vousden, 1990). 
An alternative model, the Ricardo-Viner specific factors model, assumes that in 
each sector, there are two factors of production 
-a mobile factor (labour), and a 
sector specific or immobile factor (capital). The specific factor whose relative price 
increases, gain as a result of protection as no other units of the factor can transfer 
to the sector to push down the returns to the factor. On the other hand, the factor 
specific to the other sector lose as it cannot move to take advantage of higher 
returns in the protected sector. Whether or not the mobile factor (labour) benefits or 
loses as a result of protection, depends on the share of the protected good in that 
factor's budget. Given that expenditure on a protected good (which will now have a 
higher price) is small in relation to labour's total budget, labour may gain from 
protection and its interest will therefore coincide with the interest of the immobile 
factor (capital) in the protected sector. This gives some explanation as to why 
labour and capital may support protection in an industry. Rather than returns to 
factors, industries may request protection based on whether they are import 
competing or exporting. 
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In the case of Barbados, it does not appear that there is a clear distinction between 
labour and capital on issues of protection. Both labour and employer organisations 
collaborate in making representation to government for protection. The behaviour of 
labour and capital suggests that the Ricardo-Viner model may better describe the 
Barbados experience. 
4.2.2 Empirical Research 
Brock, Magee and Young (1989) conducted three tests of the Ricardo-Viner model 
and the Stopler-Samuelson theorem to determine which model better explains the 
position of labour and capital in demanding protection in the US. The tests have as 
their basis, three implications of the Stopler-Samuelson theorem. These are: 
1. Capital and labour in an industry will oppose each other on the issue of 
protection or free trade for the industry. 
2. For the country as a whole, each factor will either favour free trade or 
protection but not both. 
3. The position taken by capital and labour will be independent of whether or 
not the industry is export oriented or import competing. 
The study assumed that the perspective of management coincided with the position 
of owners of the firms physical capital, while the labour movement reflected the 
position of labour on protection. The positions of management unions and labour 
unions before the Committee on Ways and Means in the U. S. House of 
Representatives on the Trade Reform Act of 1973 were used to test the theories. In 
cases where the information was unclear, or where no information was given, the 
staff of the Committee and other Washington experts were interviewed. 
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In the first test, the study found that in nineteen of the twenty one industries 
reviewed, labour and management worked together on the question of protection. 
This did not support the view that capital and labour oppose each other on the 
question of protection. Regarding the second test, it was found that capital did not 
always support free trade or protection, the results were mixed. The Stopler- 
Samuelson theorem suggests that capital would be unanimous (100%) in its 
support for either protection or liberalisation. Instead the study found that only 63% 
of management unions supported protection. The theorem was therefore rejected 
as factors did not take one position on protection or liberalisation. In the case of the 
third hypothesis, chi-square tests were used to determine whether or not a factor 
preferred a policy that was beneficial to the industry in which it was employed 
(export or import competing). The results showed that both capital and labour 
lobbied for protection more in keeping with the Ricardo-Viner model. 
Most of the empirical work on the policy preferences of firms has not focused on the 
factor intensity of production, and which factors will support or not support 
protection. Rather, it has sought to explain trade preferences in terms of broader 
industry characteristics. Helleiner (1977a) in commenting on corporate policy in 
relation to trade barriers, noted: 
"the state is perceived as the representative of the collectivity of individuals and 
firms within the nation, for whom it acts to maximize their collective welfare. There 
exists some discussion in this theoretical literature of the effects of trade barriers 
upon the distribution of the national income, but it is typically based upon crude two- 
factor assumptions which are not illuminating for understanding of empirically 
observed phenomena"(Helleiner, 1977a p. 102). 
In a later article, Milner and Yoffie (1989) noted that the corporate trade 
preferences are not easily comprehensible within the traditional models of the 
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political economy of trade. They also noted that the traditional approaches based 
on capital and labour intensity should be extended to include such factors as the 
strategic demands of firms. 
Helleiner (1977a) was among the early studies to highlight the trade policy 
preferences of firms. The study examined the preferences and influence of 
transnational enterprises on US commercial policy. The article notes that, although 
such enterprises are adaptive to governmental policies, they have their own 
preferences and seek to influence policy either through lobbying or through other 
means. The objective of these firms is to maximize their long term profits. In this 
pursuit, customs duties, currency controls, legal regulation and transportation costs 
are regarded as being impediments to the achievement of their objectives. These 
firms also regard the free movement of factors of production, including the free flow 
of human and financial capital and technology, to be essential to their operations. 
They oppose regulation in the domestic market because they may impede 
movement of their activities, and may lead to retaliatory action on the part of other 
countries. 
The article asserts that US trade policy is determined by reference to two factors 
namely, organised labour which lobby for increased protection in those industries in 
which labour is most vulnerable and US transnational corporations which lobby for 
reductions in trade barriers in those commodities in which they trade. These 
corporations show no particular interest in the relatively labour intensive and 
declining industries in which they are not directly involved. Out of these two forces, 
the latter being the strongest, the US commercial policy on liberalisation and 
protection is shaped. The article notes that there are several pieces of suggestive 
evidence which lend support to that conclusion. These include: 
1. Import duties on primary and intermediate products (produced by 
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transnational corporations) are on average lower than duties on final 
products. 
2. Capital-intensive and research-intensive products carry lower tariffs and 
incur greater cuts in international trade negotiations. 
3. The bias in trade barriers against products not produced nor traded by 
transnational corporations is also reflected in capital markets where US 
laws discriminate in favour of capital flows which are intermediated by 
transnationals. 
As noted in the article, evidence in support of the proposition that transnational 
corporations are successful in influencing government policy is suggestive. Some 
attempt is made to quantitatively examine the possible influence of transnational 
corporations through an examination of intra-firm transactions. However, the 
author notes that serious data limitations preclude rigorous examination of the 
hypotheses. 
Milner (1988) also examined the trade policy preference of multinational, as well 
as domestic firms. The study examined the proposition that a change in the way 
domestic and international economies are integrated affect the preferences of 
firms and influence policy outcomes. The study examined the trade policy 
preferences of US and French firms in the 1920s and 1970s. It hypothesised that 
increasing international economic integration in the form of exports, multi- 
nationality and global intra-firm trade should affect firms' preferences in the same 
way in both countries. Following from that hypothesis, the argument put forward 
was that export oriented firms, and multinational firms would be less likely to 
demand protection, and in fact would be more likely to resist protection. 
Export oriented firms, and multinational firms are likely to oppose protection for 
three reasons. First, the firm may fear that protection of the home market may 
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lead to retaliation by other countries which could take the form of protection of 
their home markets. Secondly, protection of the home market could drive up cost 
in the country including the input costs of the firm. Thirdly, the export oriented 
firm could become less competitive on the home market vis-ä-vis other domestic 
producers which do not export. 
Milner (1988) uses Table 4.1 below to summarise the behaviour of firms. 
TABLE 4.1 
ASSOCIATION AND EXPORT DEPENDENCE OF FIRMS 
TYPE IV TYPE III 
i High multinational association i High multinational association 
ii Low export dependence ii High export dependence 
Mixed interests; less protectionist than Type I; Least protectionist; most free trade 
selective protectionist 
TYPE I TYPE II 
i Low multinational association i Low multinational association 
ii Low export dependence ii High export dependence 
Most protectionist; for global protection; Less protectionist than 
intensity of demand varies with economic Type I; most favoured is open markets 
difficulty abroad 
Source: Milner (19öä) 
The Type I firm, which is not associated with a foreign firm and is not dependent on 
exports, will be persistent in its demand for protection. When faced with import 
competition these firms are likely to lobby strongly for protection. As import 
competition increases, these firm devote increasing amounts of resources to secure 
protection. For the Type II firm, the cost of closing the home market through 
possible retaliation will outweigh the possible benefits of a protected market. Firms 
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in this category will resist protection, and their primary interest will be the opening 
up of export markets. Type III firms will be the most fierce in resisting protection, 
given their outward orientation both in terms of exports and association. Even when 
there is increased import competition, these firms have an interest in keeping the 
domestic market and export market open. Type IV will face conflicting pressures for 
liberalisation and protection, since they have little export activity but substantial 
foreign production. These firms will generally favour closing the home market to 
strong competitors from abroad since they may be dominant in the home market. 
Protection will be selective against particular countries and products. 
Milner (1988) also argues that foreign subsidiaries operating in a host country will 
generally behave like Type III or Type IV firms. The more similarities they share 
with domestic firms, especially the absence of an integrated worldwide network, the 
more likely they are to demand protection. 
The methodology used in the study was to categorise firms in one of the four types, 
based on their export orientation and affiliation. An examination was made of their 
demand for protection in the two periods 
- 
1920's and 1970's. The study concluded 
that in the face of import competition, internationally oriented firms resisted 
protection in both periods, while domestic firms without that orientation supported 
protection. As there were more firms with foreign orientation in the 1970s, both 
countries (US and France) could more easily resist pressures to close their 
markets. In addition, as globalisation of industries has occurred, the option of 
protection has become more costly for industrial countries as it would injure many 
of their competitive firms. 
Milner and Yoffie (1989) focused on strategic choice in the trade policy 
preferences of firms. They hypothesised that multinational firms advocate a trade 
policy which calls for protection of the home market, if foreign markets are also 
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protected. They suggest that research into the trade policy preferences of firms 
should include a strategic choice, as well as the poles of protectionism or free 
trade. 
The paper takes the position that imperfect competition factors in international 
industries enable firms to earn profits above their competitors. Government's 
trade policy can be geared towards enabling firms to capture as large a share as 
possible of international profits. Multinational firms respond to changes in the 
imperfect competition factors and to government intervention. 
In the model, the initial position of multinational firms is in favour of free trade. 
These firms seek to maximise profits through sales to a large number of 
countries, and possibly also through sourcing their inputs from as wide a range of 
sources as necessary. Two conditions in the market however impact on their 
initial position. These are industry economics and government intervention. The 
most important industry economics factors are economies of scale and a steep 
learning curve. 
in terms of industry economics factors, industries with high fixed costs require a 
growing sales volume to realise a profitable return on investment. If the home 
market is not large enough, such industries will depend on sales in foreign 
markets in order to benefit from economies of scale. The first firms to benefit 
from such economies of scale will have a significant advantage over competitors. 
Similarly, in industries with a steep learning curve where, for example, the cost of 
manufacturing can only be reduced overtime through greater knowledge and 
experience, the firms to be established in the industry first, will benefit from lower 
costs which cannot be replicated (in the short term) by later entrants. In both 
cases, such firms will seek to capture foreign markets to benefit from large sale 
volumes. 
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Advantages achieved through economies of scale and "first mover advantages" 
along the learning curve can however be circumvented by government's trade 
policies 
- 
protection or subsidisation. In a case where the domestic market is 
closed but the foreign market opened, a firm which was formerly at a 
disadvantage can benefit at the expense of more efficient firms. Given this 
situation, firms which previously may have advocated free trade, will alter their 
position depending on how they are affected (if the government does not have a 
reputation for successful intervention and fails to create a competitive edge for its 
firms, then internationally oriented industries are likely to remain free traders). If 
the industry loses competitiveness, two responses will result. If there are few 
strategic groups in the industry, firms will favour strategic trade policies. If there 
are however many strategic groups, the response will depend on the pace of the 
erosion of the industry. Rapid erosion will bring a call for protection. Slow 
erosion, on the other hand, will bring a call for strategic trade policy. 
To examine the strategic trade policy stances of firms, Milner and Yoffie (1989) 
employed a relatively informal methodology. They examined the submissions of 
four industries to the US International Trade Commission during the 1970s and 
1980s. The industries included in the study were those producing 
semiconductors, commercial aircrafts, machine tools and telecommunications 
equipment. The procedure involved identifying corporate demand for protection 
which was conditional 
- 
that is, where the industry indicated that the home market 
(US market) should be closed if the foreign market was not liberalised. Only 
those industries which were making efforts to penetrate foreign markets were 
regarded as making strategic demands. Shifts in corporate demands for 
protection were then compared with shifts in the economics of the industry, the 
degree of openness in foreign markets, and foreign government intervention. The 
study concluded that there was evidence of strategic corporate demands in three 
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cases 
- 
semiconductors, commercial aircraft and telecommunications equipment 
industries. It also noted that the machine tool industry did not respond to foreign 
competition by turning to strategic trade policy because economies of scale and 
learning intensity changes in these industries were much less significant than for 
other industries. 
The studies by Pugel and Walter (1985) and Scheerlinck, Hens and S'Jegers 
(1996a and 1996b) used similar methodologies to investigate the factors 
determining the trade policy preferences of firms. The analysis in these studies is 
more robust than that in Helleiner (1977a), Milner (1988) and Milner and Yoffie 
(1989) in that they employed formal statistical techniques to test their 
hypotheses. 
The Pugel and Walter study, which is cited as being among the first to investigate 
the trade policy preference of firms, surveyed the Chief Executive Officers of 
Fortune 1000 companies and sought to obtain their opinion on (1) four US Trade 
Acts related to trade protection and liberalisation, (2) the Results of the 1979 Tokyo 
Round of GATT negotiations, and (3) future multilateral trade talks. Their analysis is 
based on 68 companies. 
Respondents were given a scale of options from which to choose, ranging from 
actively supporting a piece of legislation to actively opposing such legislation. One 
important point noted by the authors is that the approach assumed that firms had 
one dominant position on a particular piece of legislation. However, given that firms 
generally produce more than one product (some more competitively than others) a 
firm may favour liberalisation for some of its products, and protection for others. 
Firms were allowed to select more than one response. Only three companies made 
use of this option and only with respect to one of the Acts. Pugel and Walter 
therefore concluded that companies do take a dominant position on liberalisation. 
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Scheerlinck, Hens and S'Jegers (1996a) investigated the response of Belgian credit 
institutions to liberalisation policies focusing on deregulation of financial services2. 
The Chairpersons of 126 credit institutions were asked to provide responses to five 
issues relating to EU laws on deregulation, and on the treatment of financial 
services in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. Positions were scaled 
ranging from actively support to actively opposed (however only two scales 
sufficient/insufficient were used in relation to questions on GATT negotiations). The 
responses of 53 companies (42%) were used in the analysis. 
In a later study, Scheerlinck, Hens and S'Jergers (1996b) examined the responses 
of Belgian textile and clothing firms to a number of principles and exceptions to 
these principles in EU and GATT trade rules. Again, using scaled responses, the 
study sought to obtain the trade policy preferences of firms especially given the 
phasing out of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement. 
The approach of Scheerlinck, Hens and S'Jegers allows less choices than in the 
Pugel and Walter study. First, it is not reported that allowances were made for 
different views of firms given the fact that a firm may produce different products at 
different levels of the competitiveness cycle. Secondly, the Pugel and Walter study 
included a "No Position". Scheerlinck, Hens and S'Jergers did not include such an 
option in order to force "respondents to take a position and avoid a lack of variation 
in the dependent variable due to laziness" (Scheerlinck, Hens and S'Jergers, 1996b 
p. 727). 
Regarding the explanatory variables, the three studies propose that the stances of 
firms on trade policy are determined by basically three variables relating to (1) the 
import competitive strength of the firm, (2) its association with an international firm 
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and (3) the degree of diversification. They also hypothesise that firms favour 
liberalisation when: 
(a). they do not regard competing imports as a threat; 
(b). have greater foreign association; and 
(c). are more diversified. 
While the basic model is the same, the studies vary considerably in terms of the 
proxies used for each variable. 
In terms of the first variable 
- 
import competition, Pugel and Walter pointed out that 
import competition should ideally be measured by the responsiveness of imports to 
changes in the level of protection. However, given that data on such elasticities 
were not available, they used two proxies; the tariff rate at the beginning of the 
period averaged across all industries in which the firm produce; and the increase in 
import penetration recorded in the immediate preceding period, again averaged 
across all industries in which the firm operates. 
The tariff rate proxy reflected past import competition pressures, and past 
successes in gaining protection. The tariff rates were weighted by the share of each 
industry's employment in total company employment. Increases in import 
penetration were said to reflect the recent emergence of new or additional import 
competition. 
In both of their studies, Scheerlinck, Hens and S'Jegers drew attention to the 
difficulty in measuring import competition. A major problem was obtaining nominal 
or effective tariff data for each individual firm. These writers solved the problem by 
relying on the subjective perceptions of managers. Each firm was asked how it 
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perceived the foreign competitive threat. The responses were rated on a scale from 
very weak to very strong. 
In relation to association, the studies support the propositions of Helleiner (1977a), 
that firms with international association do not favour protection. They view customs 
duties and licensing arrangements as hindrances to trade and therefore pressure 
various governments to reduce such barriers. In addition, such barriers may 
encourage foreign countries in which they operate to take retaliatory action against 
their investments or exports. Therefore, firms with such interest will actively oppose 
protection. 
Pugel and Walter (1985) employed three variables to capture a firms access to 
foreign markets; (1) the ratio of R&D expenditure to sales, since R&D has been 
found to be an underlying influence on the international competitiveness of U. S. 
firms; (2) percentage of company sales made in foreign markets for 1976 to closest 
available year thereafter; (3) and advertising to sales ratio. These variables were 
expected to be positively correlated with the extent of multi-nationality. 
In their studies Scheerlinck, Hens and S'Jegers (1996a and 1996b) used a dummy 
variable to proxy the presence of international association. The dummy variable 
took the value of 1 if the firm had foreign establishments, and 0 if it had none3. 
Regarding the third variable 
- 
product diversification, a firm which was diversified 
was regarded as being less at risk of being injured through import competition and 
therefore should favour liberalisation. Pugel and Walter (1985) used the Herfindahl 
index to measure diversification. As a proxy for product diversification, Scheerlinck, 
Hens and S'Jergers (1996a and 1996b) used the number of sectors in which the 
firm operates. 
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In summary, the studies postulated a negative relationship between import 
competitiveness threat and support for liberalisation, a positive relationship 
between diversification and support for liberalisation, and similarly a positive 
relationship between access to foreign markets and support for liberalisation: 
SL =f (CT, D, AFM) 
-++ 
Where: 
SL = support for liberalisation 
CT = competitiveness threat 
D = diversification 
AFM = access to foreign markets 
The studies all used OLS (and principal components analysis) and ordered probit 
techniques to investigate the sign and significance of the variables. In all cases, the 
findings of OLS confirmed the findings of ordered probit regression. 
The findings of the analysis generally support the hypotheses that: 
i. firms which perceive a competitive threat (Scheerlinck, Hens 
and S'Jergers, 1996a and 1996b) or which are actually injured 
by imports (Pugel and Walter, 1985) generally do not favour 
trade liberalisation and deregulation; 
ii. firms which are diversified tend to favour trade liberalisation 
and deregulation; and 
iii. firms with foreign links, and are therefore likely to benefit from 
access to foreign markets, tend to favour trade and financial 
liberalisation over other firms. 
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4.3 DEVELOPMENT OF A MODEL FOR BARBADOS 
The literature suggests that support for liberalisation is a function of the 
competitiveness of firms as perceived by management (Scheerlinck, Hens and 
S'Jegers, 1996a and 1996b), as well as the characteristics of firms (Pugel and 
Walter, 1985). The model to be developed in this study, will examine the hypothesis 
that these factors also influence the trade policy preferences of firms in Barbados. It 
is not necessarily the case that firm behaviour will be the same in both developed 
and developing countries. Firms in Barbados are smaller and operate in a much 
smaller market than those in its major trading partners (Bemal, 1998). 
4.3.1 Perception Variables: 
4.3.1.1 Competitiveness Perception 
The perception of management about their competitiveness should influence 
support for liberalisation or protection. Managers who are optimistic about their 
competitiveness should not be as opposed to trade liberalisation as managers who 
are pessimistic (Scheerlinck, Hens and S'Jegers, 1996a and 1996b). Optimistic 
managers should have more confidence about competing on the home market, and 
possibly gaining market share in export markets with the liberalisation of trade. 
The literature has focused on measuring import competitiveness perceptions of 
managers rather than export competitiveness perceptions. There is good reason for 
focussing on import competitiveness perceptions, since a firm which is not import 
competitive is unlikely to be export competitive. For this study, the perceptions of 
managers about their import competitiveness (IMP_COM) are obtained from the 
responses of firms to Question 17 in the questionnaire (Appendix 2). The question 
sought to determine their perceptions if non-tariff barriers were removed and 
replaced with high tariffs (WTO bound tariffs). All firms which were pessimistic 
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about their import competitiveness were also pessimistic about their export 
competitiveness (Question 16). 
4.3.2 Characteristics of Firms 
4.3.2.1 Association of Firms 
Another variable which will influence perception is the relationship of the firm to 
foreign partners. Firms with external association by way of ownership, joint 
marketing or other forms of joint venture should not be as strongly opposed to 
liberalisation as firms which do not benefit from that external relationship. 
The main form of association referred to in the literature is multi-nationality, and the 
discussion centres around the argument that wherever multinationals are based, 
they will argue for liberalisation (Milner and Yoffie, 1989; Helleiner, 1977a). In the 
case of Barbados, there are no locally owned multinationals nor are any 
headquartered in Barbados. There are only subsidiaries of multi-nationals in 
Barbados, and the perception of these subsidiaries can be difficult to categorise. 
Those which benefit from economic rents may argue for protection to continue 
earning rents. Those which estimate that it may be less expensive to supply the 
local market from another base may argue for liberalisation. As discussed in 
Section 3.4.4, the majority of firms with external association generally support 
liberalisation. In keeping with the literature therefore, a positive sign is therefore 
expected. Whether or not a firm has an association (ASSOC) with a foreign 
company is obtained from question 2 of the questionnaire. Question 3 is used to 
reconfirm question 2 and to check the type of association. Only about 10% of the 
firms in Barbados are foreign owned, while another 21 % operate under franchise. 
4.3.2.2 Diversification 
A third variable which has been used in relation to the perception of the firm is its 
degree of specialisation or diversification. In the literature (Pugel and Walter, 1985), 
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it is argued that diversified firms will more support liberalisation than specialised 
firm. Firms with a large number of products may have confidence in the success of 
at least some of those products. Firms with few products may regard themselves as 
being more vulnerable to collapse if one or more of their products fail. This situation 
is expected to also hold in the case of Barbados, although local firms are smaller in 
scale than those investigated in the literature. This hypothesis is, therefore, that the 
more diversified the firm is, the more it will favour liberalisation. 
For this study, the degree of diversification (DIVER) of the firm is determined by the 
number of four digit HS categories in which the company produces4. 
4.3.2.3 Exports to Sales Ratio 
The ratio of exports to sales is used in the literature to represent the access which 
firms have to foreign markets (Pugel and Walter, 1985). It can also be interpreted to 
be a measure of the dependence of firms on foreign market sales, and for this 
reason will be included in this study. The higher the dependence on foreign 
markets, the more firms should support liberalisation ceterus paribus. As noted by 
Helleiner (1977a), and Milner (1988), firms which are export dependent will support 
liberalisation given fear of retaliation by trading partners. 
Export sales and total sales for each firm included in the analysis were obtained 
from the questionnaire (Questions 7 and 8). This data was used to calculate export 
performance (EXPFSAL)5. 
4.3.2.4 Capacity Utilisation 
Milner and Yoffie (1989) noted that economies of scale are important in determining 
the trade policy preferences of multinational firms. Firms facing economic decline 
and capacity under-utilisation are inclined to support protection. Hillman (1982) also 
notes that governments have a predisposition to supporting declining industries. 
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Such industries may seek to influence the level and timing of protection by lobbying 
to make their plight known. In Barbados, many studies, including those done by 
Maxwell Stamp (1991) and BIMAP (1991), have pointed to chronic problems of 
capacity under-utilisation in Barbados' industries and the negative impact this has 
on the competitiveness of firms. This factor is therefore likely to influence the 
preferences of these firms, and will be included in the model. 
The higher the percentage under-utilised (CAPU) the more firms will resist 
liberalisation since they will view it as a further erosion of their profitability. Data for 
the variable is obtained from responses to Question 13 of the questionnaire, which 
requested the firm to indicate the percentage of capacity under-utilisation. 
4.3.2.5 Statistical Model and Data 
The dependent variables are the responses of firms to questions on the various 
elements of WTO principles, agreements and issues. The variable takes the 
following values: 
Strongly in favour = 4 
In favour = 3 
No Position = 2 
Disagree = 1 
Strongly Disagree = 0 
The variable therefore takes high values when the firm favours liberalisation and 
low values when it is not in favour of liberalisation. 
The model used in the analysis assumes that firms have one position on trade 
liberalisation and either support or do not support liberalisation as prescribed by 
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WTO principles, agreements and issues. Given this, the signs of the model are as 
follows: 
SWTOP; = ao + a, IMP COM; + a2 ASSOC; + a3 DIVER; 
+ a4 EXPFSAL; + a5 CAPU; + e; (4.1) 
Where the coefficients a,, a2, a3, and a4 are expected to be positive, and a5 
negative, and where: 
SWTOP; 
_ 
IMP COM; 
_ 
a dummy variable measuring support for WTO principles, 
agreements and new issues by firm i. The dummy variable 
takes the value of 0,1,2,3 
, 
and 4 on an ordered scale; 
a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if management of 
firm i is optimistic about its import competitiveness, and 0 
otherwise; 
ASSOC; =a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if firm i has an 
association with an external firm by way of joint ownership, 
joint venture, joint marketing, franchise or other arrangements 
and 0 otherwise; 
DIVER; = the number of four digit HS categories in which firm i operates; 
EXPFSAL; = the ratio of export sales to total sales of firm i; 
CAPU; = the percentage of capacity under-utilisation in firm i; and 
e; = error term. 
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4.4 ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
Following previous studies in this area including Scheerlinck, Hens, and S'Jegers 
(1996a and 1996b), ordinary least squares and ordered probit regression will be 
used to analyse firm support for liberalisation. Principal components analysis is first 
used to create a measure of the overall response of the firms to various WTO 
principles, agreements and issues. Ordinary least squares are then used to 
estimate the model. In the second approach, ordered probit regression is used to 
analyse responses in detail. This method allows for analysis of qualitative 
dependent variables that take discrete values on an ordered scale (Green, 2000; 
Kennedy, 1998). Both techniques are outlined in Appendix 4. 
TABLE 4.2 
SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA 
VARIABLE MEAN STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
COEFFICIENT 
OF VARIATION 
MINIMUM 
VALUE 
MAXIMUM 
VALUE 
IMP COM 
. 
41880 
. 
49548 1.18 0 1 
ASSOC 
. 
30769 
. 
46352 1.50 0 1 
DIVER 3.51282 2.56842 0.73 1 11 
EXPFSAL 20.83060 28.50675 1.36 0 100 
CAPU 26.79487 19.64316 0.73 0 75 
Table 4.2 describes the data to be used in the analysis. It shows that ASSOC has 
the highest variation, while DIVER and CAPU, have the least variation. The highest 
level of capital under-utilisation is 75%. Export performance ranges from no 
exports (0) to all exports (100) in the case of mainly enclave industries. Table 4.3 
shows that the correlation between the variables is relatively very low in all cases. 
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TABLE 4.3 
CORRELATION MATRIX OF VARIABLES 
EXPFSAL ASSOC DIVER CAPU IMP COM 
EXPFSAL 1.0 
. 
21 
-. 
15 
. 
01 
. 
13 
ASSOC 
. 
21 
. 
10 
-. 
11 
. 
00 
. 
14 
DIVER 
-. 
15 
-. 
11 
. 
10 
-. 
04 
. 
02 
CAPU 
. 
01 
. 
00 
-. 
04 
. 
10 
. 
02 
IMP_C OM 
. 
13 
. 
14 
. 
02 
. 
02 
. 
10 
The results of tests for multicollinearity using auxiliary regression are in Table 4.4 
None of the results is significant, and R2(adj) are very low. The results suggest that 
multicollinearity is not a problem. 
TABLE 4.4 
MULTICOLLINEARITY TESTS USING AUXILIARY REGRESSIONS 
R F-VALUE 
Expfsal =f Diver, Assoc, Ca u, IMP Com 
. 
04 2.36<Fo. 05 
Diver =f Expfsal, Assoc, Ca u, IMP Com 
. 
001 1.08<Fo. 05 
Assoc = Diver, Expfsal, Ca u, IMP Com 
. 
03 2.03<Fo. 05 
Ca u= Diver, Assoc, Expfsal, IMP Com 
-. 
03 
. 
08< Fo. os 
IMP Com = Diver, Assoc, Ca u, Ex fsal 
-. 
003 1.10< Foos 
NOTE: F value at the 1% level of significance is 2.37 
4.4.1 Ordinary Least Squares Analysis 
One approach which can be used to assess the importance of various factors in 
influencing firm position on trade issues is principal components analysis, which is a 
special case of factor analysis (Koutsoyiannis, 1977). An explanation of this 
approach is provided in Appendix 4. 
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This approach begins with the hypothesis that a firm has a single position on a 
specific issue, and that its responses to each issue are in unison with its general 
perspective. Principal components are used to construct the summary measure of 
the support of firms for trade liberalisation. 
This procedure is applied in this study to: 
i. all WTO principles, agreements and new issues; 
ii. WTO principles only; 
iii. WTO Agreements only; and 
iv. new issues being considered in the WTO only. 
The first factor (or first principal) which accounts for the maximum possible 
proportion of the total variation in the set of variables is used in the analysis. The 
first factor accounts for 18.3 % of the variation in respect to all principles, 
agreements and new issues taken as one variable; 81.7 % of the variation with 
respect to principles only; 16.2 % of the variation for agreements only, and 65.3 % 
of the variation for new issues only. 
Firm stances on the four sets of issues are regressed on the five explanatory 
variables (IMP_COM, ASSOC, DIVER, EXPFSAL, CAPU). Ordinary least squares 
are used to estimate the model. Results are in Table 4.5 Overall, the results do not 
indicate strong relationships6. The explanatory power of the models (R2) are very 
low. A joint test for all of the significance of variables (F-ratio) however show that 
three of the four models are significant. All models past the Breusch-Pagan test for 
heteroscedasticity (X2 (HET)). Likelihood ratio tests (LL) were performed with a zero 
restriction place on the coefficient of import perceptions (IMP_COM) to test for the 
separate influence of perceptions on the model. Based on the results, the 
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hypothesis that the variable IMP_COM has no effect on the models can be rejected 
in the case of all areas and for agreements only. 
The results for all areas (i. e. principles, agreements and issues) indicate that export 
performance (EXPFSAL) and competitiveness perceptions (IMP_COM), influence 
firms to support WTO provisions overall. There is a negative relationship between 
support for WTO provisions and diversification (DIVER). This relationship is not in 
keeping with what was expected. The greater the number of products produced, 
the less firms apparently support liberalisation. 
In the case of principles only, the model is not significant and no variable is 
significant. 
With respect to agreements only, competitiveness perceptions (IMP_COM) and the 
degree of diversification (DIVER) are significant. Again, there is a negative 
relationship between the degree of diversification and the position of firms on 
liberalisation issues, while perceptions carry a positive influence. These results 
reinforce the earlier findings for all areas. 
In relation to new issues only, the results indicate, as expected, that export 
performance (EXPFSAL) leads firms to support WTO rules in these new areas. 
The association of firms (ASSOC) rather than influencing firms to support 
disciplines in the "new" areas as expected, leads firms not to support WTO rules on 
these issues. It may be, that firms are unsure of how new disciplines would affect 
their association with external companies. The level of diversification of firms 
(DIVER) influences them not to support new disciplines. This finding is consistent 
with results for all areas and agreements only. Again, however, they are 
inconsistent with the anticipated outcome. 
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The conclusion which can be drawn from the results is that there appears not to be 
a very strong relationship between firm characteristics, competitiveness perceptions 
and support for WTO provisions. In keeping with the literature, however, export 
performance and competitiveness influence firms to support liberalisation. 
Diversification in contrast influence firms not to support liberalisation. 
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TABLE 4.5 
OLS RESULTS FOR PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS 
ALL AREAS PRINCIPLES 
ONLY 
AGREEMENTS 
ONLY 
ISSUES ONLY 
CONSTANT 25.029 4.123 21.421 5.2486 
(13.134) (5.155) (15.970) ((7.196) 
EXPFSAL 
. 
4858E-01 
. 
1058E-01 
. 
22988E-01 
. 
2587E-01 
(1.787)* (. 928) (1.201) (2.487)*** 
ASSOC 
. 
81081 
. 
22105E-01 1.1836 
-1.1074 (. 487) (. 032) (1.011) (-1.740)** 
DIVER 
-. 
81448 
-. 
1204 
-. 
6263 
-. 
1598 
(-2.757)*** (-. 971) (-3.013)*** (-1.414)* 
CAPU 
-. 
20388E-01 
. 
12996E-01 
-. 
81263E-02 
-. 
9666E-02 
(-. 537) (. 816) (-. 304) (-. 665) 
IMP_COM 3.409 
. 
42656 2.1471 
. 
3450 
(2.226)** (. 663) (1.991)* (. 588) 
R2 (adj) 
. 
11702 
-. 
0118 
. 
11230 
. 
05190 
F-ratio 4.07*** 
. 
73 3.94*** 2.27* 
X2 (HET) 2.12 1.48 3.21 1.56 
LL 5.0$ 3.6 4$ 0.4 
I. t statistics are in brackets. Critical value at the 90% level with 112 df= 1.28; at 95% =1.65; at 99% = 2.36 
2. F test at the 90% level = 1.89; 95% = 2.29; at 99% = 3.18 
3 Significance is as follows :*= 90%; ** = 95%; *** = 99% 
4. X2 (HET) = Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity. 
5. LL = Likelihood Ratio Statistic is 
-2(log LR - log LU) where LU is the value of the unrestricted function, 
and LR is the restricted function with IMP_COM excluded. The symbol $ indicates that the hypothesis of 
no influence is rejected. 
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4.4.2 Ordered Probit Results 
The Principal Components/OLS approach to analysing responses have a number 
of limitations. In creating the Principals it is assumed that a firm has a consistent 
general position on its support for each WTO principle, agreement and new issue, 
and that those positions can be combined to create a single variable. In the case of 
all principles, agreements and new issues, as well as for agreements only, the 
amount of variation explained by the Principals is relatively low 
- 
18.3% and 16.2% 
respectively. There is wide disparity in the two results for which the Principals are 
high. Indeed, for Principles Only, there are no significant variables. In terms of OLS 
regression, this method as noted in Appendix 4 does not recognise the ranking of 
responses. Use of this method therefore means that information on the ranking of 
support for WTO rules is lost in the analysis. 
Ordered probit analysis can be used to provide a more detailed analysis of the 
responses of manufacturers to the trade policy survey. This method, which uses 
maximum likelihood estimation, allows for the information contained in the ranking 
of responses to be used in the analysis for each equation. 
The results of the ordered probit analysis for WTO principles, agreements and 
issues are in Table 4.6. 
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TABLE 4.6 
ORDERED PROBIT RESULTS 
SUPPORT FOR: 
(A) WTO PRINCIPLES 
Q19 Most Favoured Nation Treatment 
Q20 National Treatment 
Q21 Transparency 
(B) WTO AGREEMENTS 
MARKET ACCESS PROVISIONS 
Q22 Elimination of quantitative restrictions 
Q23 Tariff protection in place of QRs 
MA Tariff reductions overtime 
Q19 Q20 Q21 Q22 Q23 Q24 
CONSTANT 
. 
8135 
. 
9683 
. 
7702 
. 
9071 1.1197 1.369 
(2.802) (3.370) (2.643) (3.122) (3.249) (4.806) 
EXPFSAL 
. 
5422E-02 
. 
7589E-02 
. 
4105E-02 
. 
74003E-02 
. 
34754E-02 
. 
1158E-02 
(1.430)* (2.115)** (. 989) (2.063)** (. 752) (. 245) 
ASSOC 
. 
7236E-02 
. 
6421 E-02 
. 
5542E-. 01 
-. 
1562 
. 
1897 
. 
1638 
(. 033) (. 030) (. 253) (-. 674) (. 739) (. 657) 
DIVER 
-. 
5520E-01 
-. 
4532E-01 
-. 
7908E-01 
-. 
8356E-01 
. 
36137E-01 
-. 
6497E-01 
(-1.450)* (-1.249)* (-1.789)** (-2.266)** (. 842) (-1.736)' 
CAPU 
-. 
3556E-02 
-. 
6449E-02 
. 
2465E-02 
-. 
2937E-02 
-. 
6902E-02 
-. 
71721E-02 
(-. 710) (-1.161) (. 475) (-. 523) (-1.353)* (-1.483)* 
COM IMP 
. 
4736 
. 
3268 
. 
4145 
. 
51404 
. 
2767 
. 
4066 
_ (2.261)** (1.590)* (1.887)** (2.412)*** (1.253) (1.912)** 
X2(/) 11.22** 11.19** 11.23** 16.33*** 6.03 9.32* 
X2(2) 6.03 8.67* 7.24 10.20** 4.48 5.61 
LL 5.0$ 3.2 4.0$ 6.2$ 1.6 3.6 
T 
. 
-t statistic in brackets. Test at 90% level with 112 df = 1.28; test at 95% level = 1.65; test at 99% level = 2.36 
2. X2(I) = Joint Chi-square significance test for all variables. 
3. X2(2)= Joint Chi-square significance test for all variable with (IMP_COM) excluded. 
4. LL = Likelihood Ratio Statistic is -2(log LR - log LU) where LU is the value of the unrestricted function, 
and LR is the restricted function with IMP_COM excluded. The symbol : indicates the hypothesis of no 
influence is rejected. 
5. Significance is indicated as follows: *= 90%; *' = 95%; *** = 99% 
6. Where it appears NR = no result generated by LIMDEP due to insufficient variation in the dependent 
variable. 
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TABLE 4.6 (CONT') 
ORDERED PROBIT RESULTS 
SUPPORT FOR: 
SAFEGUARD ACTION 
Q25 Recourse to safeguard action 
Q26 Safeguard protection by tariffs only 
Q27 Safeguard action only temporary 
ANTI-DUMPING ACTION 
Q28 Recourse to anti-dumping action 
Q29 Proof of injury before action 
non Consultation before action 
Q25 Q26 Q27 Q28 Q29 Q30 
CONSTANT 1.695 
. 
7642 
. 
6680 NR 1.215 1.132 
(4.731) (2.616) (2.245) (4.207) (3.888) 
EXPFSAL 
-. 
2029E-02 
. 
67068E-02 
. 
5629E-02 NR 
. 
1807E-02 
. 
1231 E-03 
(-. 495) (1.780)** (1.447)* (. 483) (-. 029) 
ASSOC 
. 
2192 
. 
1159E-01 
. 
4157E-01 NR 
-. 
8326E-01 
. 
5572E-01 
(. 846) (. 053) (. 185) (-. 343) (. 222) 
DIVER 
. 
5958E-01 
-. 
53007E-01 
-. 
3474E-01 NR 
-. 
1123 
-. 
3307E-01 
(1.200) (-1.410)* (-. 950) (-2.860)*** (-. 795) 
CAPU 
-. 
7718E-03 
-. 
77324E-03 
. 
2999E-03 NR 
. 
3921 E-02 
. 
959113-01 
(-. 127) (-. 156) (. 063) (. 715) (1.700)** 
COM IMP 
-. 
9707E-01 
. 
3058 
. 
3318 NR 
-. 
1888 
. 
1560 
_ (-. 424) (1.453)* (1.544)* (-. 838) (. 698) 
3(2(1) 3.15 9.08 7.49 NR 10.24* 4.86 
X2(2) 2.95 6.88 4.83 NR 9.41 * 4.34 
LL 0.2 2.2 2.6 NR 0.8 0.4 
1. t statistic in brackets. Test at 90% level with 112 df = 1.28; test at 95% level = 1.65; test at 99% level = 2.36 
2. X'(1) = Joint Chi-square significance test for all variables. 
3. X2(2)= Joint Chi-square significance test for all variable with (IMP_COM) excluded. 
4. LL = Likelihood Ratio Statistic is -2(log LR - log LU) where LU is the value of the unrestricted function, 
and LR is the restricted function with IMP_COM excluded. The symbol $ indicates the hypothesis of no 
influence is rejected. 
5. Significance is indicated as follows: 90%; "* = 95%; """ = 99% 
6. Where it appears NR = no result generated by LIMDEP due to insufficient variation in the dependent 
variable. 
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TABLE 4.6 (CONT') 
ORDERED PROBIT RESULTS 
SUPPORT FOR: 
SUBSIDIES 
Q31 Recourse to countervailing duties 
Q32 Proof of injury before action 
Q33 Consultation before action 
CUSTOMS PROCEDURE 
Q34 Harmonisation of Customs Procedure 
RULES OF ORIGIN 
Q35 Origin criteria not to be trade barrier 
IMPORT LICENSING PROCEDURES 
036 Iranort licensing procedures to be transparent and predictable 
Q31 Q32 Q33 Q34 35 36 
CONSTANT 1.5865 1.908 1.696 NR 
-. 
3882 
. 
9434 
(4.421) (5.930) (5.695) (-1.172) (3.108) 
EXPFSAL 
. 
7619E-04 
. 
9032E-03 
. 
10828E-02 NR 
. 
75402E-02 
. 
52144E-02 
(. 018) (. 251) (. 319) (1.689)** (1.370)* 
ASSOC 
. 
2316 
-. 
1727 
-. 
2882 NR 
-. 
15083 
-. 
1362 
(. 904) (-. 752) (-1.260) (-. 583) (-. 594) 
DIVER 
. 
4272E-01 
-. 
1206 
-. 
1433 NR 
-. 
13531E-01 
-. 
59701 E-01 
(. 898) (-2.863)*** (-3.651)*** (-. 253) (-1.496)* 
CAPU 
. 
70531 E-04 
-. 
1348E-01 
. 
3008E-02 NR 
-. 
2637 
-. 
3427E-03 
(. 012) (-. 262)** (. 487) (-. 465) (-. 067) 
COM IMP 
-. 
3391 
. 
2817E-01 
-. 
2684 NR 
-. 
4639 
. 
50273 
_ (-1.506)* (. 133) (-1.222) (-. 191) (2.304)*** 
X1(1) 3.52 15.16** 16.62** NR 3.97 10.51 * 
X1(2) 1.19 15.15*** 14.93*** NR 3.97 5.02 
LL 2.4 0.0 1.6 NR 0.2 5.6$ 
1. t statistic in brackets. Test at 90% level with 112 df = 1.28; test at 95% level = 1.65; test at 99% level = 2.36 
2. X2(1) = Joint Chi-square significance test for all variables. 
3. X2(2)= Joint Chi-square significance test for all variable with (IMP_COM) excluded. 
4. LL = Likelihood Ratio Statistic is -2(log LR - log LU) where LU is the value of the unrestricted function, 
and LR is the restricted function with IMP_COM excluded. The symbol $ indicates the hypothesis of no 
influence is rejected. 
5. Significance is indicated as follows: *= 90%; ** = 95%; *** = 99% 
6. Where it appears NR = no result generated by LIMDEP due to insufficient variation in the dependent 
variable. 
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TABLE 4.6 (CONT') 
ORDERED PROBIT RESULTS 
SUPPORT FOR: 
TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 
Q37 Recourse to technical regulation to ensure imports are of acceptable standard 
Q38 Technical regulations not to be a trade control measure 
SANITARY AND PHYTO-SANITARY MEASURES 
Q39 Recourse to health measures to protect human, animal and plant life 
Q40 Sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures not to be trade control measure 
PRESHIPMENT INSPECTION 
Q41 Establishment of machinery for preshipment inspection 
TRADE RELATED INVESTMENT MEASURES 
nd2 I Je of local input not to be basis for decidine concessions 
Q37 Q38 Q39 Q40 Q41 Q42 
CONSTANT NR 1.429 NR 1.1778 1.3534 1.357 
(3.850) (3.493) (3.323) (4.452) 
EXPFSAL NR 
.1 1709E-02 NR -. 3525E-03 -. 2777E-03 . 58587E-03 (-. 308) (-. 093) (-. 058) (. 156) 
ASSOC NR 
. 
5231 NR 
. 
45977 
-. 
2832E-01 
. 
61414 
(2.305)** (2.073)** (-. 125) (2.746)*** 
DIVER NR 
-. 
6047E-01 NR 
-. 
54284E-01 
. 
20912 
-. 
17265E-01 
(-1.270) (-1.098) (4.137)*** (-. 348) 
CAPU NR 
. 
66200E-03 NR 
. 
88038E-03 
. 
8385E-02 
. 
30567 
(131) (. 178) (1.420)* (. 629) 
COM IMP NR 
. 
28401 NR 
. 
29509 
. 
12749 
. 
32515 
_ (1.346)* (1.397)* (. 539) (1.539)* 
X1(1) NR 11.11** NR 9.65* 24.65*** 12.45** 
X1(2) NR 9.23* NR 7.61 24.31*** 10.01"* 
LL NR 1.8 NR 2.0 0.4 2.6 
I, t statistic in brackets. Test at 90% level with 112 df = 1.28; test at 95% level = 1.65; test at 99% level = 2.36 
2. X2(I) = Joint Chi-square significance test for all variables. 
3. X2(2)= Joint Chi-square significance test for all variable with (IMP_COM) excluded. 
4. LL = Likelihood Ratio Statistic is -2(log LR - log LU) where LU is the value of the unrestricted function, 
and LR is the restricted function with IMP_COM excluded. The symbol $ indicates the hypothesis of no 
influence is rejected. 
5. Significance is indicated as follows: *= 90%; ** = 95%; *** = 99% 
6. Where it appears NR = no result generated by LIMDEP due to insufficient variation in the dependent 
variable. 
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TABLE 4.6 (CONT') 
ORDERED PROBIT RESULTS 
SUPPORT FOR: 
TRADE RELATED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Q43 Implementation of legislation to protect trade related intellectual property of local companies 
Q44 Implementation of legislation to protect trade related intellectual property of foreign companies 
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 
Q45 No unilateral action to be taken in disputes 
Q46 Full acceptance of WTO decisions in disputes 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 
Q47 Tariffs not to be levied on E-Commerce 
Q43 Q44 Q45 Q46 Q47 
CONSTANT NR NR NR NR 2.234 
(5.139) 
EXPFSAL NR NR NR NR 
. 
3288E-02 
(. 761) 
ASSOC NR NR NR NR 
-. 
36506 
(-1.543)* 
DIVER NR NR NR NR 
. 
19494E-01 
(. 382) 
CAPU NR NR NR NR 
-. 
60426E-02 
(-1.079) 
IMP_COM NR NR NR NR 
. 
28419 
(1.049) 
X2(1) NR NR NR NR 5.64 
X1(2) NR NR NR NR 3.97 
LL NR NR NR NR 1.6 
I. t statistic in brackets. Test at 90% level with 112 df = 1.28; test at 95% level = 1.65; test at 99% level = 2.36 
2. X2(1) = Joint Chi-square significance test for all variables. 
3. X2(2)= Joint Chi-square significance test for all variable with (IMP COM) excluded. 
4. LL = Likelihood Ratio Statistic is -2(log LR - log LU) where LU is the value of the unrestricted function, 
and LR is the restricted function with IMP_COM excluded. The symbol $ indicates the hypothesis of no 
influence is rejected. 
5. Significance is indicated as follows: "= 90%; *' = 95%; '"" = 99% 
6. Where it appears NR = no result generated by LIMDEP due to insufficient variation in the dependent 
variable. 
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TABLE 4.6 (CONT') 
ORDERED PROBIT RESULTS 
SUPPORT FOR: 
(c) WTO ISSUES 
ENVIRONMENT POLICY 
Q48 No trade control measures in the area of environmental policy to be enforced until WTO rules developed 
COMPETITION POLICY 
Q49 Anti-competitive or restrictive business practices should be eliminated 
INVESTMENT 
Q50 Foreign investors should be given MFN treatment 
Q48 Q49 Q50 
CONSTANT 1.2368 
. 
86534 
. 
8470 
(4.070) (3.060) (3.000) 
EXPFSAL 
. 
6019E-02 
. 
91112E-02 
. 
83593E-02 
(1.686)** (2.186) (1.978)** 
ASSOC 
-. 
49825 
-. 
36408 
-. 
2061 
(-1.833)** (-1.551) (-. 894) 
DIVER 
-. 
52564E-01 
-. 
40211E-01 
-. 
60904E-01 
(1.187) (-1.018) (-1.537)* 
CAPU 
. 
39224E-02 
-. 
50725E-02 
-. 
56403E-02 
(. 823) (-. 980) (1.097) 
IMP_COM 
. 
58477E-01 
. 
10869 
. 
82675E-01 
(-. 240) (. 487) (. 372) 
X2(/) 8.72 9.44* 9.54* 
X2(2) 8.64* 9.18* 9.38* 
LL 0.0 0.2 0.2 
I. t statistic in brackets. Test at 90% level with 109 df = 1.28; test at 95% level = 1.65; test at 99% level = 2.36 
2. XZ(! ) = Joint Chi-square significance test for all variables. 
3. X2(2)= Joint Chi-square significance test for all variable with (IMP_COM) excluded. 
4. LL = Likelihood Ratio Statistic is 
-2(log LR - log LU) where LU is the value of the unrestricted function, 
and LR is the restricted function with IMP_COM excluded. The symbol $ indicates the hypothesis of no 
influence is rejected. 
5. Significance is indicated as follows: *= 90%; "" = 95%; """ = 99% 
6. Where it appears NR = no result generated by LIMDEP due to insufficient variation in the dependent 
variable. 
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4.4.2.1 Overall Performance 
In terms of significance, the model performed only fair overall. Eight equations of a 
total of 32 were not computable because of insufficient variation in the dependent 
variable, while 15 (62.5%), of the remaining 24 were significant. On two provisions 
- 
recourse to safeguard action (Q25) and competition policy (Q49) 
- 
the model did 
not produced any results. In addition, in the case of seven other issues only one 
variable in the model was significant. These were, use of tariffs rather than QRs 
(Q23), proof of injury and consultation before anti-dumping action (Q29 and Q30), 
proof of injury and consultation before countervailing action (Q31 and (Q33), limited 
use of rules of origin criteria (Q35) and a moratorium on the imposition of taxes on 
e-commerce. Regarding the performance of individual variables, the results as 
shown in Table 4.7, were mixed. 
TABLE 4.7 
SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE OF VARIABLES 
(TOTAL NUMBER OF EOIJATIONS 
= 32) 
VARIABLE UNRESTRICTED MODEL RESTRICTED MODEL 
(EXPECTED SIGN NUMBER OF EQUATIONS WITH NUMBER OF EQUATIONS WITH 
SIGNIFICANT VALUES SIGNIFICANT VALUES. (IMP_COM 
EXCLUDED 
Number of Number of Number of expected Number of 
expected signs unexpected signs unexpected 
signs signs 
EXPSFAL + 9 0 5 0 
DIVER + 1 11 3 4 
ASSOC + 3 2 3 1 
CAPU 3 2 1 0 
IMP COM 
- 
11 1 
- - 
As shown in column 2 of the table, export performance (EXPFSAL) and 
perceptions about competitiveness (IMP_COM) recorded the largest number of 
expected signs indicating that they influenced firms to support WTO sponsored 
liberalisation. There is limited support for the proposition that association (ASSOC) 
has a positive effect on liberalisation policies. There is also limited support for the 
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hypothesis that capital under-utilisation (CAPU) has a negative effect on such 
policies. In both cases, the number of significant coefficients with the expected 
signs is relatively low. Similar to the results obtained using principal components 
analysis, there appears to be strong evidence that the degree of diversification 
(DIVER) influences firms not to support liberalisation policies. 
Likelihood ratio tests were conducted to identify the influence of firm performance 
as opposed to management perceptions on the trade policy preferences of firms. 
With the exclusion of management competitiveness perceptions (IMP_COM), the 
number of significant equations fell marginally to 11 (45.8% of the total number). 
Likelihood ratio tests of the hypothesis that perceptions have no influence on the 
trade policy preferences of firms showed that it can be rejected only in the case of 
Q19, Q21, Q22, and Q36. Column 3 of Table 4.7 however shows that with the 
exclusion of IMP_COM, the number of significant variables (both with the expected 
sign and the unexpected signs) is lower. The evidence regarding the influence of 
IMP_COM on trade policy preference is therefore mixed. 
4.4.2.2 WTO Principles (Q19 
- 
Q21) 
With respect to WTO principles, the results show that there is a positive relationship 
between competitiveness perceptions (IMP_COM) and support for all WTO 
principles 
- 
non-discrimination, national treatment and transparency (Q19 
- 
Q21). 
Export performance (EXPFSAL) has a positive influence on the principles of non- 
discrimination and national treatment only (Q19 & Q20). 
There is a negative relationship between diversification (DIVER) and support for 
WTO principles (Q19 
- 
Q21). This result is not in keeping with the literature. As 
noted earlier, the explanation for the negative sign could be that these firms are 
diversified in the first instance because they doubt the competitive strength of any 
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one product given the small size of the domestic market. In this case, these firms 
may tend not to favour liberalisation. 
Chi-square values based on log-likelihood ratio tests show that all equations on 
WTO principles are significant at the 95% level. 
4.4.2.3 VVTO Agreements (Q22 
- 
Q47) 
Manufacturers strongly support recourse to anti-dumping action (Q28), 
harmonisation of customs procedures (Q34), use of standards and technical 
regulations (Q37), use of sanitary and phyto-santiary regulation (Q39), protection of 
intellectual property of local and foreign firms (Q43) and (Q44), and full observance 
of WTO dispute settlement procedures (Q45) and (Q46). For these questions, no 
regression results could be generated due to lack of variation in the dependent 
variable. 
Generally, firms which consider that they are competitive (IMP_COM) support the 
various instruments for liberalisation. This support is significant in relation to 
elimination of import restrictions (Q22), tariff reductions overtime (Q24), safeguard 
action by tariffs only (Q26), the temporary nature of safeguard action (Q27), 
transparent import licensing (Q36), the limitations on use of standards (Q38) and 
sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures (Q40), and TRIMS (Q42). One apparent 
anomaly is that competitiveness perceptions influence firms not to support taking 
action against subsidised imported products (Q31). This however could be in 
keeping with the view expressed by the manufacturing sector that subsidisation is 
not as great a problem as it is for the agricultural sector. 
Of all the variables, diversification (DIVER) appears to have the most protectionist 
influence. This factor leads firms not to favour the elimination of QRs (Q22), 
reductions in tariffs overtime (Q24), safeguard action by tariffs only (Q26), proof of 
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injury by firms before anti-dumping action is taken (Q29) or countervailing duties 
are imposed (Q32), consultation with the offending country before imposing a 
countervailing duty (Q33), nor transparency in import licensing (Q36). These results 
again reinforce the suggestion that diversification may have come about because of 
perceived vulnerability of firms. Diversification leads firms to favour preshipment 
inspection of goods (Q41), perhaps seeing opportunities for restricting trade. 
Export performance (EXPFSAL) generally leads firms to favour trade liberalisation. 
This factor is significant in relation to the elimination of QRs (Q22), the use of tariffs 
as safeguards rather than QRs (Q26), temporary use of safeguards (Q27), not 
using rules of origin criteria to inhibit trade (Q35) and transparency in import 
licensing procedures (Q36). Like competitiveness perceptions, the export 
performance factor is clearly in favour of trade liberalisation. There is no result with 
an unexpected sign which is significant. 
Capacity under-utilisation (CAPU) leads firms not support the replacement of QRs 
with tariffs (Q23), reduction of those tariffs overtime (Q24), nor proof of injury before 
countervailing action is taken (Q32). Not in keeping with what is expected, this 
variable influenced firms to favour informing another country before anti-dumping 
action is taken (Q30), and preshipment inspection (Q41). 
The association (ASSOC) of firms is not a very strong influence on their support for 
liberalisation. Firms with external association support only three provisions: the 
requirements that technical regulation (Q38) and health and safety measures are 
not used to impede trade (Q40), and TRIMS compliance (Q42). These instruments 
which can be used as non-tariff barriers are very important for firms operating 
across boarders. Firms with external association, however, disapprove of 
liberalisation in one area 
- 
no restrictions on electronic commerce (Q47). With 
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respect to this issue firms might be unsure as to how changes in the status quo 
would affect their operations. 
4.4.2.4 INTO New Issues (Q48 
- 
Q50) 
In relation to the new issues being considered in the WTO 
- 
Environment Policy, 
Investment Policy and Competition Policy 
- 
export performance (EXPFSAL) has 
influenced firms to favour WTO rules in the first two areas (Q48 & Q50). 
Association (ASSOC) has influenced firms not to support a moratorium on 
restrictions for environmental reasons (Q48). Diversification (DIVER), in keeping 
with previous results, influences firms not to support MFN treatment for investors 
(Q50). 
In summary, ordered probit analysis lends some support to the proposition that the 
export performance and competitiveness perceptions of firms cause Barbadian 
manufacturing firms to support liberalisation. Weaker evidence shows that 
association also has a positive effect. Diversification influences these firms not to 
support liberalisation. There is weak evidence that capital under-utilisation 
negatively affects the perceptions of firm about trade liberalisation. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
This paper investigated the support of firms for trade liberalisation through an 
examination of the responses of firms to essential aspects of WTO disciplines. 
These disciplines are aimed at the liberalisation of trade, and require member 
countries to implement market access commitments, change all trade policy laws to 
recognise WTO disciplines, and to be transparent in their trade relations. 
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The study is the first to be done on Barbados, and is generally wider in scope than 
previous studies on international trade agreements as reported in the literature. It 
examined thirty two WTO provisions covering principles and agreements as well as 
new issues. 
Survey responses of manufacturing firms to WTO principles, agreements and 
issues analysed in Chapter 3, showed that firms reject WTO disciplines as a 
package. Firms are however selective in terms of the areas which they support 
depending on self interests. They especially do not favour WTO principles on 
national treatment and transparency. 
In relation to WTO Agreements, firms especially support aspects of those 
agreements which leave room for offering protection, such as recourse to 
safeguard provisions, anti-dumping and subsidies action, and the use of technical 
barriers and sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures. 
While firms are not in favour of transparency as a principle, they are in favour of 
some specific areas embraced by this concept. For example, they are in favour of 
transparency in import licensing and customs procedures, indicating that it is the 
overall philosophy rather than its application in specific areas which is of concern to 
them. Support for those disciplines as well as support for the protection of 
intellectual property rights, rulings in cases of dispute, and the adoption of anti- 
competitive rules suggest that the concerns of firms maybe about fair trade and not 
only free trade. 
Regression analysis using both OLS and ordered probit techniques were employed 
in this chapter to examine the factors influencing the preferences of firms. In 
keeping with the literature, the paper employed the concept that the analysis of firm 
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responses can be structured under two broad headings; management perceptions 
about import competitiveness, and the characteristics of firms. 
The model developed for Barbados included the import competitiveness 
perceptions of managers, the external association of firms, the degree of 
diversification of firms, export performance, and the percentage of capacity under- 
utilisation. All variables with the exception of capacity under-utilisation where a 
negative sign was expected, all variables were expected to have a positive 
influence on the support of firms for WTO rules. 
The results of OLS regression are weak. They however suggests that export 
performance and competitiveness perceptions influence firms to support 
liberalisation policies. Diversification however reduces support for liberalisation. 
Capital utilisation and the external association of firms do not greatly influence the 
stances taken by firms. 
At a more detailed level, ordered probit regression was used to individually 
examine WTO provisions and possible provisions on three new issues. In general, 
there was no robust evidence regarding the influence of any of the variables across 
all the areas. However, export performance and competitiveness perceptions 
appear to be strongest in positively influencing firm's support for liberalisation. Much 
weaker evidence exists in the case of firm association. Capital under-utilisation in 
general influences firms not to support liberalisation. The major anomaly is that 
diversification has a negative, rather than the expected positive, influence on trade 
liberalisation. 
With one exception, the results are in keeping with the predictions of theories on 
the political economy of protection. In keeping with Helleiner (1977a) and Milner 
(1988) export performance has a positive influence on the support of firms for open 
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trade. As hypothesised by Milner and Yoffie (1989), capital under-utilisation has a 
negative effect on firm support for liberalisation policies. Similar to the results of 
studies undertaken by Pugel and Walter (1985) and Scheerlinck, Hens, and 
S'Jegers (1996a and 1996b) firm association, and competitiveness perceptions 
were found to influence firms to support liberalisation. Both Pugel and Walter 
(1985) and Scheerlinck, Hens, and S'Jegers (1996a) found strong evidence that 
diversification positively influences the preference of firms for liberalisation. The 
later study of Scheerlinck, Hens, and S'Jegers (1996b) found only weak evidence 
for the positive influence of diversification. This study has found that in the case of 
firms in Barbados, diversification has a negative influence on support for 
liberalisation. This could possibly be a small economy effect whereby given the 
small size of the home market, firms produce many different products as a strategy 
to remain profitable. More diversified firms may therefore be relatively more 
insecure about trade liberalisation than less diversified firms. 
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END NOTES 
1 In the case of some countries (especially developing countries), a tariff is likely 
to both assist government in raising revenue and also protect domestic 
producers. 
2 In as much as the study is on the growing area of trade in services which has 
some prominence in the WTO, it is still of relevance to this review. 
3 Association is measured somewhat differently in Sheerlinck, Hens and S'Jegers 
(1 996a). Association takes the value of 0,1, or 2 depending on the status of the 
firm under Belgium law. 
4 The data was obtained from the BIDC Directory of Manufacturers and Service 
Companies 1996. 
5 Exports here refer to both CARICOM and extra-regional exports. 
6 Models were tested with log transformation of some variables. The results did 
not improve. 
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PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND BARBADOS' 
EXPORT PERFORMANCE 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The pure theory of international trade does not seek to explain the competitive 
differences of firms on export markets. The theory is based on the assumption of 
perfect competition where all firms earn normal profits, and are equally 
competitive. The conditions which exist to ensure those outcomes include the 
existence of a large number of buyers and sellers on the market, the production 
of identical products, inability of firms to influence price, low costs of entry and 
exit in the market, and the free and full availability of information to all firms. 
Under those assumptions, firm characteristics are not important in determining 
their competitive position (Lall and Kumar, 1981). 
Later theories on commodity trade, including the factor proportion theory and 
technology theories, seek to explain export performance under the assumption of 
imperfect competition. Differences in the characteristics of firms based on such 
factors as technology, productivity, firm size and product differentiation can 
determine the competitive position of firms in export markets. 
A number of studies, notably Courakis and Roque (1988), Conlon (1992), and 
Auquier (1980), have investigated the factors influencing firm level export 
performance and have pointed to the importance of such determinants as factor 
endowments, technology and economies of scale. In addition, a number of other 
studies, including Kumar and Siddharthan (1994), and Goodman and Ceyhum 
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(1976), have noted that business strategies and government policies also impact 
on export performance. 
For developing countries, an understanding of the industry characteristics which 
promote and inhibit export performance is important, given changes in the global 
economy. The process of trade liberalisation and globalisation is requiring that 
firms increase their international competitiveness in order to retain or increase 
their market share. It is therefore important for governments to be aware of the 
factors which impact on the export performance of firms in order to design 
appropriate strategies to assist these firms. 
In the case of Barbados and other small economies in the Caribbean, there is 
also the added dimension that trade liberalisation is systematically reducing the 
trade preferences enjoyed by firms in the region. Those preferences, which are 
offered under such agreements as the GSP, CBI, CARIBCAN and LOME 
(discussed in Chapter 2), are being impacted on in two ways. First, post 1995 
WTO rules require member countries to bind their tariffs, and to undertake tariff 
reductions. These reductions have resulted in a decrease of the margin of 
preference offered under the above preferential agreements. Secondly, 
Barbados and other preference-receiving countries in the Caribbean are 
engaged in international trade negotiations to create free trade agreements with 
countries in the Americas, and in Europe. WTO rules, on which those 
negotiations are based, require the elimination of tariffs on "substantially all 
trade". That requirement means that the benefits of preferential arrangements 
are likely to progressively diminish as those arrangements are put in place 
(Appendix 7). 
Given those developments, it is necessary to establish and implement trade and 
industrial policies which will enable firms which benefit from trade concessions to 
remain competitive as preferences are reduced and eventually eliminated. 
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5.1.1 Objectives of the study 
The objective of this study is to examine how factor endowments, technology, 
and scale economies variables influence manufacturing export performance in 
Barbados. It will also examine how the existence of preferential trade 
arrangements impact on those exports. 
The research is important, as it will add to the limited work undertaken on the 
determination of export performance in developing countries. It will especially 
enable a comparison of the factors influencing export performance in developed 
countries with those in a small developing economy. In addition, the study will 
allow for a greater understanding of how preferential trade arrangements impact 
on export performance of developing countries in general. 
5.1.2 Structure of the study 
This study has five sections. Section 5.2 is a review of the theoretical and 
empirical literature on factors influencing export performance. In section 5.3 a 
model is developed for Barbados. In section 5.4 econometric analysis is 
undertaken of the factors determining the export performance of Barbadian 
manufacturing firms. Section 5.5, the conclusion, summarises the findings of the 
study. 
5.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
5.2.1 Theoretical Framework 
A number of papers have examined the factors determining the export 
performance of firms focusing mainly on factor endowment and technology factors. 
As noted by Courakis and Roque (1988), model specifications generally rely on 
the following general form: 
(X; )=f(HO; +ESj +TV1) 
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Where: 
(X) = Export performance, comparative advantage or similar 
variable; 
HO = Heckscher-Ohlin or Factor input variable; 
ES = Economies of scale factor; and 
TV = Technological variables. 
The subscript i refers to the ih industry. 
Variables used in models to represent factor endowment variables (HO), attempt 
to capture the essence of the Heckscher-Ohlin model. The model holds that a 
country which is abundant in a particular factor, be it land, labour or capital, will be 
able to produce goods which require more of its abundant factor, relatively less 
costly than another country or other countries. 
Following directly from this is the proposition that a country will produce and export 
that good, the production of which is intensive in the abundant factor of the 
country. Therefore, it is generally expected that as developing countries are 
relatively labour abundant they will export goods which are intensive in labour, and 
particularly unskilled labour. In models on developing countries, a positive 
relationship is anticipated between labour usage and export performance, and a 
negative relationship between capital (physical) usage and export performance 
(Helleiner, 1976). Wood and Berge (1997) note that with increases in the mobility 
of physical capital, that factor is not critical to the determination of export 
performance. 
Economy of scale (ES) variables relate to the production capacity of the firm or 
industry. It is usually measured by sales of the firm, employment, capital assets, 
value added or a combination of those factors. Most studies include size as 
measured by sales or employment to capture the effects of scale. Economies of 
scale affect export performance in several ways. First, an expanding firm in a small 
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market can reach a point where the domestic market is saturated and in order to 
expand it must export to other markets. Secondly, a large monopolist firm may be 
able to benefit from price discrimination in a foreign market. In addition, large firms 
often benefit from marketing capacity and finance which enable them to bear the 
risks of exploring foreign markets (Hirsch and Lev, 1974). 
The large size of a firm is generally expected to confer advantages in terms of 
capacity to penetrate export markets in whatever country the firm operates, and to 
bear the risks of distributing in international markets. Given those factors, a 
positive relationship is generally expected between firm size and export 
performance. 
Technological considerations (TV) in determining trade flows come in many forms. 
The most cited is the technological gap theory attributed to Michael Posner, and 
the product cycle theory attributed to Raymond Vernon. 
The technological gap theory essentially states that when a new product or 
product innovation is developed in a particular country, that country will enjoy an 
advantage in trade over other countries which trade in similar product(s). This 
country will enjoy a comparative advantage in the production of the particular good 
although it may not have a comparative advantage in terms of factor intensities or 
factor endowments. This comparative advantage will be sustained until the new 
technology is adopted by the other trading partners. 
In the case of the product cycle theory, product innovation takes place in a high- 
wage country which is relatively abundant in capital and the product will be 
manufactured in a place close to the home market. However, as the product 
becomes standardised, and as knowledge becomes diffused, exports of the 
product may be threatened by competitors. As a result, companies will seek to 
maintain their market position by moving to low wage labour abundant countries. 
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Following the neo-technology models, developed countries which are leaders in 
technological innovations are expected to have a positive relationship between 
technology and export performance. On the other hand, there is expected to be a 
negative relationship between export performance and technology in the case of 
developing countries. The latter generally do not develop new technologies, and 
there is a lag in their ability to obtain technology from developed countries 
(Courakis and Roque, 1988). 
5.2.2 Empirical Research 
While there appears to be consensus on the core factors which should be included 
in examining export performance, there is much less agreement on the types of 
proxies of such factors. In terms of export performance variables, Goodman and 
Ceyhun (1976) pointed out that there are several definitions of export performance 
of firms. These include: 
- 
the country share of world exports by industry; 
- 
industry share of total country exports; and 
- 
the share of industry (or firm) exports or net exports to total industry 
(or firm) sales. 
The Goodman and Ceyhun study itself used the geometric average of export 
growth and export to sales ratio in two time periods to measure export 
performance. The particular functional form used in the study was: 
EP; t = {(Yit/Yit-j) (Rjt/Rjt-1)}; 1/2 
Where: 
EP, t = Export performance; and 
Y; t = exports in the ith industry in period t; and 
Rit = Y; t/S; t, the ratio of exports to sales in the iu' industry in period t; 
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Export performance as a ratio to firm or industry sales is limited in that it only 
conveys information about the export intensity of the firm or industry. The share of 
world exports of the firm or industry provides more information about 
competitiveness. Data limitations have however often forced researchers to use 
the ratio of firm exports to total firm sales as the proxy of export performance. 
For factor proportion variables, studies generally include capital and labour 
intensity. Helleiner (1976) used seven different variables to measure differences in 
factor intensity. These included: 
- 
total capital intensity, both human and physical as measured by 
value added per employee; 
- 
skill-intensity, measured by the average wage; 
- 
skill-intensity, measured by the proportion of the labour force which 
is technical, scientific and professional; 
- 
capital-intensity, measured by the capital stock per employee; 
- 
capital-intensity, measured by the wage share in value added; 
- 
capital-intensity, measured by non-wage value added per employee; 
and 
- 
natural resource intensity, measured by natural resource inputs 
per unit of output. 
Conlon (1992) used four variables to measure factor usage within an industry: 
- 
capital intensity, measured by the value of fixed tangible assets per 
person employed in an industry, divided by an estimate of the fixed 
tangible assets per person used in all manufacturing industries; 
-a capital stock index which is the capital in an industry, normalised 
by the estimated capital stock in all industries; 
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- 
the estimated proportion of renewable and non-renewable resources 
used in intermediate input; and 
- 
the sum of both renewable and non-renewable resources. 
Some studies used the labour skill factor alone to take account of factor 
proportions, for example, Goodman and Ceyhun (1976), Kraft (1989), and 
Courakis and Roque (1988). In the case of the first study, the variable was defined 
as the ratio of non-production workers to production workers, or the ratio of skilled 
to unskilled workers. 
In the second study, Kraft (1989) measured skill as the ratio of unskilled to skilled 
blue collar workers; the ratio of employees who have an academic degree to all 
blue and while collar workers; and a third variable as the ratio of white to blue 
collar workers. Courakis and Roque (1988) used similar variables to represent 
skilled and unskilled labour in their study. 
The distinction between labour and capital in any particular manufacturing industry 
is likely to be a blurred one, as labour also utilise capital in the production of 
products. Attempting to disaggregate the effect of both factors is likely to result in 
some double counting. One of the variables used by Helleiner (1976) 
- 
total capital 
intensity 
- 
avoids the problem of double counting. It however provides little 
information on the two factors which are important for understanding trade 
between different countries. Using factor rewards to measure factor intensities, 
assumes that there is some correlation between such rewards and factor usage in 
all industries, which may not hold across a number of industries producing different 
products with different requirements for labour/capital combinations. 
In relation to technology, Courakis and Roque (1988) note that technology 
variables in research are usually proxied by indices which reflect R&D 
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expenditures; skilled labour intensities; the value or number of patents; or the first 
date of trade. 
The Courakis and Roque study itself used two variables to measure technological 
factors: 
(1) Follower technological variables were defined as; 
- 
skilled labour to capital ratio; and 
- 
the ratio of R&D expenditures to the value of output. 
(2) Leader technological variables were defined as; 
- 
percentage of scientists and engineers in total country 
employment; and 
- 
ratio of R&D expenditures to the value of country output. 
Goodman and Ceyhun (1976) used similar variables to measure technological 
innovations. In their study, technological innovations were proxied by; the ratio of 
R&D expenditure to total sales; and the employment of scientists and engineers to 
total employment. In his comparative study on the exports of Australia and East 
Asian countries, Conlon (1992) broadened the concept of technology to include 
human capital, and used eleven variables as proxies. These included: 
- 
administrative and managerial personnel as a percentage of the 
workforce; 
- 
percentage of tertiary qualified employees; 
- 
proportion of female production workers of total employees; 
- 
proportion of female production workers of total female employment; 
- 
proportion of females of total employees; 
- 
ratio of research and development expenditures to value of industry 
turnover/shipment; 
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- 
ratio of research and development expenditures to value added; 
- 
percentage of scientists and engineers to total employees; 
- 
percentage of scientists, engineers and technicians to total 
employees; 
- 
proportion of wages to value added; and 
- 
proportion of wages of production workers to total wages and 
salaries. 
The diversity in variables used to proxy technology is evidence of the difficulty in 
defining the term. The variables employed provide a narrow indication of the use 
of technology. 
Research and development is used in many of the studies. However, as pointed 
out by Kleinknecht (1987), R&D in small firms without an R&D department may be 
informal and difficult to measure. In the case of those measures which use 
categories of employees to measure technology use, care must be taken to 
distinguish this variable from factor endowment influences. 
The economies of scale variable is proxied by firm size in many studies. Firm size 
is defined in different ways. Auquier (1980) defined firm size in terms of the size of 
production, and also the proportion of output exported. Kraft (1989) defined size 
purely in terms of the number of employees. Conlon (1992) used both scale and 
size as a single variable. The proxies used in the study for this variable included: 
- 
the percentage of establishments employing varying levels of 
persons. The study used four levels, firms representing 10,20, and 
50 or fewer persons, and 100 or more persons; 
- 
employment per enterprise (or group of establishments); 
- 
employment per establishment; 
- 
number of enterprises; 
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- 
average number of establishments per enterprise; and 
- 
number of small enterprises as a proportion of the total number of 
enterprises in the industry. 
In addition to factor endowment variables, scale variables and technology 
variables, several studies also include other factors such as; tariff protection, 
industry growth and advertising, capital ownership, association with external firms, 
and product differentiation. 
The usual assumption about advertising is that the higher the level of adverstising, 
the higher sales will be. Both Helleiner (1976), and Goodman and Ceyhun (1976) 
included the ratio of advertising to sales in their models. Growth within an industry 
can play an important role in export performance. Firms operating in an 
environment of growth are more likely to expand than firms operating in contracting 
areas. Industry growth was measured by Goodman and Ceyhun (1976) as the 
ratio of sales in the present period, to sales in the previous period. Firms often 
seek to maintain or increase their market shares through product differentiation. 
This variable can therefore be important in determining export performance. 
Helleiner (1976) measured the degree of product differentiation by the standard 
deviation or the degree of dispersion of the unit value in the market of the 
importing country. Regarding tariff protection, Lowinger (1975) found foreign tariffs 
on US exports to be significant in determining US export performance. 
Relatively few studies have examined the export performance of firms in 
developing countries. Among the studies which examined the export performance 
of firms in developing countries are Lall and Kumar (1981), Lall (1986), and Kumar 
and Siddharthan (1994). 
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Lall and Kumar (1981) investigated the export performance of the 100 largest 
engineering firms in India during the period 1966 
- 
1968, and 1976 
- 
1978. Four 
alternative measures of export performance were used: 
- 
exports propensity, or export as a percentage of sales; 
- 
absolute value of exports; 
- 
growth of export values, between 1966-1968, and 1976-1978; 
and 
- 
change in export propensity between the two periods. 
The explanatory variables used in the study included: 
- 
total sales by the firm as a scale variable; 
- 
profitability, measured by profits before tax; 
- 
change in profitability; 
- 
technological activity, measured by a dummy variable which took the 
value of 1 if the firm is a registered R&D performer and 0 otherwise; 
- 
Composition of industry, measured by a dummy variable which took 
the value of 1 if the firm was mainly a producer of machinery and 
equipment (more advance processes) and 0 otherwise (the usual 
capital stock per worker was tested, but not found to be significant); 
and 
- 
the absolute value of exports in the base year, introduced as a 
control variable to account for the possibility that firms with a high 
level of exports in the base year could not be expected to increase 
their exports as rapidly as other firms. 
Based on OLS estimation, the major findings of the study were; (1) that India had a 
comparative advantage in simpler metal products rather than more complex 
machinery, (2) larger firms tend to export more in absolute terms, (3) firms which 
expand their exports the fastest enjoyed rapid increase in profits, and (4) research 
and development is positively related to the rate of growth of exports. 
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Lall (1986) examined the export performance of leading engineering and chemical 
firms in India using the percentage of exports to total sales as the dependent 
variable, and nine dependent variables; firm size as measured by total sale, age of 
the firm, subsidy granted by government, the proportion of sales revenue devoted 
to advertising, the proportion of total salaries paid to high-income managers and 
technical personnel, royalties as a percentage of sales, the number of licenses 
held by each firm, the percentage of equity held by foreign firms, and formal 
expenditures on research and development. Similar to the 1981 study reviewed 
above, a dummy variable was included in testing the export performance of 
engineering firms to distinguish between firms which primarily make capital goods, 
and those which mainly make simple metal products. 
The study found that there was a positive relationship between export performance 
and firm size, subsidies, advertising and licensing. These factors were however not 
always significant in both sets of industries. Research and development was 
positive for chemical industries but negative for engineering industries. This, 
according to the author, was the result of the differing nature of technical change in 
the two industries, since technological adaptations in the engineering industry may 
not be geared towards export markets. 
The author noted that the results showed that the model worked better for process 
industries like chemicals than for batch or assembly industries like engineering. 
This is attributed to some extent to their different technological characteristics. 
Kumar and Siddharthan (1994) also researched the factors determining the export 
performance of manufacturing enterprises in India using data from 640 firms for 
the periods 1987/88 and 1989/90. The study included the following variables: 
- 
exports to sales ratio (as the independent variable); 
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- 
ratio of R&D expenditure to sales (technology variable); 
- 
proportion of high income employees in total wage bill 
(second technology variable); 
- 
proportion of royalties, licenses and technical fees remitted 
abroad (third technology variable); 
- 
net sales of the company (scale variable); 
- 
gross fixed asset to sales ratio (capital intensity variable): 
- 
advertising expenditure to sales ratio; 
- 
profits before tax to sales ratio; 
- 
total value of imports as a proportion of sales; 
- 
two dummy variables representing the type of foreign 
ownership; and 
- 
two dummy variables each distinguishing between the 
1987/88 and 1989/90 data sets. 
The study used Tobit estimates given the fact that a large number of firms in the 
sample did not export. The major findings of the research were: 
- 
the technology variables were positive and significant for low and 
medium technology activities such as food processing and transport 
equipment indicating that innovation in such areas can improve 
export competitiveness. For high technology industries such as 
electrical machinery and pharmaceuticals, developing countries 
cannot improve their export competitiveness on the basis of R&D; 
the relationship between firm size and export performance appears 
to be non-linear. For some industries, the relationship is an inverted 
U-shape indicating that large oligopolistic firms are not inclined to 
export. For other industries, the relationship is U-shaped indicating 
that a certain minimum size must be reached before exporting 
becomes feasible; 
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- 
advertising increased a firm's export performance in some industries; 
and 
- 
exports in low and medium technology industries are labour 
intensive. For high technology industries, capital intensity is 
necessary for breaking into export markets. 
The results for association were mixed. However, industries with higher levels of 
foreign equity met with some export success. 
Table 5.1 summarises the findings of a sample of studies. The results of the 
research for developing countries are not as clear as theory suggests they should 
be. The studies however do not refute the basic proposition that labour intensity 
and economies of scale factors do positively influence export performance in 
developing countries. The results for technology are more mixed, indicating 
perhaps that research needs to be more disaggregated and should focus on both 
follower and leader technology factors (Courakis and Roque, 1988). Apart from 
these variables, other factors have also been found to be important in determining 
export performance. Among these are advertising (Lall, 1986), association with 
international firms (Kumar and Siddharthan, 1994), wage costs (Helleiner, 1976), 
and both nominal and effective protection in the home market (Willmore, 1992). 
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TABLE 5.1 
SUMMARY OF A SAMPLE OF STUDIES INVESTIGATING THE EXPORT 
PERFORMANCE OF FIRMS 
STUDY INVESTIGATION SIGNIFICANT FACTORS 
Patibandla Exports of 76 Indian firms for 1983-84. OLS Firm size, advertising, relative 
(1995) regression used with exports to sales ratio as the production efficiency 
de endent variable. 
Kumar and Exports of firms in India for the 1987/88 Firm size, technology, 
Siddharthan and1989/90 period. Tobit regression used with export government export promotion 
(1994) to sales ratio as the dependent variable. policies, firm association 
Calof (1994) Relationship between Canadian exports and firm Firm size 
size. 14,072 firms used. Alternative dependent 
variables were: propensity to export, country 
exported to, export attitudes. ANOVA tables used in 
analysis. 
Conlon (1992) Manufactured exports of 85 Australian, 61 Korean, Natural resources and capital 
61 Singapore and 29 Taiwan firms. Data from 1980- intensity (Australia). R&D 
85 used in the OLS estimates. The dependent and skilled labour force other 
variable was exports to sales. countries 
Bonaccorsi Relationship between Italian exports and firm size. Firm size 
(1992) Analysis of variance used with export to sales ratio 
as measure of export performance. A total of 2,614 
observations used. 
Willmore Transnationals and Brazilian foreign trade. Various Foreign ownership, advertising, 
(1992) dependent variables used including dummy variable capital intensity, vertical 
for exporter and non-exporter. Logit and OLS integration, geographical 
methods used. Data on 17,053 firms used in the concentration, and nominal 
analysis. protection 
Courakis and Exports and imports of 19 Portuguese industries for Physical capital, skilled and 
Roque (1988) the 1972-79 period. OLS estimates were used with unskilled labour, economies of 
exports and imports of industries as the dependent scale 
variables. 
Lall (1986) Export performance of 100 Engineering and 25 Size, subsidy, advertising, R& 
Chemical Indian firms during 1978-80 
. 
OLS D, Foreign ownership 
regression used with export to sales as dependent 
variable. 
Lall and Kumar Engineering exports of 100 Indian firms for the Type of product, profitability, 
(1981) periods 1966-68 and 1976-78. Dependent variables R&D 
include export intensity, change in exports and total 
exports. OLS regression used. 
Auquier (1980) Exports of 60 French firms using 1963 data. Exports Firm size, product 
to sales was the dependent variable. OLS estimates differentiation, tariff 
were undertaken. protection, Trade with other 
EC countries 
Helleiner (1976) Imports of US, Canada and other OECD countries Average wage, capital 
from LDCs intensity, product 
differentiation 
Goodman and US manufacturing exports. Ratio of export growth Scale economies, industry 
Ceyhun (1976) and export share in sales used as dependent variable. growth, R&D, human capital 
OLS cross section and time series used for the 
eriod 1956-68. 
Source: Compiled from various studies. 
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5.3 DEVELOPMENT OF A MODEL FOR BARBADOS 
Economic theory, supported by empirical research, suggests that at least three 
factors should be considered in an investigation into the export performance of 
firms. These are; factor endowments, economies of scale, and technological 
developments. In addition, research also supports the inclusion of other 
important policy variables such as protection, and the association of firms. The 
model developed for Barbados is guided by theory, and the findings of empirical 
research. 
Data on the variables used in the model was obtained from the Trade Policy 
Survey which included ALL registered manufacturing enterprises existing in 
1998. The survey was conducted by mail followed by telephone interviews and 
factory visits to obtain missing information or to clarify responses. The 
methodology used precluded the use of questions which were complex in nature, 
and which would therefore result in inaccurate responses or no responses. 
5.3.1 Dependent Variable 
5.3.1.1 Export Performance 
Export performance of firms is measured by the commonly used ratio of firm 
exports to total firm sales (EXPFSAL)l. Defined in this way, the investigation will 
seek to determine the factors which influence the export intensity of firms. No 
data was available to test Barbados' share of world exports by industry, nor the 
industry share of total Barbados exports. The survey from which data for this 
analysis is taken, focussed on firms and not industries. 
The results of the survey were biased in favour of exporting firms. This is another 
reason for using the export intensity variable. The study could not address the 
151 
Chapter 5 Preferential Trade Agreements 
issue of the propensity (or probability) of firms to export given the preponderance 
of exporting firms in the data set. 
5.3.2 Explanatory Variables 
5.3.2.1 Factor Inputs 
The characteristics of Barbados 
-a small developing economy - including the 
size of its labour force, its population and population density, make it relatively 
abundant in the supply of labour. Following the H-O-S model, it is expected that 
Barbados will export goods which are relatively labour intensive. A measure of 
factor input intensity is included in the model. The variable (CAPWORK), is 
defined as the ratio of the value of capital in use by the firm to the number of 
workers in that firm. It is expected that there will be a negative relationship 
between export performance and CAPWORK. 
5.3.2.2 Economies of Scale 
The economies of scale variable can be measured by sales of the firm or number 
of employees. Stigler (1968) recommended that firm size should be measured by 
sales in a product market, by employees in a labour market, by materials in a 
materials market, and by assets in a capital market. This would suggest that, in 
terms of determining the affect of size on export performance, firm sales are the 
more appropriate measure. 
Some studies have found that there is a non-linear relationship between firm size 
and export performance (Patibandla, 1995; Kumar and Siddharthan, 1994). It is 
expected that in the case of Barbados a certain "critical mass" must be reached 
before exporting becomes possible or even feasible. The relationship between 
firm size and export performance is therefore expected to be U-shaped. Firm 
size FSALE, and its quadratic form (FSALE2) are therefore included in the 
model. 
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5.3.2.3 Technology 
As noted in the literature review, most research attempts to measure technology 
in use in a firm through inclusion of such variables as R&D expenditure, patents 
registered or highly qualified or scientific staff to total staff complement. In the 
case of Barbados, formal R&D expenditures are unlikely to be a good measure, 
given the small size of firm. As noted earlier, R&D in small firms without an R&D 
department may be informal and difficult to measure. In the case of patents, only 
one local patent was registered in Barbados in the last twenty years. This proxy 
for technology is therefore not a good measure of R&D for firms in Barbados. 
The measurement of technology based on a differentiation of technical and non- 
technical staff is also likely to pose problems in the case of small firms where the 
production process is not well structured, and staff work across production areas. 
In addition, given the objective of keeping the questionnaire simple, no questions 
were included which would require the respondent to distinguish between 
different grades of staff (for example, scientific and production personnel). 
A narrow definition of technology is adopted. The use of the new internet 
technology in business was employed as a measure of the firms inclination to 
incorporate the most up-to-date human and capital technology. The dummy 
variable TECH1 measures the use of internet technology by the firm. It takes the 
value of 1 if management personnel in the firm have access to the internet and 0 
otherwise. Given that the internet can now be considered as a follower 
technology, a positive relationship is expected between export performance and 
TECHI. 
5.3.2.4 Other Factors 
Beyond factor endowments, technology and economies of scale factors, a 
number of studies including Kumar and Siddharthan (1994) and Goodman and 
Ceyhum (1976) found that government policies and business strategies can 
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affect the export performance of firms. Based on government policies in 
Barbados and a number of reports on factors affecting the manufacturing sector 
including Maxwell Stamp Plc (1991) and the IADB (1989), four other factors are 
investigated. These are trade preferences, wage costs, the association of firms, 
and protection to domestic businesses. 
5.3.2.4.1 Trade Preferences 
A number of studies, most notably the Commonwealth Secretariat/ World Bank 
Study (2000) stressed that trade preferences are important to the export 
performance of Barbados and other small economies. A variable will therefore be 
included in the model to test for the significance of preferential trade in 
determining the export performance of firms. Although none of the studies 
examined includes preferences as an independent variable, support for its 
inclusion comes from the work of Helleiner (1976) who argued that trade barriers 
are an important factor influencing the export performance of firms. In examining 
the factors determining the export performance of developing countries to the 
USA, the study used import shares into the USA as the dependent variable, to 
overcome the "noise" created by differential trade barriers. In as much as 
preferences reduce or eliminate tariffs (although largely leaving non-tariff barriers 
intact) they reduce some of the "noise" referred to in Helleiner (1976). 
A dummy variable (PREFALL) will be included in the model. The variable will 
take the value of 1 if exports of the firm receive preferences and 0 otherwise. It is 
expected that the variable will be positive. This variable is positive for 72 firms or 
61.5% of firms in the sample. Not all the products of these firms benefit from 
preferences. As noted in Chapter 3 approximately 75.1% of exports from firms 
benefit from preferences. 
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5.3.2.4.2 Wage Costs 
There is a general view in Barbados that labour costs are a major factor 
contributing to the uncompetitiveness of the economy. Included in this view is an 
argument that for the manufacturing sector the impact of labour costs is 
particularly acute, and that high labour costs are contributing to the decline of the 
sector. Given the current liberalisation of the economy, it is argued that these 
costs will negatively affect the sector. This view is supported by international 
lending agencies such as the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank 
and the Inter-American Development Bank which routinely argue that productivity 
is lagging behind wage costs (Chapter 3). 
To investigate this school of thought, a variable to represent wage cost was 
included in the model. The variable WAGSAL is the share of wages in sales of 
the firm. The higher the share of wages in sales of the firm, the less profitable the 
firm will be and the less likelihood that it will be competitive on the export market. 
It is expected that there will be a negative relationship between WAGSAL and 
export performance. 
The negative sign expected for CAPWORK which anticipates that labour skills 
will have a positive influence on Barbados' export performance and the negative 
expected sign for WAGSAL which anticipates that labour costs will have a 
negative impact on export performance require further comment. Together, 
these results would indicate that while Barbados' exports are relatively labour 
intensive, high wage costs can militate against export competitiveness and 
performance. They would also suggest that Barbados' export performance 
depends on the production of goods from labour intensive low wage industries. 
This hypothesis is consistent with the long-standing views of international 
institutions and Barbados' industrial strategy. The IDB (1989) notes that: 
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" Given Barbados' limited resource, the small size of the domestic market, and 
the relative abundance of labor, the prospects for development of the 
manufacturing industry largely depend on its performance in the export of labor- 
intensive products" (IBD, 1989 p. 9). 
The report goes on to note that increasing wage cost erodes Barbados' export 
competitiveness, and such costs should be contained. Traditionally, Barbados' 
industrial strategy has focussed on employment generation in the manufacturing 
sector (Government of Barbados Development Plans 1983 
-2000). This strategy 
was reinforced by the incentives offered to the sector. Indeed those incentives 
heavily favoured firms based on the level of employment (Fiscal Incentives Act 
1974). Given that deliberate policy, Barbados has tended to attract firms 
employing large numbers of workers. At the same time, government has resisted 
lobbing efforts of trade unions to enact minimum wage legislation. It has noted 
that this could increase the cost of production and retard export growth. 
5.3.2.4.3 Association of Firms 
According to the Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank (2000) report on small 
states, one of the strategies which firms in these states should adopt to 
overcome the limitation of small size is to form strategic alliances. At the level of 
empirical research, Kumar and Siddharthan (1994) and Lall (1986) found a 
positive relationship between firm size and export performance. Given these 
considerations, the relationship between the association of firms in Barbados 
with international firms will be investigated. The variable included in the model, 
ASSOC is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm has a joint 
venture, joint marketing or franchise arrangement with foreign firm(s), and 0 
otherwise. 
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5.3.2.4.4 Protection on the Local Market 
The Maxwell Stamp (1991) and other studies (Chapter 2) have argued that tariff 
and principally non-tariff barriers create an anti-export bias in Barbados' trade 
policy regime which encourages firms to produce for the domestic rather than the 
export market. The impact of tariffs on export performance will be investigated. 
The variable (TAR) measures tariff protection on the domestic market, and is 
the percentage of products produced by each firm which attract the maximum 
CARICOM common external tariff (CET). A negative relationship is expected 
between export performance and tariff protection. 
5.3.2.4.5 Protection on Export Markets 
Several studies including UNCTAD (1998), and Onguglo (2000) have suggested 
that some goods in which developing countries have a comparative advantage 
are excluded from preferential arrangements or face significant non-tariff barriers. 
The non-tariff barriers include high rules of origin criteria (normally wholly 
produced or produced from primary materials), sanitary and phyto-sanitary 
measures, and product standards. As indicated earlier, none of the arrangements 
contain broad provisions on how non-tariff barriers are to be minimised or 
eliminated. The existence of these barriers, impact negatively on the capability of 
developing countries to maximise the tariff preferences offered. A variable will be 
included to assess the impact of these embedded preference restrictions on 
export performance. The variable EPR, takes the value of 1 if any product 
produced by the firm is excluded under the provisions of any of the 
arrangements, or the rules of origin criteria which require that the product be 
wholly produced or produced from primary materials. The variable takes a value 
of 0 otherwise. 
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5.3.3 Model Specification and Data 
The specification of the model and the expected signs are as follows: 
EXPFSAL; = ßo + ßi CAPWORK; + ß2 FSALE; + ß3 (FSALE; )2 + ß4 TECH1; 
+ A5 WAGSAL; + ß6 PREFALL; + ß7 ASSOC; 
+ß8 TAR; +ß9EPR; +ei (5.1) 
Where the coefficients Al ßa, ß6, and ß, are expected to be positive, and ßI, ß2, 
P5, ß8, ßs, negative, and where: 
EXPFSAL; = the ratio of export sales to total sales of firm i; 
CAPWORK; = the ratio of the value of capital employed in 
firm i, to the number of workers in firm i; 
FSALE; = the value of sales of firm i; 
(FSALE; )2 = the squared of the value of sales of firm i; 
TECH1; =a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if 
management personnel in firm i have access to the 
internet to conduct business, and 0 otherwise; 
WAGSAL; = the share of wages in sales for firm i; 
PREFALL; =a dummy variable which takes the value of I if 
firm i benefits from trade preferences, and 0 otherwise; 
ASSOC; =a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if 
firm i has external association and 0 otherwise; 
TAR; = the percentage of products produced by firm i, 
which attract the maximum CARICOM Tariff rate; 
EPR; =a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if goods 
produced by firm i are excluded from preferential trade 
arrangements, if the rules of origin require the good to be 
wholly produced or produced from base materials, or are 
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classified as being sensitive by a preference giving 
country, otherwise 0; and 
e; = error term. 
5.4 ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
The data used in the analysis was obtained from a survey of manufacturing 
enterprises in Barbados based on their 1997 performance. Survey responses 
are highlighted in Chapters 2,3 and Appendix 3. As discussed in the appendix, 
the responses are representative of the population over firms and employment in 
manufacturing sub-sectors. 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show some characteristics of the variables used in the 
analysis. 
TABLE 5.2 
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
VARIABLE MEAN STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
COEFFICIENT 
OF 
VARIATION 
MINIMUM MAXIMUM 
EXPFSAL 20.83061 28.50675 1.368503 0 100 
CAPWORK 108961.3 172990.4 1.587631 328.02 975521 
FSALE 6364174 9187094 1.443564 26000 48760106 
FSALE 1.24E+08 3.44E+08 2.768134 676E+06 2.38E+09 
WAGSAL 0.268752 0.137347 0.511056 2.17E-02 0.63333 
TAR 4.162393 3.34022 0.802758 0 100 
Table 5.2 shows that variation of data for the variables WAGSAL and TAR is 
relatively small. The largest variation is in respect of sales (FSALE and FSALE2) 
and CAPWORK indicating that a wide cross section of companies are 
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represented in the sample. In the case of EXPFSAL, some companies do not 
export while others (mainly offshore companies) export all of their output. 
Another feature of the data is that in relation to the variable TAR, some 
companies do not benefit from the maximum CARICOM CET while, for other 
companies, all of their output is protected by the maximum CET. 
Table 5.3 shows a description of the discrete variables used in the model. The 
data reveals that a large percentage of firms (70.1 % and 69.2% respectively) do 
not have internet technology (TECH1) and do not have any form of external 
association (ASSOC). Regarding trade preferences, 61.5% of all firms benefit 
from (or make use of) the arrangements. 
TABLE 5.3 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON DISCRETE VARIABLES 
VARIABLESa POSITIVE RESPONSES NEGATIVE RESPONSESC 
TECH1 35(29.9%) 82 70.1% 
ASSOC 36(30. % 81(69.2%) 
PREFALL 72(61. % 45(38.5%) 
EPR 89 76% 28 24% 
a. Data is in relation to all 117 companies in the sample. 
b. Positive responses represent the value of 1 for the dummy variable. 
c. Negative responses represent the value of 0. 
Correlation analysis showed that there is a low relationship between the 
explanatory variables. The highest coefficient value (r = 
. 
44618) is between the 
variables PREFALL and EXPFSAL. The results of test for multicollinearity using 
auxiliary regressions are reported in Table 5.4. The auxiliary regressions do not 
suggest that multicollinearity is a problem, as R2(adj) are low and the equations 
are not significant2. 
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TABLE 5.4 
MULTICOLLINEARITY TESTS USING AUXILIARY REGRESSIONS 
R F-VALUE 
Tar = f( Ca work, Fsale, Tech1, Wagsal, Prefall, Assoc, EPR) 
-. 
05 
. 
19 < Fo. o5 
Ca work = f( Tar, Fsale, Techl, Wagsal, Prefall, Assoc, EPR) 
. 
06 2.16 < Fo. os 
Fsale = f( Ca work, Tar, Tech!, Wagsal, Prefall, Assoc, EPR) 
. 
10 2.09 < Fo. o5 
Techl = Ca work, Fsale, Tar, Wagsal, Prefall, Assoc, EPR) 
-. 
05 
. 
20 < Fo. o5 
Wagsal =f Ca work, Fsale, Techl, Tar, Prefall, Assoc, EPR) 
. 
06 2.07 < Fo. o5 
Prefall Ca work, Fsale, Techl, Wagsal, Tar, Assoc, EPR) 
. 
05 1.89 < Fo. o5 
Assoc = Ca work, Fsale, Techl, Wagsal, Prefall, Tar, EPR) 
. 
05 1.94 < Fo. os 
EPR =f Ca work, Fsale, Techl, Wagsal, Prefall, Assoc, Tar, 
-. 
003 
. 
94< F0.05 
F value at 99% level of signiticance is z. ttu 
5.4.1 Empirical Results 
OLS regression analysis was used to investigate the relationship between firm 
characteristics and export performance. William Greene's LIMDEP was used to 
estimate the model. The results are in Table 5.5. All variables carry the expected 
signs and are statistically significant at the 90 percent level or better. The 
explanatory power of the model is around 30% which is not high. The value is 
however within the range for similar cross sectional studies. A joint test of all the 
variables, as measured by the F-ratio, shows that the relationships are 
significant3. 
The Breusch-Pagan test indicates that the problem of heteroscedasticity could 
not be ruled out. The estimated t-values for White's heteroscedasticity-consistent 
variances and standard errors (see Technical Appendix 4) are therefore reported. 
The results show that capital intensity (CAPWORK) is significant at the ten 
percent level, and carries the correct sign. The data used in the analysis is total 
exports and not exports to a specific country. Some countries to which Barbados 
export will be more labour intensive than Barbados itself. However, developed 
and more developed countries are Barbados' major export trading partners. 
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Indeed, the USA is Barbados' major trading partner accounting for over 15% of 
exports on average. The results therefore supports the H-O-S or factor 
endowments theory which suggests that Barbados as a labour intensive country 
relative to industrial capital intensive countries, would export relatively labour 
intensive goods. These results suggest that Barbados' competitive advantage is 
in producing manufactured goods which have a high labour content. The results 
are in keeping with the findings of Kumar and Siddharthan (1994), and Courakis 
and Roque (1988) who found capital to be significant in determining the export 
performance of firms in India and Portugal respectively. 
The performance of WAGSAL shows that there is a negative relationship 
between wages costs and export performance. This suggests that increases in 
wage costs could undermine the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector as 
suggested by the World Bank and other international agencies. 
Together, the negative signs on CAPWORK and the WAGSAL as expected 
confirm that although Barbados' exports are labour intensive, Barbados must 
constrain wage costs, as these cost can negatively impact on export 
competitiveness. 
FSALE and FSALE2 are significant at the one percent level. The negative sign of 
the estimated coefficient of FSALE, and the positive sign of the estimated 
coefficient of FSALE2 show that export intensity declines as firm size increases 
until "critical mass" level is reached, and the firm is large enough to export. 
Patibandla (1995) found reported similar results for India. The results are 
interesting as firms in Barbados are regarded as being small (Commonwealth 
Secretariat/World Bank, (2000); Bernal (1998)) relative to firms in larger 
countries. It would appear that scale economies are important for export 
performance irrespective of the size of the economy in which the firm operates. 
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Internet technology, because of its wide diffusion to virtually all countries, can be 
considered to be a follower technology. The coefficient of TECH1 is significant 
and indicates that there is a positive relationship between this type of technology 
and export performance. The findings support the pioneering work of Courakis 
and Roque (1988) which found that follower technology can be used by 
countries which are not leaders in the field, to increase export performance. 
As expected, there is a positive relationship between export performance and 
ASSOC. This is an indication that firms in Barbados do better in exporting if there 
is a formal association with a foreign firm which has a marketing or other base in 
export market(s). The results support the findings of Kumar and Siddharthan 
(1994), and Willmore (1992). 
The negative coefficient of TAR, with significance at the ten percent level, 
indicates that protection on the home market negatively impact on export 
performance. This result is in keeping with the findings of Willmore (1992), and 
Conlon (1992). The results also lend support to the findings of studies done on 
manufacturing by Maxwell Stamp (1991), which suggest that high levels of 
protection resulted in an anti-export bias in Barbados trade policy regime. 
As expected there is a significant positive relationship between trade preferences 
(PREFALL) and export performance, indicating that the existence of preferential 
arrangements do positively influence Barbados' export performance. The 
variable EPR, is significant with a negative sign, indicating that barriers 
embedded in preferential trade arrangements such as the exclusion of products 
from preferential trade arrangements, as well as stringent rules of origin criteria 
do restrict export under such arrangements. The significance of these two 
variables is in keeping with views of developing countries, and supported by such 
institutions as UNCTAD, that protection in developed countries restricts exports 
of developing countries. 
163 
Chapter 5 Preferential Trade Agreements 
Likelihood ratio tests support the hypothesis that PREFALL and EPR have an 
influence on export performance. The result reconfirms the importance of 
preferences to Barbados' export performance. 
A number of questions can be raised regarding the inclusion of some variable in 
the equation, as well as the use of OLS regression given that some firms do not 
export. In the case of the first issue, the sales of the firm are used to calculate the 
export intensity of the firm, as well as being a variable on the right hand side to 
measure economies of scale of firms. Results (in Column 2 of Table 5.5) show 
the restricted model with the firm sales variable excluded. The results show that 
all variables retain their expected sign, and that only TAR is not significant. 
Regarding the use of OLS regression to estimate the relationships, if the 
observations of the dependent variable are clustered around zero, then OLS 
estimates will provide biased estimates of the coefficients. To investigate the 
importance of this problem, the model has also been estimated using Tobit 
regression (Gujarati 1995), which is based on maximum likelihood estimation 
(see Appendix 4). The results of Tobit regression are presented in Table 5.6. The 
results confirm those obtained by way of OLS estimation. All of the variables 
carry the expected sign, and again only TAR is not significant4. The results also 
confirm, that trade preferences play a role in determining export performance. 
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TABLE 5.5 
RESULTS OF OLS REGRESSION 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 27.501 22.618 39.902 18.128 30.452 
(3.204) (2.633) (4.238) (2.433) (3.789) 
[3.489] [2.959] [4.315] [2.771] [4.026] 
CAPWORK 
-. 
1960 
-. 
1851 
-. 
2578 
-. 
1609 
-22.250 (-1.439)* (-1.331)* (-1.674)** (-1.172) (-1.439)* 
[-1.864]++ [-2.108]++ [-2.007]++ [-1.459]+ [-1.672]++ 
FSALE 
-. 
1816 
-. 
9122 
-. 
1962 
-. 
10588 
(-2.679)*** (-1.220) (-2.865)*** (-1.408)* 
[-2.741]+++ [-1.253] [-2.913]+++ [-1.462]+ 
FSALE2 
. 
4120 
. 
2693 
. 
4451 
. 
3026 
(2.330)*** (1.356)* (2.488)*** (1.513)* 
[2.788]+++ [1.605]+ [3.009]+++ [1.840]++ 
TECH 9.167 10.461 10.613 9.388 10.838 
(1.893)** (2.121)** (1.934)** (1.909)** (1.953)** 
[1.731]++ [1.895]++ [1.845]++ [1.710]++ [1.825]++ 
WAGSAL 
-34.385 -31.62 -32.5163 -28.392 -26.460 (-2.009)** (-1.824)** (-1.675)** (-1.657)* (-1.367)* 
[-1.906]++ [-1.836]++ [-1.672]++ [-1.576]+ [-1.361]+ 
PREFALL 27.354 23.958 27.392 
(5.657)*** (5.080)*** (5.577)*** 
[6.588]+++ [6.056]+++ [6.369]+++ 
ASSOC 12.372 11.494 15.3158 11.246 14.182 
(2.447)*** (2.266)** (2.684)*** (2.202)** (2.471)** 
[2.212]++ [2.123]++ [2.326]+++ [2.058]++ [2.185]++ 
TAR 
-. 
8931 
-. 
7267 
-1.0444 -. 9793 -1.131 (-1.370)* (-1.097) (-1.413)* (-1.482)* (-1.517)* 
[-1.529]+ [-1.251] [-1.576]+ [-1.693]++ [-1.725]++ 
EPR 
-11.197 -12.693 -11.310 (-2.102)** (-2.339)** (-1.872)** 
[-1.996]++ [-2.108]++ [-1.741]++ 
R2(adj) 
. 
3039 
. 
270 
. 
1041 
. 
2819 
. 
0835 
F 6.63*** 7.13*** 2.69** 6.69*** 2.51** 
LL 7.8$ 30.6$ 4.8$ 34.4$ 
X2(HET) 22.74 28.85 14.26 19.90 11.55 
1. Figures in round brackets are t values for traditional OLS regression.. 
2. For traditional standard errors, significance is as follows: *= 90%, ** = 95%, *** = 99% 
3. For the White corrected standard errors, significance is as follows: += 90%, ++ = 95%, +++ _ 
99% 
4. LL is a log-likelihood ratio test for zero restriction placed on the coefficients of the variable(s) 
excluded in each equation. The symbol $ indicates that the hypothesis of no influence is rejected. 
5. XZ (HET) is the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity. 
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TABLE 5.6 
RESULTS OF TOBIT REGRESSION 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 3.114 
-1.913 30.658 -7.131 20.687 (. 259) (-. 158) (2.392)** (-. 670) (1.883)** 
CAPWORK 
-. 
3018 
-. 
2998 
-. 
3962 
-. 
2823 
-. 
3703 
(-1.473)* (-1.413)* (-1.756)* (-1.345)* (-1.616)* 
FSALE 
-. 
1516 
. 
1041 
-. 
1737 
-. 
5893 
(-1.725)** (. 103) (-1.960)** (-. 058) 
FSALE2 
. 
3397 
. 
8176 
. 
3878 
. 
1187 
(1.504)* (. 309) (1.698)** (. 445) 
TECH 10.963 12.371 12.9998 11.523 13.475 
(1.685)** (1.867)** (1.739)* (1.742)** (1.778)** 
WAGSAL 
-50.6112 -48.031 -40.1036 -45.446 -34.174 (-2.265)** (-2.120)** (-1.544)* (-2.021)** (-1.314)* 
PREFALL 56.349 54.836 57.225 
(7.282)*** (7.023)*** (7.238)*** 
ASSOC 13.788 13.480 19.0869 13.036 18.198 
(2.077)** (2.024)** (2.483)** (1.932)** (2.341)** 
TAR 
-1.142 -1.0270 -1.3128 -1.220 -1.401 (-1.303)* (-1.147) (-I. 302)* (-1.368)* (-1.372)* 
EPR 
-11.835 -13.875 -11.8491 (-1.616)* (-1.873)** (-1.425)* 
LL 3.0 62.2 2.6 64.2 
1. Figures in brackets are t values. 
2. Significance levels: *= 90%, ** = 95%, *** = 99% 
3. LL is a log-likelihood ratio test for zero restriction placed on the coefficients of variable(s) 
excluded in each equation. The symbol $ indicates that the hypothesis of no influence is rejected. 
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5.5 CONCLUSION 
This study reviewed Barbados' preferential trade performance, and investigated 
the factors influencing the export performance of firms. The study is the first to 
empirically test the importance of factor endowments, technology, and scale 
economies in determining that performance. It is also the first to examine the 
importance of preferences in determining Barbados' export performance. 
The study builds on the discussion of chapters 2 and 3. Those chapters showed 
that despite some deficiencies with preferential trade arrangements, such as the 
exclusion of items within the production capability of Barbados and high rules of 
origin criteria, approximately 80% of Barbados' exports receive preferences in 
CARICOM markets and in the markets of third countries through non-reciprocal 
trade arrangements. 
Chapter 3 showed that a majority of exporting firms, approximately 91.1 %, utilise 
preferential arrangements. For these firms, an average of 75% of their exports 
receive preferences. This clearly demonstrates the importance of preferences to 
Barbados' export performance, and hints to the magnitude of the impact of the 
withdrawal of such preferences. 
In this chapter, an examination of the factors fashioning Barbados' export 
performance shows that factor endowments in the form of labour to capital stock 
in the firm, technology in the form of internet availability, and economies of scale 
factors particularly related to the size of the firm are important in determining 
export performance. These results are in keeping with those reported in the 
literature including the studies of Courakis and Roque (1988) and Calof (1994). 
They also show that business strategies in the form of external association have 
a positive impact on export performance. This is in keeping with the results of 
Kumar and Siddharthan (1994), Willmore (1992) and Lall (1986). Wage costs 
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and government tariff protection also impact on export performance. Conlon, 
(1992) examined wage cost as a factor proportion variable and found that it was 
not significant in the case of the exports of firms in Australia, Korea, Singapore 
and Taiwan. In the case of Barbados however, this study has found that there is 
evidence that increases in wage costs relative to sales (which are affected by 
such factors as technology and productivity) can negatively affect export 
performance. This is in keeping with the view of a number of international 
organisations including the IMF, World Bank, and IDB. There is also some 
support for the view, that tariff protection contributes to an anti-export bias in 
Barbados' trade policy regime, and can lead firms to produce for the domestic 
rather than the export market. This is in keeping with the findings of Auquier 
(1980), Milner (1994) and Maxwell Stamp (1997). 
The results also show a strong positive relationship between trade preferences 
and export performance. Trade preferences offered through preferential trade 
arrangements such as CBI, CARIBCAN, LOME, GSP and CARICOM, are very 
important in determining export performance. However, restrictions embedded in 
the various arrangements, do retard exporting under the various arrangements. 
This result reinforces the view of small economies that preferential trade 
arrangements are important to their export performance (Chapter 2), and that the 
elimination of these preferences could negatively impact on firms and on export 
performance. 
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END NOTES 
See for example Kumar and Siddharthan (1994), Bonaccorsi (1992), lall (1986), 
and lall and Kumar (1981). 
2 Also, none of the R2(adj) from the auxiliary regressions is more significant than 
in the model (Gujarati, 1995). 
3A number of alternative models were also investigated, the log transformation 
of some variables and two alternative definitions of export performance 
-the ratio 
of firm exports to sample exports and firm exports to country exports for the 
period. None of the models performed better than the model presented. In 
addition, a number of models were estimated with dummy variables to capture 
industry effects. These variables were not significant and did not alter the sign 
nor significance of the other variables. 
4 Likelihood ratio tests in both the OLS and Tobit models revealed that the 
hypothesis that TAR has no influence on the models cannot be rejected. The 
evidence on the influence of domestic tariffs on export performance is therefore 
not as strong as for other variables. These results are however not inconsistent 
with the findings of Maxwell Stamp (1991), that quantitative restrictions are the 
primary source of anti-export bias in the case of Barbados. 
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INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE 
SELECTION OF SENSITIVE SECTORS IN BARBADOS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Developing and developed countries alike have over the years used various 
strategies to protect "sensitive" industries (Salvatore, 1987). While protectionist 
strategies differ across countries, the intention is always the same 
- 
to reduce 
import competition on the home market for products which may not otherwise be 
competitive. 
The reasons given for protecting domestic industries are wide and varied 
(Corden, 1987). They include; protection of the economy from the shock of 
external recessions, sustaining employment and income levels, retaliation 
against protection in other countries, national security especially in the case of 
industries producing military apparatus, food security in the case of agriculture, 
and protection of infant industries. 
Trade control measures employed to protect domestic industries are also 
numerous and varied. The more overt forms of protection are quantitative 
restrictions and high tariffs. Other forms include, voluntary export restraints, 
subsidisation of production, establishing complex customs procedures, restrictive 
government procurement and state trading practices, invoking anti-dumping 
action and applying countervailing duties, and the use of technical barriers, as 
well as sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures (Baldwin, 1984). 
Political economy models of protection seek to explain why governments grant 
protection to industries. Early models focused on the lobby theory of protection, 
which explains the pattern of protection in terms of the lobby strength of domestic 
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industries (Brock and Magee, 1978; Caves 
, 
1976; Pincus, 1975). A variety of 
other models have also sought to explain patterns of protection including the 
adjustment assistance model (Cheh 1974), equity-concern model (Ball 1967 and 
Baldwin 1982), the status quo model (Lavergne 1983), and the international 
bargaining model (Helleiner, 1977b). Empirical tests of these models reveal that 
a number of factors explain the pattern of protection across industries in different 
countries. In broad terms, those factors include: 
"(a) those related to the state of the domestic or the world economy, 
exemplified by the bahaviour of either output or employment; 
(b) those related to the competitiveness of domestic production vis-a- 
vis imports, exemplified by the changes in real rates of exchange or in the trade 
balance; and 
(c) those related to the shifts in comparative advantage that affect the 
whole structure and growth of domestic production, which can be thought to be 
time related" (Grilli, 1987 p. 318). 
Basri and Hill (1996) note that most of the research on the political economy of 
protection has focused on developed countries due to the lack of data and the 
lack of transparency in the decision making process in developing countries. 
There are therefore outstanding questions as to the factors influencing the 
pattern of protection in developing countries, and how well models constructed in 
the context of industrial countries describe the determination of protection in 
small developing economies. 
6.1.1 Objectives of the Study 
In preparation for international trade negotiations, the Barbados Government 
identified a number of sectors which it would negotiate to have excluded from 
free trade under the new arrangements. This study will examine the factors 
which influenced government to select the industries chosen. Specifically, it will 
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investigate the same data set considered by a committee established by 
government to undertake the identification process. The data included 
- 
industry 
employment, contribution to government tax revenue, import levels, export 
levels, and past levels of protection. 
In addition to the factors proposed by government for consideration by the 
committee, the local manufacturing sector argued that the issue of "unequal 
protection" should be considered in selecting the sensitive sectors, as sensitive 
sectors in developed countries are also highly protected. Based on this 
argument, manufacturers proposed that any sector which is protected in 
developed countries should also be protected in Barbados. This issued was also 
considered by the committee and will be investigated in this study. 
The study will be the first to be undertaken on Barbados, and will add to the 
limited research on trade policy protection issues in developing countries 
especially in the context of international trade negotiations. 
6.1.2 Structure of the Study 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section 6.2 reviews the 
literature on the political economy of protection. In section 6.3 a model of the 
political economy of protection in Barbados is developed. In section 6.4 
econometric analysis is used to estimate the model. Section 6.5, the conclusion, 
reviews and summarises the findings of the study. 
6.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
6.2.1 Theoretical Framework 
The political economy of protection had its origins in welfare economics, which is 
"concerned with the evaluation of alternative economic situations from the view 
point of the society's well being", (Koutsoyiannis, 1979 p. 525) and the theory of 
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public choice which can be defined as "the application of economics to political 
science", (Mueller, 1976 p. 1). 
In his contribution to welfare economics, Bergson (1938) suggested a social 
welfare function similar to the individual's indifference curve to show the utility 
enjoyed by individuals in different states (e. g. Rich and poor or educated and 
non-educated) 
. 
Samuelson (1956) extended that work to show that community 
indifference curves could be derived through the distribution of income. The 
Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function can be written as: 
W=W (Z,, Z29 
.... 
Zn) 
where W is a function of all variables (z5) which can affect the social welfare of 
the individual or community, such as the provision of goods and services 
(Mueller, 1976). The role of the community is to choose a combination of zs 
which would maximise the social welfare of the community. The Bergson- 
Samuelson model does not specify how this would be done (Baldwin, 1982). In 
the case of a democracy, it could be assumed that the elected government would 
make the value judgment on which combination of zs would maximise social 
welfare (Koutsoyiannis, 1979). Government will then redistribute income 
continually to reach that state. 
In his contribution to public choice theory, Downs (1957) proposed that elected 
individuals and voters pursue their self interest in the political market place. In 
terms of trade policy, it is proposed that individual producers (who organise into 
groups) seek to maximise their welfare by demanding that competing imports on 
the domestic market be restricted or prohibited. Elected representatives, on the 
other hand, are the suppliers of protection who seek to maximise their welfare by 
gaining re-election. Governments will accept or reject a demand for protection 
based on the number of voters who support or oppose the measure. The earliest 
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and dominant models explaining the pattern of protection across industries in 
various countries are based on this concept. 
The earliest and two most dominant models which seek to explain import 
protection patterns 
- 
the common-interest or pressure group model, and the 
adding machine model 
- 
build on the public choice hypotheses of Downs. They 
propose that governments grant protection to industries based on some stimuli. 
In the case of the former model it is capacity to apply lobbying pressures, while in 
the latter it is voting strength (Basri and Hill, 1996). 
In the common interest model, groups with a common interest are inclined to 
lobby government for protection. Researchers who contributed to the 
development of the model, Olson (1965), Pincus (1975), and Brock and Magee 
(1978), argue that in a democratic country, the actual outcome of protection may 
not reflect the views of the majority of the country's citizens due to such market 
imperfections as information asymmetries, and lobbying on the part of interest 
groups. 
Proponents of this model argue that the structure of a country's industrial 
protection is determined by the forces of demand for and supply of protection. 
The demand for protection comes from rent seeking interest groups, and the 
supply of protection is provided by government. In this model, protection is 
determined by the lobby process with government as the passive player. 
Whether or not interest groups do actually lobby for protection depend, on the 
expected gains and costs of the effort. According to this school of thought, 
interest groups will allocate resources to lobbying where the cost of lobbying is 
less than the expected gain (Baldwin, 1984). 
Baldwin (1982) graphically illustrates the demand for protection (Figure 6.1). Ot0V 
is the cost of lobbying curve. The curve reflects the fact that the higher the level 
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of protection (tariff) required, the higher will be the costs of lobbying. Baldwin 
suggests that lobbying funds are used to enable the candidate to both boost his 
or her popularity, and also to show voters how they will be helped by the 
protection being requested. The curve starts at the point 0t0, reflecting that 
altruism may result in some protection being granted at zero or negligible costs. 
FIGURE 6.1 
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF LOBBYING 
4 
ti 
0 
e2 
e 
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The curve OQS reflects the benefits from tariff protection. These benefits 
increase until they reach Q, at which point the tariff becomes prohibitive. The 
equilibrium in the model is reached where the marginal cost of a tariff increase is 
equal to the marginal revenue derived by that industry from the tariff increase. In 
Figure 6.1, that level is at e2 where the slope of the benefit curve OQS is equal to 
the slope of the cost curve Ot0V. At this point, the lobbying expenditure of the 
protection seeking industry is equal to the economic rent or benefit derived from 
the higher tariff. It is noted that a number of variations can be made to the model. 
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For example, for some industries the cost (voter-support) curve may lie totally 
above the benefits curve so that no lobbying will occur. Another possibility is that 
the cost curve may rise more rapidly than the benefits curve. 
A variation to the model is made by Frey (1985). The model (Figure 6.2) is 
similar to the Baldwin (1982) illustration in many respects. The cost of lobby 
curve OA reflects the increasing cost of attaining protection. The cost curve will 
be lower if (a) the economic interests are well organised, (b) the lobbying 
machinery is efficient, and (c) there is support in society for protection of the 
industry (as is usually the case in agriculture (Frey, 1985)). Unlike the model of 
Baldwin (1982), however, the benefits curve OBC is concave to the origin, 
indicating that increasing tariffs yield decreasing marginal benefits over a range. 
Again there is a prohibitive tariff range BC. 
The benefits of lobbying are maximized where marginal benefits are equal to the 
marginal costs of lobbying. In Figure 6.2 this is at the point t*. At this point the 
slope of the benefits curve OBC is equal to the slope of the cost curve OA. At t 
the benefits to the protection seeking industry are equal to the expenditure of the 
industry on its lobby campaign for protection. Again, the cost of lobbying can be 
prohibitive and may lie along the curve OA'A". According to Frey (1985), this 
situation can arise if the economic interests are difficult to organise, or if the 
group is being organised for the first time. 
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FIGURE 6.. 2 
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF LOBBYING 
AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL 
A" 
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Olson (1965) suggests that voluntary formation lobbying or pressure groups is 
more likely to take place where the group is small or concentrated and therefore 
better to organise. He pointed out that the free-rider problem undermines the 
formation of a lobbying group given that it is possible to receive the benefits of 
lobbying without incurring its costs. Olson (1982) added that that the extent to 
which the industry is threatened will also determine whether or not a group is 
organised regardless of its size. A series of repeated shocks, may be necessary 
before a group pursues protection. It can be expected therefore that there will be 
a negative relationship between such factors as the growth rate in employment or 
output and the duty cuts. 
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In a more recent work supporting the pressure group model, Frey and Weck- 
Hannemann (1996) suggest that pro-tariff (protection) interests will include 
mainly import competing producers, firms producing complementary products 
and supplying inputs to the import-competing firms, workers and trade unions. 
These groups usually have strong visible evidence of the impact of free trade. 
Public administrators and technocrats are also important players in formulating 
protection policies. These bureaucrats argue for protection for their clientele in 
order to maximise their utility which may be fashioned, among other things, by 
the prestige, power and influence they enjoy over industries. 
The anti-tariff interests will include interests with weak lobbying machinery. The 
latter will include consumers, domestic exporters, multinational corporations, and 
domestic firms which purchase their inputs on the local market. The case for free 
trade made by these groups is generally not as forceful as the pro-tariff groups, 
given that the benefits of free trade are not as direct, immediate and visible. 
These groups, especially consumers, do not have as strong an incentive to 
organise and to lobby effectively. In the case of consumers, this group also 
includes workers and employees. There may therefore be some divided loyalties. 
Groups are likely to form and lobby for protection where three conditions exit. 
These are, when the group has already been formed for another reason, for 
example an existing farmers cooperative; when the group gets a specific benefit 
from being a member of the group, for example agricultural information or crop 
insurance; and when the group can impose restrictions on free-riders. Frey and 
Weck-Hanneman (1996) note that those conditions are more likely to exist on the 
producer than the consumer side. 
Like the common interest model, the adding machine model (Caves, 1976) sees 
protection as being the outcome of the interaction of demand and supply forces. 
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Again, this model views government as an institution which responds to requests 
for protection. 
The model postulates that consumers are weakly organised because of a lack of 
knowledge and the high cost of forming a pressure group. As a result producers 
are the main players in lobbying for protection. The distinction between this 
model and the common interest model is that it does not focus on the incentives 
which groups have for organising to request protection (it is assumed that 
producers will organise). The model proposes that voting strength determines 
protection. The model also proposes, that the voting strength of an industry will 
increase the higher its labour content, decentralisation or geographical 
dispersion. On the supply side governments seek to secure their re-election 
through increasing popularity with voters. It will therefore positively respond to 
calls for protection if it appears that such a policy will improve the chances of re- 
election. 
The theory on the demand for protection as developed by Olson (1965) is likely 
to be relevant to Barbados given the process for the determination of protection. 
Firms and industries frequently organise and lobby government for protection. 
They also organise to lobby for the exclusion of multinational firms from being 
established in the island which could compete with local producers and 
distributors. On the other hand, there are no strong consumer groups which 
oppose protection. On the supply side, political representatives make the final 
determination of protection therefore the number of votes to be gained or loss 
from granting protection are likely to feature in any decision by government. In 
this case, the adding-machine model (Caves, 1976) could also have some 
applicability in the Barbados context. Given the small size of the country 
however, decentralisation and geographical dispersion are not likely to be factors 
influencing the voting strength of an industry. Labour content is however likely to 
be very important. 
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6.2.2 Empirical Research of Models 
6.2.2.1 Interest Group Model 
Pincus (1975), like Olson (1965), acknowledges that free-riders could be a 
problem to lobbying efforts. He noted, however, that that problem would 
disappear in the case of a monopoly. In his seminal paper, Pincus proposed two 
hypotheses about the ratio of collective effort to collective benefit. It is first 
proposed that the fewer the individuals who benefit, and the more concentrated 
the benefits, then the larger will be ratio of group effort to the effects of the duty. 
Secondly, the intensity of pressure group activity will depend on geographical 
location. He reasoned that an industry's lobbying efforts will be greater the more 
geographically concentrated the industry, since coordination and monitoring are 
more effectively undertaken. 
To test his hypothesis, Pincus used a number of economic and political variables 
to explain nominal duties applied under the United States Tariff Act of 1824. The 
variables included; output, the number of establishments (as potential pressure 
groups), input duties, the income of proprietors, industrial concentration, sales 
dispersion, country dispersion, and congressional representation. The OLS 
results showed that the most intense pressure for protection came from 
industries with lower proprietary incomes, with higher industrial concentration of 
output and therefore concentrated tariff benefits, and with fewer problems of 
communication due to geographical dispersion. 
6.2.2.2 Adding Machine Model 
Caves (1976), who first introduced the adding machine model, compared how 
this model as well as the interest-group model and a national policy model 
explained Canadian tariff rates in place in 1963. In the case of the adding- 
machine model, five variables are used to explain tariff levels: 
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- 
Value added per-worker: 
- 
where it is expected that the lower the 
value added per worker, the more workers will benefit from tariff 
protection. 
- 
Seller concentration: 
- 
percentage shipments for the four largest 
firms in the industry, which is expected to be negatively related to 
tariffs, given that the more concentrated the industry (or the less 
diversified the industry), the less weight voters will have on the 
political process. 
- 
Shipping costs: 
- 
where it is expected that the higher the shipping 
costs the greater will be the dispersion of the industry, and 
therefore the greater will be the voter strength. 
- 
Minimum efficient scale: 
- 
which is defined as shipments per plant 
by the Canadian industry in 1967, expressed in units of average 
shipments per plant in the corresponding US industry for the same 
year. The reason for the inclusion of this variable is that granting 
protection will secure more votes where the home market can 
sustain a large number of efficient scale plants earning more than 
the opportunity cost of their factors of production. 
- 
The percentage of employees located outside Quebec and Ontario 
in 1963: 
- 
again this is a measure of dispersion and it is expected 
that the higher the dispersion, the higher will be voters strength. A 
positive relationship is therefore expected. 
As discussed earlier, the interest-group model proposes that tariff levels are the 
outcome of rent seeking activity lobbying for protection based on the cost and 
expected benefits of the protection. The model used by Caves expects the 
following; (1) a positive relationship is predicted between seller concentration and 
tariff levels due to better organisation and the free-rider problem which is more 
likely to exist if industries are more dispersed; (2) a negative relationship 
between minimum efficient scale production and tariffs, as there are likely to be 
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free-riding small firms; (3) a negative relationship between tariffs and value 
added per worker, since an industry can make a stronger case for equity when it 
employs a large number of low-skilled and low wage workers; (4) a negative 
relationship between transport costs and tariffs given that an industry can more 
readily make a case for protection if it does not enjoy protection from high 
transport costs; (5) a negative relationship between buyer concentration and 
tariffs, given that industries which purchase the output of other industries will 
oppose protection for sellers; (6) a negative relationship with industrial growth as 
shocks to an industry will encourage firms to unite and lobby for protection; and 
(7) negative with diversification, as an industry is more vulnerable to import 
competition and other disturbances when its industries are not diversified. 
The national policy model proposes that the collective national preferences, as 
represented by government, are determined by national priorities and goals 
- 
for 
example, the goal of industralisation. The question investigated by Caves (1976) 
is whether national preferences extend to protection and to the level of 
determining the mix of manufacturing industries. Seven variables were used to 
test the national policy model in the context of Canadian tariff levels: 
- 
Relative productivity (with the USA): 
- 
Tariffs are applied to offset 
productivity advantages. 
- 
Value added per-worker: 
- 
An industry intensive in physical and 
human capital with high value added per worker contributes more 
to national esteem than a low-skill labour industry therefore a 
positive relationship is expected. 
- 
Job content: 
- 
National preferences favour industries with a 
relatively high-middle class content. 
- 
Depth of industrial processes: 
- 
Industries with deeper levels of 
processing are more favoured and given more protection than 
simple assembly. 
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- 
Industry growth: 
- 
Industries with high growth potential should be 
more favoured than those with low growth potential. 
- 
Economies of scale: 
- 
Modern industries benefiting from economies 
of scale are probably more attractive than small-scale industries 
because of national esteem in large industries. 
- 
Location: 
- 
National policies favour industries located in the cites of 
Quebec and Ontario. 
Caves used cross section data on Canadian tariffs for 1963 and tested the three 
models in explaining the pattern both nominal and effective tariffs. The results 
across all of the models were weak overall. Most of the variables were either not 
significant or carried the unexpected sign. Industrial concentration was consistent 
with both the adding machine and interest group models. Transportation costs 
and minimum efficient scale production favoured the interest group model. The 
geographical location variable was the only one which favoured the national 
policy model. Caves concluded that the interest group model had the greatest 
explanatory power. The depth of industrial process was significant in relation to 
explaining effective protection but not nominal protection, giving some support for 
the view that political bargains are made over effective protection. 
6.2.2.3 Adjustment Assistance Model 
The adjustment assistance model proposes that governments seek to minimize 
short-run labour adjustment costs in deciding on tariff cuts during international 
trade negotiations, or taking safeguard action under such agreements (Cheh, 
1974). Such factors as the percentage of unskilled workers in the industry, the 
percentage of workers over 45 and the proportion of workers in rural areas are 
considered in determining the capacity of workers to adjust to changes in the 
industry. 
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Although not directly investigating the adjustment assistance model, the findings 
of Anderson (1980) supported the model. The study, which examined the 
effective rates of assistance to Australian Manufacturing industries for the 1968 
to 1969 and the 1977 to 1978 periods, used both demand and supply factors 
representing both economic and political considerations. 
It was expected that the demand for protection would be higher, the more labour 
intensive the industry, the smaller the value added share in output, the higher the 
decline in employment, and the lower the average wage per employee. The 
higher the import penetration, the greater should be the assistance to industries. 
The smaller the number of firms in the industry, the better organised for lobbying 
the industry should be and therefore the higher the level of protection. 
The supply of protection is based on the objective of government to be re- 
elected. In making a determination of protection for an industry, government will 
consider such factors as loss of votes and loss of party contributions. It is more 
likely therefore to protect industries that are owned by party supporters and to 
defend such protection on welfare grounds. The arguments will be even more 
convincing if the industry has such characteristics as a large number of 
employees, low average wages, and does not benefit from such natural 
protection as high transportation costs. Government is also likely to protect 
import competing industries which, presumably, will more be affected by free 
trade, than exporting or non-tradable industries. 
in keeping with the adjustment assistance model, the main conclusions of 
Anderson (1980) were, that labour intensive low wage industries with low value 
added shares of output are mostly highly protected. It also found that industries 
with fewer firms and having a larger number of employees tend to be assisted 
more, and that exporting firms and non-tradable manufacturing industries tended 
to be protected less. 
184 
Chapter 6 Selection of Sensitive Sectors 
6.2.2.4 Equity-Concern Model 
Ball (1967) investigated the relationship between protection and wages of 
workers. Using rank correlation between 1962 US effective tariffs and the 
characteristics of 31 US industries, Ball concluded that US tariffs afforded higher 
effective protection to lower wage industries and less effective protection to high 
wage industries. As high wages are associated with higher skill, by extension, US 
tariffs protected industries using relatively higher proportions of unskilled labour. 
6.2.2.5 Comparative-Costs Model 
The comparative cost model proposes that government will seek to protect 
industries which are at a cost disadvantage vis-a-vis other countries. It is 
therefore expected that in international negotiations to reduce tariffs, duty cuts 
will be low in industries which are at a cost disadvantage. Ray (1981) was among 
the first to use this model. The variables used were designed to reflect the 
elasticity of demand and supply for the product, comparative advantage for the 
products as measured by such variables as the percentage of scientists and 
engineers in research and development, and the percentage of skilled workers in 
the workforce. Changes in the supply and demand for the products produced by 
the industry and geographical concentration were also included. 
The study found that both tariff and non-tariff restrictions are applied 
predominantly in industries in which the USA has a comparative disadvantage. 
6.2.2.6 International-Bargaining Model 
The international-bargaining model which is attributed to Helleiner (1977b) 
examined protection in the context of developed and developing countries. The 
model proposes that in international trade negotiations, governments will reduce 
tariffs and other trade barriers in exchange for other countries making similar 
concessions. Developing countries do not have much with which to bargain. In 
addition, they generally receive special and differential treatment under Part IV of 
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the GATT. As the exports of these countries provide competition for industries in 
developed countries, especially in unskilled areas, tariff cuts in multilateral 
negotiations on products produced by these countries are not as deep as for 
industrial countries. 
To test the model, Helleiner regressed a number of industry characteristics on 
Canadian nominal and effective protection rates for the years 1961 and 1970. 
These dates represented the period before and after the Kennedy Round of 
GATT multilateral trade negotiations. The variables used by Helleiner included; 
(1) average wage which is expected to be negatively related to tariff rates; (2) 
non-wage income which is expected to be negatively related to tariff levels; (3) 
aggregate value added per worker which should be negative; (4) scale 
economy, which in accordance with Caves (1976) is expected to be positively 
related to tariff levels; (5) market concentration, which is expected to be positively 
related to protection; (6) the proportion of work force employed in small 
establishments which should be positively related to tariff levels; and (7) the 
natural resource intensity of industries the sign of which is ambiguous, as 
developing countries do export natural resource products and should attract high 
tariffs. On the other hand, Canadian resource intensive export industries may not 
need protection. 
The study found that unskilled labour intensity was by far the most significant 
explanatory variable in the Canadian tariff structure. This implied that domestic 
demand for protection from industries using unskilled labour, as well as 
international political bargaining were important factors. Relatively small tariff 
reductions seem to be associated with a low degree of market concentration, a 
low degree of resource intensity, and a large number of smaller firms. 
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6.2.2.7 Status Quo Model 
In this model, the objective of maintaining the status quo is of primary importance 
to government. To test the importance of historical influences for the United 
States, Lavergne (1983) used the tariff levels for 300 manufacturing industries 
that were set in 1930. He tested a number of influences including lobbying 
pressures, minimisation of displacement costs, the comparative advantage of the 
industry relative to foreign competition, international bargaining, and 
maintenance of historical continuity. His estimates revealed that the most 
important factor influencing the setting of tariffs was conservatism or maintaining 
the status quo. 
Table 6.1 provides a summary of the industry characteristics which are 
investigated by the various models. 
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TABLE 6.1 
EXPECTED AND ACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS FOR KEY INDUSTRY 
CHARACTERISTICS 
INDUSTRY VARIOUS MODELS (EXPECTED RELATIONSHIPS) EMPIRICAL 
VARIABLES RESULTS 
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1. Seller and positive negative positive 
geographic and 
density negative 
ratios 
2. Number of negative negative 
firms 
3. Growth negative negative Negative 
rate 
4. Extent of negative positive 
foreign 
investment 
5. Extent of negative' 
sales to other 
industries 
6. Number of positive positive' 
workers 
7. Labour positive positive positive positive' 
output 
coefficient 
8. Proportion positive positive positive positive 
of unskilled 
workers 
9. Age of positive positive positive 
workers 
10 positive positive 
Proportion in 
rural areas 
11 Average negative negative negative negative 
wage 
12. Import positive positive' 
penetration 
13. Extent of positive positive 
imports from 
LDCs 
14 Historical positive positive' 
level of 
protection 
Source: Adapted from Baldwin (1984) 
1. Indicates the relationship is usually statistically significant at the 10 percent level or better. 
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6.2.3 Outstanding Issues 
The models described above are not mutually exclusive, as it is possible that 
protection can be the outcome of a number of different factors (Table 6.1). The 
table draws attention to the fact that some of the industry characteristics are 
common to a number of different models, and that in some cases, no clear 
distinction can be drawn between the various hypotheses. 
At least three issues can be raised regarding studies on the determination of 
trade protection. The first is, that these studies mainly research factors 
determining tariff levels. However, tariffs are only one of the instruments which 
government use for the protection of an industry. In light of its international trade 
obligations, a country may set a low tariff on imports of a competing good while 
for example using sanitary and phyto-sanitary regulations to protect the domestic 
industry. The second issue regarding studies on the political economy of 
protection is that the work has focused almost exclusively on developed 
countries. Few studies have been undertaken on developing countries, and little 
is known of the applicability of which political economy of protection models best 
describes the process in developing countries. The third issue relates to the 
administration of protection. Most political economy models either do not 
consider the administrative process for formulating protection policies, or assume 
"a homogeneous government, capable of assessing the trade-offs among the 
demands made by particular groups of economic constituents" (Carmichael, 
1989 p. 343). Across countries the process of determining the sensitivity of 
industries differ however, and within a country many different processes may be 
used in formulating a protection policy. 
Regarding the first issue, Baldwin (1984) highlighted that if subsidies or quotas 
are substitutes for tariffs, then regression results based on tariffs only would be 
misleading. He however went on to note that at least for the USA, there is a high 
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correlation between tariffs and non-tariff barriers indicating that these forms of 
protection are complements. 
One study which examined tariff and non-tariff barriers is Greenaway and Milner 
(1994). The study examined factors determining the UK's nominal tariffs, 
effective tariffs and non-tariff barriers. The factors investigated in the study 
included: 
- 
market power concentration by industry; 
- 
unionisation of the industry; 
- 
geographical concentration; 
- 
industrial specialization; 
- 
the share of industry sales to other industries; 
- 
total employment; 
- 
the employment output ratio of the industry; 
- 
relative wage costs; 
- 
labour skills in the industry; 
- 
the share of imports in the industry; 
- 
export share of the industry; and 
- 
the degree of intra-industry trade. 
In explaining nominal and effective tariffs, the study did not find product or labour 
market power, geographical concentration or product specialisation to be 
important in explaining the pattern of protection. It however did find support for 
adjustment cost and comparative advantage influences on the level of protection. 
The factors included high import share, wage costs, and the industrial intensity of 
unskilled labour. The overall results for effective protection were similar to those 
for nominal protection. 
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In relation to non-tariff barriers, the study concluded that although the results 
were weaker than for tariffs, they were not inconsistent with those results. The 
most significant factor determining the level of non-tariff protection was labour 
skills. The authors concluded that, in the case of the UK, it did not appear that 
tariff and non-tariff barriers were substitutes. This conclusion supports the view of 
Baldwin (1984) that there is some correlation between tariff and non-tariff 
protection. 
On the second issue concerning the limited work on developing countries, Basri 
and Hill (1996) noted that the main focus of the literature to date is on developed 
countries where data bases are more readily available, and the policy making 
process is more structured and transparent. In the case of developing countries, 
far less research has been undertaken on the political economy of protection. 
They noted however, that it is important to determine whether or not theories 
developed in industralised countries are transferable to developed countries. 
That study examined the factors explaining the intra-industry variation in the 
effective rate of protection in the Indonesian manufacturing sector in 1991. The 
variables used in the study included: 
- 
Value added: 
- 
as a proxy for industry size where it was expected 
that the larger the industry size the greater the amount of political influence 
because of lobbying leverage. A positive relationship was therefore expected 
with the level of protection. 
- 
Value added per worker: 
- 
as a proxy for labour intensity, with the 
expectation that the more labour intensive the industry the greater will be its 
voting power and therefore the greater will be the protection granted. However, it 
is possible that in developing countries which are labour abundant it is the capital 
intensive industries which may be uneconomic and which may require protection. 
The sign is therefore ambiguous. 
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- 
Number of firms in the industry: 
- 
based on the hypothesis that the 
fewer the number of firms in the industry the better they should be able to 
organise and lobby, and therefore the higher the level of protection should be. A 
negative relationship would therefore be expected between the number of firms 
in the industry and the level of protection. The influence of this variable can 
however become ambiguous given the influence of industry size and the 
concentration of firms. 
- 
Share of government in value added: 
- 
which was expected to have 
a positive influence on protection as government would protect industries in 
which it is involved. 
- 
Share of foreign interests in value added: 
- 
which was expected to 
be positive, as foreign firms often enter the domestic market based on the 
promise of fiscal incentives and protection. 
- 
Industry concentration: 
- 
given that highly concentrated firms are 
expected to be better organised to lobby for protection. 
- 
Growth rate of output: 
- 
as high industry growth suggests the 
possibility of new entrants, and therefore limited possibilities for organisation. A 
negative sign was therefore expected. 
- 
Average size of firms in the industry: 
- 
based on the hypothesis that 
the larger the average size of firms, the greater the potential for effective 
lobbying, and therefore the higher the level of protection. 
-A dummy variable to represent industries: - as influential individuals 
were known to play a major role in some industries. A positive sign was 
expected. 
The study found that the factors influencing the level of effective protection were 
value added; value added per worker; the share of foreign interests in value 
added; and the political influence of individuals. The researchers reported that 
none of the models 
- 
interest group model and national interest model 
- 
emerged 
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as clearly explaining protection in the manufacturing sector. However, given the 
political process in Indonesia, they favoured the interest group model. 
Regarding the third issue of the administration of protection, Carmichael (1989) 
notes that governmental arrangements for deciding on industrial and trade policy 
issues often tend to involve many institutions. This observation holds in the USA, 
where both the Department of Commerce and the International Trade 
Commission are involved in the decision making process (Hansen and Prusa, 
1997). Carmichael also notes that decision making bodies maybe narrowly 
focused with not much consideration of the domestic consequences of specific 
industry or trade initiatives. Given this, there maybe inconsistencies in the 
decision making process among the various bodies. 
In cases where there is a separation of the political and bureaucratic process, 
conventional political economy theory may still explain how interest groups 
influence regulators. Hansen and Prusa (1997) suggests that interest groups 
influence bureaucrats through politicians. They note: 
" interest groups seek to maximize their wealth by lobbying politicians; politicians 
seek to maximize their political support from interest groups by delivering interest 
group pressures to bureaucrats; and bureaucrats seek to maximize agency 
budgets, subject to politicians' rewards and sanctions". (Hansen and Prusa, 1997 
p. 235). 
Hansen and Pnasa (1997) investigated decision making by the USA's 
International Trade Commission. The Commission by law is required to take into 
account a number of economic factors in determining injury to an industry, 
including evidence of price undercutting, domestic sales, capacity utilisation, 
employment, profits, productivity and volume of unfairly traded imports. It is 
therefore expected that economic factors would be significant in determining the 
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outcome of anti-dumping and countervailing duties cases. A number of political 
variables were also included in the model to test for such influences. These 
included, political representation of industries in Congress, campaign contribution 
of industries to politicians, industry employment as a national interest factor, 
industry concentration, and country variables to test for country biases in the 
protection pattern. 
The study found that political party contributions, import market share, and the 
percentage change in capacity utilization have a positive and significant effect on 
ITC decisions. It also found some evidence of a country bias in favour of 
European countries and an industry bias in favour of the steel industry. Another 
important outcome was that little support was found for the Olson (1965) 
hypothesis that industry concentration influences the protection of industries. The 
main conclusion of the study was that both political and economic factors do 
impact on ITC decisions, although its remit is to be objective. 
6.3 DEVELOPMENT OF A MODEL FOR BARBADOS 
A number of observations can be made regarding the political economy 
literature: 
- 
firstly, with respect to lobbying models, not only is a democracy 
assumed, but also that there is a decision-making process through 
which individual industries lobby politicians for protection; 
- 
secondly, it is assumed that industries will lobby politicians who are 
the final decision makers, rather than technocrats who only make 
recommendations; 
- 
thirdly, technocrats and decision-makers are assumed to have 
access to and to consider detailed information on industries in 
reaching decisions about the level of protection to be granted; 
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- 
fourthly, many studies seek to explain the determination of 
protection based on a specific hypothesis such as minimisation of 
adjustment costs or ensuring equity among different categories of 
labour; and 
- 
fifthly, the structure and level of protection existing in other 
countries are not generally investigated2. Much of the literature 
focuses on internal differences across industries. 
Regarding these issues, some caveats must be made in the context of Barbados, 
and in the context of the purpose for which its sensitive lists have been 
developed 
- 
as an initial bargaining position in international trade negotiations. 
6.3.1 The Political Process 
In Barbados, the political process for selecting sensitive industries is similar to 
that in which the USA International Trade Commission is charged with making a 
determination on protection based on economic factors (Hansen and Prusa, 
1997). A committee comprising public and private sector interests was charged 
with selecting sensitive sectors based on a similar number of economic 
indicators. Private sector representation reflected the entire manufacturing and 
agricultural sectors and the distribution trade. As noted in Chapter 3, the 
mandate of the committee was to consider the following factors: 
1. WTO regulations that "substantially all trade" must be included in 
free trade. 
2. Economic considerations such as: 
- 
contribution of the industry to employment; 
- 
contribution to government revenue; 
- 
the vulnerability of the industry; and 
- 
the competitiveness of the industry. 
3. Such other considerations as the committee deemed relevant. 
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The lists of sensitive products were approved by politicians on the 
recommendation of the committee. In those circumstances, the lobbying theory 
and the voting strength theory, as defined in the literature, would not directly 
apply. It can however be assumed that industries lobbied politicians for 
protection, and that the lists prepared by the committee reflected the lobby and/or 
voting strength of the industries. If this is assumed, then such factors as industry 
size, employment, and industry concentration can be interpreted as representing 
political considerations. This however would not be the ideal approach for 
estimating political economy variables. To capture political factors, Hansen and 
Prusa (1997) used industry size. They also used the more precise variables of 
contributions to political parties, and political representation. Lack of 
transparency in the case of Barbados means that no data are available in terms 
of campaign contributions. Political representation or geographical concentration 
of industries as factors influencing the pattern of protection is less important in 
Barbados than for the USA, given the relatively small size of the country and the 
fact that workers in any industry are likely to reside in many voting areas. 
6.3.2 Role of Technocrats 
The issue highlighted by Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1996), namely that 
technocrats can play a role in arguing for protection for their respective 
constituents, is important here. Given WTO rules that no industry be excluded, 
and that substantially all trade be liberalised, it can be expected that 
representatives of agriculture and industry would argue for the most protection to 
be maintained on industries they represent based on national interest factors 
such as employment, contribution to foreign exchange earnings, and the degree 
of backward and forward linkages between firms and industries within the 
economy. 
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6.3.3 Specific Influences 
Some models discussed above focus on specific influences. It is however likely 
that in the selection of Barbados' sensitive industries, a number of factors 
influenced the final decision. It is possible that industries would have lobbied 
politicians for protection, as discussed earlier, therefore the common interest 
model should be investigated. It is also possible that technocrats would have 
argued for protection for their respective industries based on such factors as 
employment and foreign exchange earnings, therefore national interests models 
would be relevant. Given the mandate of the committee that the impact of 
liberalisation on such factors as employment be considered, the adjustment 
assistance and the equity-concerns issues should also be examined. The status 
quo model is also relevant, as Barbados has an entrenched pattern of protection, 
and this is likely to influence future patters of protection. It is therefore likely that 
more than one of the models would be appropriate to explain the factors 
influencing the selection of sensitive sectors in Barbados. 
6.3.4 Unequal Protection 
The issue of how protection in other countries influences the pattern of protection 
has not been emphasised in the political economy literature. This is not 
surprising as the literature does not focus on protection in the international trade 
negotiation context. However, the approach by firms in Barbados to such 
negotiations is not new. Milner and Yoffie (1989) note that the demand for 
protection by firms may be "strategic". Firms may demand protection for the 
home market, if foreign markets are protected. They note that "strategic" 
demands by firms are not easily comprehensible within traditional models of the 
political economy of trade. The study found that the demand for protection by a 
number of sectors in the USA was strategic. They also concluded that these 
demands were more likely to be acted upon than demand for unconditional 
protection (Chapter 3). In the case of Barbados, the committee was of the view 
that the concerns of manufacturers had some merit and therefore considered the 
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issue. An examination was undertaken of tariff levels existing in the USA, 
Canada and the EU as a guide to protection existing in those countries. It should 
be noted however, Barbados' position may however be more about the issue of 
"fairness" rather than being "strategic", since Barbados does not have the 
international bargaining strength to react in a "strategic" manner in international 
trade negotiations. 
Although the lobbying theories cannot be directly tested, consideration of this 
issue by the committee confirms that firms lobbied for protection. Whether or not 
government supplied that protection will be considered in the analysis which 
follows. 
6.3.5 Data Availability 
Many studies utilise micro level data in investigating patterns of protection. Such 
variables include, value added per worker, share of government in value added, 
and share of foreign investment in value added. For Barbados, as is the case of 
most developing countries, this type of detail data is not available. The data on 
which decisions about protection were made was at a more aggregated level. 
The data examined by the committee included: 
- 
number of firms in each industry; 
- 
number of products produced by firms; 
- 
employment in each industry; 
- 
imports into each industry; 
- 
domestic exports of each industry; 
- 
government revenue derived from each industry; 
- 
tariff levels existing in Barbados' major export industrialised 
markets 
- 
USA, EU and Canada; and 
- 
protection offered to industry in previous time periods. 
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The data on trade flows were at a higher level of dis-aggregation than for other 
variables. The issue of double counting was a problem in respect of the number 
of firms in each industry, and the number of persons employed to produce a 
particular product within a firm. 
For this analysis in this paper, an industry (sector) was defined at the two digit 
level of the Barbados Customs Tariff. This classification has a number of 
advantages. First, trade statistics, trade tariffs and the products of industries are 
categorised according to the HS classification, therefore comparisons can be 
more easily made. Secondly, the WTO classification of agricultural and other 
products is based on the HS classification, and it is likely that the new trade 
agreements would follow the same system. Thirdly, this relatively broad two digit 
classification reduced the problem of double counting. The problem of double 
counting occur because firms produce more than one product and therefore can 
be classified as falling into more than one industry depending on how broadly an 
industry is defined. A detailed classification (for example at the six digit level) 
would increase the problem of double counting across the various industries. The 
problem of double counting is also relevant in respect of employment. Those 
firms which produce different products often employ the same persons in 
different production processes. It is often therefore not possible to accurately 
count the number of persons employed in making different products at a very 
detailed level. 
Where available, data at the firm level was also considered by the committee. 
Data on the agricultural sector at the level of the production unit and employment 
were not available given the large number of unregistered units. These were 
therefore excluded from this analysis. Excluding agricultural production and non- 
manufacturing activities, a total of 92 sectors were included in the analysis3. 
199 
Chapter 6 Selection of Sensitive Sectors 
In terms of the characteristics of firms, no data on the backward and forward 
linkages of industries were available. In these areas, the influence of technocrats 
and the lobbying efforts of the private sector weighed heavily on the decision 
making process. That influence is difficult to disaggregate. 
6.3.6 The Model 
The model to be used in this study will test how well political economy models of 
protection explain the selection of sensitive sectors in Barbados, using data to 
proxy the various theories developed in the literature. 
Similar interpretations can be applied to the data as those developed in the 
literature: 
- 
Based on national interests, it can be expected that both politicians 
and technocrats would support protection for industries which 
employ large numbers of persons or comprise a large number of 
firms. This will be in an effort to minimise the adjustment costs on 
the economy as a result of tariff reductions undertaken under the 
provisions of the agreements. A positive relationship is therefore 
expected between the selection of the industry as being sensitive, 
the number of firms in the industry, and employment in the industry. 
- 
Trade shares provide some indication of the competitive position of 
the industry. Industries with greater levels of import competition can 
be regarded as being more vulnerable than industries faced with 
less competition. On the export side, industries with greater levels 
of exports would be seen as being more competitive than industries 
with less exports. A positive relationship is therefore expected 
between import levels, and protection, and a negative relationship 
between exports and protection. 
- 
In the case of Barbados, government revenue derived from trade 
taxes is only 8% of total government revenue. However, for national 
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interest reasons, sectors which contribute substantially to 
government revenue are still likely to be regarded as being 
sensitive given that other sources would have to be identified to 
replace revenue loss as a result of free trade. A positive 
relationship is therefore expected between revenue and industry 
sensitivity. 
As identified in the status quo model, a good place to start in the 
determination of future protection is the historical pattern of 
protection. In the case of Barbados, the historical pattern of both 
tariff and non-tariff protection was considered in selecting sensitive 
sectors. It is expected that historical patterns of both tariff and non- 
tariff protection would positively influence the selection process. A 
positive relationship is expected between sensitivity and the 
existing level of tariff and non-tariff protection. 
Protection offered to similar industries in other markets, particularly 
in industrialised countries is expected to influence the selection of 
sensitive sectors in Barbados. This protection can be either in the 
form of tariff or non-tariff barriers. The basic data considered by the 
committee was applied to tariff levels of the United States, the 
European Union, and Canada. It is expected that government will 
seek to ensure that local production is not disadvantaged by way of 
high tariff barriers in export markets, while at the same time 
experiencing high import competition on the domestic market due 
to low domestic tariffs. A positive relationship between tariff levels 
in developed trading partners, and industry protection in Barbados 
is therefore expected. 
It is therefore expected that the following will be the case with respect to how the 
various factors influenced the decision of that committee: (1) the larger the 
number of persons employed in the industry, the greater the number of firms in 
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the industry, or higher the level of taxes collected from the industry, the more 
sensitive the committee would have considered the industry to be, given a 
concern to minimize any negative impact on the economy through the closure of 
industries, the loss of jobs or the loss of revenue; (2) industries experiencing a 
relative high level of import penetration would have been regarded as being 
vulnerable and therefore requiring some level of protection; (3) industries with 
relatively high levels of exports would have been regarded as being competitive, 
and therefore requiring less protection; (4) industries which formerly benefited 
from protection either by tariffs or quantitative restrictions would need some level 
of continued protection in order to transition to open trade; and (5) industries 
which enjoy relatively high levels of protection in the markets of Barbados' major 
trading partners should also be protected in Barbados in order to avoid being 
disadvantage in open trade. 
The specification of the model to be tested is: 
SEN; = 60 + 61 EMP; + 62 FIRM; + 63 TAX; + 64 IMPS; 
+ 65 EXPS; + 56 OSTAR; + 67 CANTAR; + 68 EUTAR; 
+ 69 BARTAR; + 610 FORPRO; + el (6.1) 
Where the coefficients 61,62, ö3,54,5ß, 57, ö8,69 and 61o are positive and 
S5 negative, and where: 
SEN; = the number of HS two digit products selected by 
government for protection in industry i, normalised by the 
total number of two digit products produced in Barbados; 
EMP; = the number of persons employed per firm in industry i 
relative to the total number of persons employed in the 
manufacturing sector; 
FIRM; = the number of firms in industry i relative to the total number 
of firms in the manufacturing sector; 
202 
Chapter 6 Selection of Sensitive Sectors 
TAX; = collection of import duties on imports of industry i relative 
to the total amount of import taxes collected; 
. 
IMPS; = competing imports in industry / (that is, imports with the 
same HS number as goods produced locally) relative to 
total country imports; 
EXPS; = exports by industry i relative to total country exports; 
USTAR; = average USA 1996 applied tariff rate for corresponding 
industry i; 
CANTAR; = average Canadian 1996 applied tariff rate for 
corresponding industry i; 
EUTAR; = average EU 1996 applied tariff rate for corresponding 
industry i; 
BARTAR = average Barbados applied tariff rate (1997) for industry i; 
and 
FORPRO; = number of HS two digit products which were protected by 
quantitative restrictions or by a surtax during 1997 in 
industry i normalised by the number of products produced 
in Barbados classified at the two digit level. 
6.4 ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
Two econometric techniques will be used to test the model 
- 
OLS and Probit 
regression. The OLS model will use the variables as specified above. Probit 
regression will also use the same explanatory variables with the same signs 
expected. The dependent variable in this model is however a discrete variable 
(DUMEXC; ) which takes the value of 1 if any product(s) produced by firms in 
industry i are selected for exclusion from free trade, and 0 otherwise. 
The specification of the model is based on the data considered by government 
officials to select sensitive industries discussed in Chapter 3 and section 6.3.5. 
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The explanatory variables have also been investigated by various studies 
identified in the literature review. Lavergne (1983) examined current and past 
levels of protection. Greenaway and Milner (1994) examined industry 
employment and size, import penetration and export performance. Hansen and 
Prusa (1997) examined tariff duties in addition to many of the national interest 
factors also investigated by Greenaway and Milner (1993). 
In terms of the dependent variable, a number of studies investigated the factors 
explaining the pattern of effective protection (including Basri and Hill, 1996). In 
the case of Barbados, a lack of estimates of effective protection at the industry 
level will not allow the use of that formulation in the model. In addition to using 
the variable SEND the study will follow previous studies in using probit regression 
with sensitivity defined as a discrete variable (DUMEXC, ) as noted above (see 
Greenaway and Milner, 1994; Hansen and Prusa, 1997). 
6.4.1 The data 
Similar to the findings of Hansen and Prusa (1997) where there was high 
correlation between the variables required by law for consideration by the ITC, a 
number of variables considered in selecting sensitive sectors in Barbados are 
also correlated. As reported in Table 6.2, the highest incidence of correlation 
(greater than 
. 
5) are in respect of the variables: 
- 
IMPS and TAX; 
- 
EMP and FIRM; 
- 
EMP and EXPS; 
- 
FIRM and FORPRO; and 
- 
CANTAR and EUTAR. 
Regarding TAX and IMPS, tax collections are based on the volume of imports. A 
high correlation is therefore expected to exist between taxes and imports4. In the 
case of EMP and FIRM, this is expected as Barbados is relatively abundant in 
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labour, and manufacturing firms are expected to use relatively more of this factor. 
The more firms there are in an industry, the greater is expected to be 
employment in that industry. In keeping with this school of thought, it can be 
expected that there will be a relatively high correlation between EMP and EXPS. 
Barbados' exports are expected to have a relatively high labour content. 
The existence of relatively high correlation between FORPRO and FIRM can be 
explained by the very active import substitution policy pursued by government 
until the mid 1990s, and probably lobbying efforts on the part of industry to delay 
phasing out of the surtax. The correlation between CANTAR and EUTAR was 
discussed in chapter 3. Given the historical involvement of these countries in 
international trade negotiations, that correlation between these variables is not 
surprising. 
TABLE 6.2 
CORRELATION BETWEEN EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
EMP TAX EXPS IMPS FIRM USTAR CANTAR EUTAR BARTAR FORPRO 
EMP 1.000 
TAX 
. 
226 1.000 
EXPS 
. 
532 
. 
274 1.000 
IMPS 
. 
225 
. 
999 
. 
272 1.000 
FIRM 
. 
678 
. 
266 
. 
278 
. 
262 1.000 
USTAR 
-. 
010 
-. 
083 
-. 
034 
-. 
085 
. 
003 1.000 
CANTAR 
. 
075 
-. 
004 
-. 
001 
-. 
005 
. 
224 
. 
140 1.000 
EUTAR 
. 
157 
-. 
017 
. 
150 
-. 
019 
. 
003 
. 
299 
. 
569 1.000 
BARTAR 
. 
222 
. 
010 
. 
244 
. 
002 
. 
357 
-. 
006 
. 
087 
. 
169 1.000 
FORPRO 
. 
462 
. 
167 
. 
245 
. 
164 
. 
509 
. 
055 
. 
164 
. 
185 
. 
370 1.000 
Two steps were taken to address the potential problems associated with 
multicollinearity. First, employment in each industry (EMP) and the number of 
firms in each industry (FIRM) were combined. The variable EMPFIRM is the 
average number of persons employed per firm in each industry. Secondly, as the 
variables IMPS and TAX relate to import activity, principal components analysis 
was used to create a composite import activity variable IMPTAX. The first 
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principal, which is used in the analysis, accounts for 93.8% of the variation in the 
two variables (Appendix 4). 
The adjusted model therefore become: 
SEN; = 50 + 61 EMPFIRM; + 52 IMPTAX; + 63 EXPS; 
+ ö4 USTAR; + 65 CANTAR; + 66 EUTAR; 
+ 57 BARTAR; + 68 FORPRO; + e; (6.2) 
Where the coefficients 51,62,54, b5,56,57 and ö8 are positive and ös 
negative, and where: 
EMPFIRM; = the average number of persons employed in each industry i; and 
IMPTAX; = the level of import activity (imports and tax collection) in industry i. 
The other variables are as reported for equation (6.1). 
As shown in Table 6.3, these procedures reduced the incidence of very high 
correlation. 
TABLE 6.3 
CORRELATION ANALYSIS BETWEEN REVISED EXPLANATORY 
VARIABLES 
EMPFIRM IMPTAX EXPS USTAR CANTAR EUTAR BARTAR FORPRO 
EMPFIRM 1.000 
IMPTAX 
. 
143 1.000 
GENEXP 
. 
580 
. 
274 1.000 
USTAR 
. 
021 
-. 
083 
-. 
034 1.000 
CANTAR 
. 
248 
-. 
004 
-. 
001 
. 
140 1.000 
EUTAR 
. 
398 
-. 
017 
. 
150 
. 
299 
. 
569 1.000 
BARTAR 
. 
144 
. 
010 
. 
244 
-. 
006 
. 
087 
. 
169 1.000 
FORPRO 
. 
243 
. 
167 
. 
245 
. 
055 
. 
164 
. 
185 
. 
370 1.000 
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Auxiliary equations (Table 6.4) however indicate that the presence of 
multicollinearity cannot be totally ruled out as F tests are significant in some 
cases, although R2(adj) are lows. 
TABLE 6.4 
AUXILIARY REGRESSIONS OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
AUXILARY MODELS F-VALUE R ADJ 
9.930 
. 
40 
EMPFIRM = IMP TAX, EXPS, USTAR, CANTAR, EUTAR, BARTAR, FROPRO) 
1.41 
. 
03 
IMPTAX = EMPFIRM, EXPS, USTAR, CANTAR, EUTAR, BARTAR, FROPRO) 
8.97* 
. 
37 
EXPS = IMP TAX, EMPFIRM, USTAR, CANTAR, EUTAR, BARTAR FROPRO) 
1.50 
. 
03 
USTAR = IMPTAX, EXPS, EMPFIRM, CANTAR, EUTAR, BARTAR, FROPRO) 
6.38* 
. 
29 
CANTAR = IMPTAX, EXPS, USTAR, EMPFIRM, EUTAR, BARTAR, FROPRO) 
10.01* 
. 
40 
EUTAR = IMPTAX, EXPS, USTAR, CANTAR, EMPFIRM, BARTAR, FROPRO) 
2.75* 
. 
11 
BARTAR = IMPTAX, EXPS, USTAR, CANTAR, EUTAR, EMPFIRM, FROPRO) 
3.14* 
. 
14 
FROPRO = IMPTAX, EXPS, USTAR, CANTAR, EUTAR, BARTAR, EMPFIRM 
Asterisks indicate significance at the 90% level or higher. 
Summary statistics on the variables are reported in Table 6.5. The summary 
shows that on average, Barbados' tariff levels are higher than tariff levels for the 
EU, USA and Canada, but vary less. 
TABLE 6.5 
DESCRIPTION OF VARIARI. FS 
VARIABLE MEAN STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
COEFFICIENT 
OF 
VARIATION 
MINIMUM MAXIMUM 
SEN 
. 
4347 
. 
4984 1.14 0 1 
EMPFIRM 22.3 27.60 1.23 0 165.33 
IMPTAX 21132747 38199752 1.80 906.108 225633735 
EXPS 
. 
10869E-01 
. 
26957E-01 0.40 0 71847176 
USTAR 6.067 9.62 1.58 0 90.741 
CANTAR 11.0629 21.86 1.97 0 198.13 
EUTAR 9.37 12.21 1.30 0 74.73 
BARTAR 13.47 8.20 
. 
608 0.740 36.5 
FORPRO 1.15 2.33 2.02 0 11 
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6.4.2 Results 
The objective of this study as noted in section 6.1.1, is to examine how various 
factors considered by a committee established to select sensitive sectors in 
Barbados influenced the decision of that committee. The results below report on 
how the various factors appear to have influenced the pattern of protection which 
the committee recommended to government and government accepted. 
The results of OLS estimation are reported in Table 6.6. The amount of variation 
explained by the model overall is around 50%, which is in keeping with cross 
section work in this areas. The model pass a joint test for the significance of all 
variables. The Breusch-Pagan test indicates that the presence of 
heteroscedasticity is not a problem. The t-values for White's heteroscedasticity- 
corrected standard errors (Appendix 4) are however also reported. Overall, there 
are no major differences between the traditional t-values and the t-values for 
White's heteroscedasticity-corrected standard errors. With the exception of 
IMPTAX and EXPS which are not significant, all variables have the expected 
signs. 
The results show strong support for the proposition that the factors determining 
the selection of sensitive industries were USA tariff rates (OSTAR), Barbados 
tariff rates (BARTAR), and the former level of non-tariff protection offered to the 
sector (FORPRO). All of these variables are significant and carry the expected 
signs. 
There is mixed support for the importance of employment and firms in the sector 
(EMPFIRM) in determining the selection of sensitive industries. OLS standard 
error and t-values indicate that the variable is not significant, while the White 
heteroscedasticity-corrected standard error and t-value indicate that the variable 
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is significant. The Chi-square value for the log-likelihood ratio tests with a zero 
restriction place on the coefficients of EMPFIRM, CANTAR, and EUTAR indicate 
that it cannot be rejected that these have no influence on the model. 
Likelihood ratio tests with zero restrictions placed on the coefficients of USTAR 
and the protection variables BARTAR and FORPRO suggest that the null 
hypothesis of no influence on the model can be rejected. 
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TABLE 6.6 
RESULTS OF OLS REGRESSION 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
CONSTANT 
-. 
8037E-01 
-. 
6832E-01 
-. 
43500E-01 
. 
7854E-01 
(-2.082) (-1.838) (-1.100) (-2.049) 
[-1.839] [-1.646] [-1.059] [-1.805] 
EMPFIRM 
. 
9514E-03 
. 
71733E-03 
. 
1280E-02 
(1.133) (. 805) (1.669)** 
[1.611]+ [1.172] [2.538]+++ 
IMPTAX 
-. 
10227E-09 
-. 
1135E-09 
-. 
2175E-09 
. 
1158E-09 
(-. 215) (-. 239) (-. 432) (. 246) 
[-. 335] [-. 322] [-. 720] [-. 399] 
EXPS 
. 
48484E-09 
. 
1747E-08 
. 
42755E-09 
. 
18001E-09 
(. 240) (1.037) (. 199) (. 092) 
[. 319] [1.193] [. 271] [. 121] 
USTAR 
. 
66023E-02 
. 
64313E-02 
. 
71427E-02 
(3.491)*** (3.406)*** (4.000)*** 
[6.261 ]+++ [5.794]+++ [7.970]+++ 
CANTAR 
. 
24603E-03 
. 
3563E-03 
. 
10608E-03 
(. 253) (. 368) (. 103) 
[. 402] [. 550] [. 108] 
EUTAR 
. 
13321E-02 
. 
19361E-02 
. 
324766E-02 
(. 701) (1.059) (1.676)* 
[. 622] [. 890] [. 990] 
BARTAR 
. 
73888E-02 
. 
71580E-02 
. 
68571E-02 
. 
76616E-02 
(3.188)*** (3.096)*** (2.786)*** (3.353)*** 
[2.625]+++ [2.559]+++ [2.336]+++ [2.749]+++ 
FORPRO 
. 
42131 E-01 
. 
42995E-01 
. 
43753E-01 
. 
42777E-01 
(5.104)*** (5.223)*** (4.988)*** (5.244)*** 
[5.937]+++ [6.050]+++ [5.761]+++ [5.894]+++ 
RZ(adj) 
. 
49034 
. 
488862 4.2245 
. 
49646 
F-Value 11.94 13.42 10.51 15.95 
LL 1.41 13.1$ 1.2 
(1) Standard t-values are in round brackets. White's heteroscedasticity-corrected t values are in square 
brackets. 90%, 95%, and 99% level of significance are designated as *, ** and *** respectively for 
standard t values, and +, ++ and +++ respectively for White's heteroscedasticity-corrected standard 
errors 
(2) LL is a log-likelihood ratio test for zero restriction placed on the coefficient of the variable(s) 
excluded in the equation. The symbol $ indicates that the hypothesis of no influence is rejected. 
(3) F-Value is a joint test for the significance of all variables. All models pass the test. 
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TABLE 6.7 
RESULTS OF PROBIT REGRESSION 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
CONSTANT 
-2.873 -2.401 -2.549 -2.738 (-4.867) (-4.793) (-4.737) (-4.570) 
EMPFIRM 
. 
2226E-01 
. 
1990E-01 
.. 
2207E-01 
(2.070)** (1.938)** (2.170)** 
IMPTAX 
. 
99509E-08 
. 
9148E-08 
. 
9335E-08 
. 
8989E-08 
(1.365)* (1.321)* (1.309)* (1.290)*** 
EXPS 
. 
10154E-07 
. 
4892E-07 
. 
7076E-08 
. 
1773E-07 
(. 213) (. 793) (. 163) (. 464) 
USTAR 
. 
4101E-01 
. 
3546E-01 
. 
5283E-01 
(1.425)* (1.602)* (. 952) 
CANTAR 
. 
3687E-01 
. 
4101E-01 
. 
3884E-01 
(1.168) (1.349)* (1.267) 
EUTAR 
-. 
1370E-01 
-. 
5659E-02 
-. 
1421E-03 
(-. 624) (-. 282) (-. 008) 
BARTAR 
. 
71963E-01 
. 
5922E-01 
. 
64550E-01 
. 
72903E-01 
(2.908)*** (2.595)*** (2.726)*** (2.904)*** 
FORPRO 
. 
91992E-01 
. 
89962 
. 
8645 
. 
91060 
(3.066)*** (2.888)*** (3.022)*** (3.250)*** 
LL 4.2$ 4.8$ 1.6 
XZ 76.096 71.784 71.187 74.539 
(1) t-values are in brackets 
(2) 90%, 95%, and 99% level of significance are designated as *, ** and *** respectively. 
(3) LL is a log-likelihood ratio test for zero restriction placed on the coefficient of the variable(s) 
excluded in the equation. The symbol $ indicates that the hypothesis of no influence is rejected. 
(4) X2 is a chi-square test for the significance of all variables. All models pass the test. 
211 
Chapter 6 Selection of Sensitive Sectors 
Table 6.7 reports on estimates of the model, using probit regression. The fully 
specified model pass a log-likelihood test (at the 1% level) for zero restrictions on 
all variables, as indicated by the significance of the chi-square value. All 
variables in the model except EUTAR and EXPS which are not significant, have 
the expected signs. 
The results show that EMPFIRM, IMPTAX, USTAR, BARTAR and FORPRO are 
significant and therefore influenced the selection of sensitive industries. 
Likelihood ratio tests with a zero restriction placed alternatively on the 
coefficients of EMPFIRM, USTAR, BARTAR and FORPRO suggest that these 
variables had an influence on the selection of sensitive industries. 
A comparison of the OLS and probit analysis shows that there is evidence that 
EMPFIRM, FORPRO, BARTAR and USTAR were significant in influencing the 
protection granted to industries. There is weak support for the variable IMPTAX. 
This variable is significant in the probit model, but not the OLS model. 
The significance of EMPFIRM lends some support to the adjustment assistance 
model (Cheh, 1974). In selecting sensitive industries, some effort appears to 
have been made on the part of government to minimise short-run adjustment 
labour costs. This strategy would be consistent with the argument put forward by 
developing countries that free trade may lead to significant adjustment costs 
within these economies, and that there is a need to allow flexibility for these 
countries to protect their industries in order to minimise these costs. 
The significance of the variables BARTAR and FORPRO supports the status quo 
model (Lavergne, 1983). Inertia and the inclination not to disturb tariff and non- 
tariff protection established over the years appears to be a major policy objective. 
Indeed, by leaving the status quo in place there is less likelihood that producers 
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would challenge the lists of sensitive sectors. Keeping the status quo may also 
be a strategy to minimise adjustments costs. 
The results indicate that a strategic approach (Milner and Yoffie, 1989) may have 
been taken to the selection of sensitive industries, and that the stance taken by 
manufacturers on the concept of "unequal protection" might have played a role in 
influencing the selection of sensitive sectors in Barbados. In particular, the 
protective tariff of the U. S. (OSTAR) was significant. This is not surprising, given 
the fact that the U. S. is Barbados' major trading partner, and industries in this 
country are expected to provide the greatest threat to domestic industries. 
Apparently Canada and the EU are not regarded as providing the same level of 
threat, as the tariffs of these two countries were not significant in determining 
domestic protection. The consideration of unequal protection issues by the 
committee suggests that lobbying played a part in determining the patterns of 
protection and therefore sensitivity (the interest group model and the adding 
machine model however were not directly tested). 
There is some evidence that import activity (IMPTAX), which includes import 
taxes and the level of imports and can be regarded as national interest factors, 
played an important role in the selection process. The weak evidence is not 
totally surprising, as import tariffs account for only a small proportion of 
government revenue 
- 
around 8%. 
Export competitiveness or performance apparently did not have a significant 
influence on the setting of sensitivity. This is not totally inconsistent with the 
import competition strategy adopted by Barbados over the years, whereby 
industries were protected regardless of their export performance. 
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6.5 CONCLUSION 
This paper examined the selection of sensitive industries in Barbados in the 
context of negotiations to devise international trade agreements on free trade. 
Barbados is currently involved in negotiations to create the FTAA and to develop 
a new partnership agreement with Europe. A committee established by 
government was mandated to establish the sensitivity of industries based on 
WTO rules, and on economic criteria including employment levels, contribution to 
tax revenues, vulnerability, and competitiveness. 
WTO rules require that such negotiations be undertaken within the framework of 
Article XXIV of the GATT. The issue of WTO compatibility has however not been 
definitively established, as member countries of that organisation have not 
agreed on the interpretation of the "substantially all trade" provision in Article 
XXIV. Notwithstanding that, such a clause does signal that limitations are to be 
placed on the types and numbers of industries which a country can exclude from 
free trade under the provisions of free trade agreements. 
Based on current discussions in the WTO committee on Regional Trading 
Arrangements, it is likely that the sectors selected by Barbados would pass a 
WTO "quality test" of substantially all trade, as no sector has been excluded from 
any possible tariff reductions (Chapter 3). However, there is some doubt that the 
volume of trade to be restricted would pass a "quantity test" of the substantially 
all trade criteria, especially in relation to the FTAA. It is likely, that some pruning 
of the list of sensitive sectors would have to be undertaken. 
In this chapter, an analysis of the factors influencing selection of industries being 
proposed by Barbados for protection was undertaken. The analysis used the 
data set considered by the committee established by government. 
214 
Chapter 6 Selection of Sensitive Sectors 
The analysis found that a combination of factors influenced government in the 
selection of its sensitive industries. The evidence suggests that industries were 
selected with the aim of minimising attrition in sectors with relatively large 
numbers of employees (Cheh, 1974). Sectors which formerly benefited from 
protection were highly favoured in the process (Lavergne, 1983). The results also 
suggest that the process sought to address a major concern of manufacturers 
regarding "unequal protection" as there is a positive relationship between tariff 
levels in the US and the sensitivity attached to sectors. 
The process of selecting sensitive industries was undertaken by a committee of 
technocrats rather than direct selection by politicians. Lobbying theories were not 
directly tested. In as much as the process took into account the opinion of 
manufacturers on the issue of "unequal protection", however, there is support for 
the influence of lobbying on the determination of patterns of protection. 
Overall the study found support for political economy theories in the context of 
Barbados. In particular, it found support for the hypothesis that lobbying by 
domestic firms about "unequal protection" in trading partners, influenced the 
selection of sensitive industries. 
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END NOTES 
1 Attempts to gain a competitive advantage on an export market, for example 
through export subsidization is also regarded as a form of protection. 
2 The international bargaining model developed in Helleiner (1977) considers the 
issue of protection existing in other countries, as well as the work of Hansen and 
Prusa (1997). The issues of unequal protection is one however in which 
manufacturers requested that the bargaining process should not relate to across- 
the-board cuts in tariffs. Tariff cuts should not be inter-industry, but intra-industry. 
3 There are 99 Chapters in the Barbados Customs Tariff. The following Chapters 
were excluded from the analysis: 
Chapter 1- Live animals. 
Chapter 5- Products of animal origin etc. 
Chapter 6- Live trees etc. 
Chapter 97 
- 
Works of art. 
Chapters 77,98 and 99 are reserved and contain no products. 
For Chapters 2,3 and 4, only registered food processing operations were 
included in the analysis. 
4 As noted in the correlation table, there is low correlation between the variable 
BARTAR and the variables TAX AND IMPS. This result is not unsurprising as 
tariff rates are set in relation to protection for the entire CARICOM region as a 
whole, and not only Barbados. 
5 Dropping some variables from the auxiliary equations did not eliminate the 
problem. Klien's rule of thumb (Gujararti, 1995) suggests that multicollinearity 
may not be a problem, as the R2 of the auxiliary regressions are less than for the 
estimated model. 
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6 Models were tested with the log transformation of some variables. The results 
were not better than those reported. Models were also estimated with RTAX and 
RIMP alternatively, instead of IMPTAX. In terms of signs and significance of the 
coefficients, the models were similar. 
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CONCLUSION 
7.1 SUMMARY OF THE STUDY 
This thesis examines three trade policy issues arising out of Barbados' 
participation in multilateral, hemispheric and regional trade agreements. At the 
multilateral level, Barbados is obligated to implement current WTO rules and is 
engaged in negotiations to deepen some existing agreements, and also to create 
new ones. At the hemispheric level, it is involved in negotiations to create the 
FTAA and to devise a new partnership agreement with Europe. 
WTO rules require member countries to liberalise trade in both goods and 
services. In addition, negotiations in a number of new areas including investment, 
competition policy and the environment are to be undertaken with a view to 
establishing rules in these areas. Negotiations to create the FTAA and develop a 
new partnership agreement with Europe are being undertaken within the context 
of WTO compatibility. That compatibility, among other things, requires that 
substantially all trade be liberalised. 
The framework within which WTO obligations are to be implemented, and new 
agreements negotiated, has implications for existing one-way preferential trade 
agreements currently enjoyed by Barbados including CARIBCAN, CBI, and 
regional agreements between CARICOM and Colombia; and CARICOM and 
Venezuela. That framework also has implications for Barbados' ability to protect 
domestic industries on the local market. In respect of the former, WTO 
sponsored liberalisation is reducing the margin of preference enjoyed by 
Barbados and other beneficiaries. In the case of the latter, WTO obligations, 
particularly the requirement to substantially liberalise trade under new trade 
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agreements, mean that trade policy options available to government to protect 
domestic industries are limited. 
Given the implications Barbados, in international trade negotiations, has joined 
other developing countries in requesting special and differential treatment. One 
of the arguments being made in support of the request is that competition on the 
world market is not perfect, and differences in country and firm size, access to 
information, technological development, and production structures, place 
developing countries and particularly small developing countries, at a 
disadvantage. They also argue, that a lack of support for free trade policy among 
producers, makes such policies politically difficult to implement. Among the 
special and differential treatment being requested by these countries are: 
- 
derogations and longer periods for the implementation of agreements; 
- 
technical assistance and funding to assist countries in transitioning from 
one-way preferential agreements; and 
- 
greater flexibility to protect sensitive industries. 
The thesis examined three trade policy issues related to those concerns. It first 
investigated the trade policy preferences of manufacturing firms in relation to 
WTO rules, which gave an insight into the extent of support for trade 
liberalization in Barbados. Secondly, it examined the factors determining 
Barbados' export performance. Finally, it examined the political economy 
process, and factors determining the selection of sensitive sectors in Barbados. 
The analysis in chapters 4 and 5 was based on responses to a Trade Policy 
Survey which was specifically designed for that purpose. The questionnaire was 
designed and mailed to all 435 enterprises registered with the BIDC at 
September 1998. The response to the questionnaire can be considered to be 
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good in that 152 companies responded. Following factory visits and telephone 
interviews to obtain missing information, 117 completed questionnaires were 
used in the analysis. In addition to providing company performance data and 
data on the competitiveness perceptions of management, firms were asked to 
provide positions on three WTO principles, fourteen agreements and three "new" 
issues. The response options ranged from strongly agree to strongly disagree. 
Chapter 3 reviewed the results of the survey. Overall, most of the firms (37.5%) 
strongly agreed with WTO disciplines, 21.8% agreed, 17.3% disagreed, while 
13.3% strongly disagreed. Some 9.8% expressed no opinion on the issues. 
These figures show that overall, firms agree with trade liberalization under WTO 
rules. 
At a more detailed level, the results show that the majority of firms reject the 
WTO principles of non-discrimination, national treatment and transparency. 
Firms do however largely support some elements of WTO Agreements, 
especially those elements relating to protection by tariff, employing safeguard 
action, taking action against goods being dumped or subsidised, using technical 
barriers to trade and sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures, protecting intellectual 
property, and using the disputes settlements mechanism. Firms are against the 
elimination of QRs, protection by tariffs only, and the temporary nature of 
safeguard action. They are also against the provision that rules of origin are not 
to be used as trade barriers, and that no trade control measures should be 
enforced in the area of the environment until WTO rules are developed. These 
results show that firms favour the continued use of some elements of protection. 
In chapter 4 both OLS and ordered probit regression analysis were used to 
investigate the factors influencing the trade policy preferences of firms. The 
analysis revealed that export performance, external association, and a positive 
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perception about international competitiveness influence firms to support 
liberalisation. Capacity under-utilisation influence firms not to support 
liberalisation. Those results are in keeping with the findings of similar studies in 
the literature. Not in keeping with the findings of similar studies, was the result 
that firms which are more diversified in terms of the number of products produced 
tend not to support liberalisation. 
In terms of preferential trade arrangements and Barbados' export performance, 
the results of the Trade Policy Survey discussed in chapter 2 showed that 
approximately 80% of Barbados' exports benefit from trade preferences, and that 
some 91.5% of exporting firms benefit from trade preferences. A comparison of 
preference in CARICOM, the EU, the U. S. and Canada, showed that the 
preference margin is higher in CARICOM than in developed countries. The 
research suggests that if trade preferences are removed, this could significantly 
impact on Barbados' export performance in a negative way. 
In chapter 5 data from the Trade Policy Survey was also used to undertake 
OLS and Tobit regression analysis. Following the literature, the analysis included 
factor endowments, economies of scale and technology variables. A number of 
firm characteristics and policy factors were also investigated including wage 
costs, the existence of trade preferences, the existence of restrictions under 
preferential trade agreements, the external association of firms and tariff 
protection of products on the Barbados market. All of the variables were 
significant and carried the expected sign. Regression results showed that 
Barbados' exports are relatively labour intensive, that firm size is important to 
export performance, that technology use, trade preferences and external firm 
association positively influence export performance. They also show that wage 
costs, tariff protection on the local market, and the existence of restrictions under 
preferential trade agreements negatively impact on export performance. 
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These results are in keeping with the literature and point to the fact that factor 
endowments, economies of scale factors, and technology are important in 
determining export performance. They however also indicate that other factors 
such as trade preferences, trade restrictions, wage costs and the external 
association of firms are also important. 
The third study examined the selection of sensitive industries in Barbados to be 
excluded from liberalisation under new international trade agreements with 
countries in the Americas and Europe. The WTO rule which requires that 
"substantially all trade" must be liberalised means that government must be 
judicious in its selection of industries to be protected. A review of tariff protection 
in chapter 3 showed that there are few similarities between sectors protected in 
Barbados and those protected in the USA, Canada, and Europe. Overall, 
however, there is a low correlation between tariff levels in Barbados and its major 
trading partners. 
In chapter 6 OLS and probit regression methods were used to investigate the 
industry characteristics influencing the selection of sectors. Ninety-two sectors 
based on two digit classifications in the Barbados Customs Tariff were used in 
the analysis. The results showed that employment, import activity by way of 
import competition and government tax collections, as well as previous protection 
patterns, influenced the selection of sensitive sectors. The analysis also showed 
that there is some evidence that lobbying undertaken by manufacturers for a 
"strategic" stance to be taken with respect to liberalisation influenced the 
selection process. The results directly support the adjustment assistance model 
and the status quo model of trade protection. 
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7.2 TRADE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH 
Results obtained in this thesis have a number of implications for Barbados both 
in terms of its participation in international trade negotiations, and its 
implementation of domestic economic policies in a liberalised trade regime. 
7.2.1 Participation in International Trade Negotiations 
The analysis has shown that manufacturing firms in Barbados do support many 
of the key components of WTO Agreements. However, they do not support some 
of the fundamental elements of liberalisation including the principles of non- 
discrimination, national treatment and transparency. They are also against key 
elements in safeguard provisions which are the elimination of QRs, and the 
reduction of tariffs over time. 
The type of concessions being requested by developing countries in trade 
negotiations such as longer transitional periods and greater flexibility to assist 
domestic industries should reduce some of the concerns of local manufacturers 
about trade liberalisation. Given the selective nature of firms in supporting or not 
supporting certain provisions, Barbados should make a careful selection of those 
concessions which it supports. 
On the issue of the continuation of benefits for developing countries under 
preferential trade arrangements or for technical and financial assistance for 
countries transitioning from preferences, the evidence suggests that they may be 
important for Barbados. Trade preferences are significant in determining 
Barbados' export performance and removal of these preferences could have a 
negative effect on exports. 
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7.2.2 Development of Domestic Policies 
While Barbados supports requests by developing countries for differential 
treatment, Barbados also needs to focus on domestic policies in order to benefit 
from the process of trade liberalisation. The analysis in this thesis points to some 
adjustments which would have to be made to some domestic policies. 
Firstly, the external association of firms and perceptions about their 
competitiveness are factors influencing support for trade liberalisation. These 
factors will in turn affect the willingness and ability of firms to adjust, where 
necessary, to benefit from liberalisation. It is important for Barbados to put 
monetary, fiscal and other measures in place to encourage firms to form strategic 
alliances with established firms in other markets. At the same time, it will be 
necessary to put programmes in place to remedy some of the long standing 
issues which affect the competitiveness of firms and their bias against exporting, 
as highlighted in the Maxwell Stamp and other studies. These would include 
reducing costs, the retooling of factories, and provision of technical assistance to 
firms. At the same time, Barbados should avoid granting permanent or long-term 
concessions to firms which could encourage them to produce for the local 
market, and it should not seek to protect firms on the local market. 
Secondly, it should be emphasised that while preferences are important to export 
performance, so too are such factors as association, firm size, and technology. 
Also, as Barbados' exports are not capital intensive, issues of labour productivity 
are especially important to the competitiveness of its exports. 
As trade liberalisation is phased in, and as preferences become less important, it 
will be necessary for government to place emphasis on the other factors which 
positively impact on export performance. Again it will have to put measures in 
place to encourage association with external firms, local mergers and 
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expansions, and programmes to increase labour productivity. As wage costs and 
tariff protection impact negatively on export performance, it will be necessary for 
government to contain labour costs and avoid sustained protectionist policies. 
Finally, although there may be a case for Barbados to join other developing 
economies in calling for flexibility in the interpretation of Article XXIV, which 
would allow it greater flexibility to protect sensitive sectors, it should carefully 
consider the reasons for granting protection to industries. It may wish to avoid 
protecting industries based on the historical pattern of protection, and to focus 
more on offering contingent protection. At the level of strategy, it may also wish 
to engage other countries in the process of reciprocal tariff reduction. This issue 
is important, because as discussed above, there is some evidence that 
protection has a negative influence on the export performance of firms. 
Barbados by virtue of its membership of the WTO and participation in 
negotiations to create new global trade agreements is committed to the process 
of trade liberalisation. As part of its negotiating strategy, it has joined other 
developing countries in requesting special and differential treatment. However, it 
is important that the flexibility offered by such treatment should not result in 
lingering protectionism, as this can reduce the ability of firms to adjust to global 
trends and benefit from the opportunities of greater market access to other 
countries. 
7.3 CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
This study has contributed to research on trade policy issues in developing 
countries, especially as that policy relates to international trade agreements. 
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Firstly, research undertaken in the literature to date on the trade policy 
preferences of firms, the determination of the export performance of firms, and 
the political economy of protection, has focused on developed countries. This 
study has contributed to work in those three areas through analysing those 
issues in relation to a developing country and more particularly a small 
developing economy. The research has shown that in the specific areas 
investigated, the models constructed in a developed country context, are largely 
relevant to a small developing economy. However, adjustments may be required 
in some cases. It may be necessary to further examine how the diversification of 
firms affects their trade policy preferences. It may also be necessary to focus 
more on the influence of policy factors in determining export performance, and to 
consider the "strategic" stances of domestic firms in determining the pattern of 
protection. 
Secondly, for Barbados, these were the first empirical studies to be conducted on 
those issues. To facilitate this research, original data was collected and used in 
the analysis of two of the studies 
- 
trade policy preferences, and determinants of 
the export performance of firms. In the relation to the other study 
- 
the selection 
of sensitive sectors 
- 
an assessment was made of the process for selecting 
sensitive sectors, based on the actual data utilised in the process. 
Thirdly, an extensive and in-depth analysis of support for WTO Agreements was 
undertaken in the context of one of its member countries. 
Fourthly, Barbados has joined other developing countries in making a case for 
special and differential treatment in the WTO, and in negotiations to create the 
FTAA and to create partnership agreements (to replace the LOME Convention). 
The research has contributed to an understanding of some of the concerns of 
these countries through an examination of the underpinning issues. 
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Finally, the results of the studies have identified variables which can assist in 
improving Barbados' competitiveness, while also highlighting factors which can 
hamper exporting in the new global paradigm. 
7.4 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study has concentrated on specific trade policy issues arising out of 
Barbados' participation in international trade agreements. However, some 
interesting research topics have remained outside the scope of this work. 
Regarding the factors influencing trade policy preferences of firms, some work 
can be undertaken regarding such preferences at the level of sectors. This would 
enable a more direct comparison of factors determining the trade policy 
preferences of sectors which benefited from protection and government 
concessions and those which did not. 
In terms of specific variables, this study followed the practice in the literature of 
measuring competitiveness perceptions, which are subjective, rather than actual 
competitiveness of the enterprise. It would be useful to undertake a study using 
an objective measure of competitiveness to determine how characteristics of 
firms alone determine trade preferences. Survey limitations prevented the 
development of such variables in this study. 
Research into the factors influencing the export performance of firms, could 
investigate the extent to which trade preferences influence exports to specific 
markets, in order to obtain more disaggregated picture of the importance of trade 
preferences. Also, an investigation should be conducted into how the margin of 
preference impacts on export performance. This would provide a clearer picture 
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of how reductions in trade preferences will impact on export performance. Again, 
because of survey limitations, the measurement of a number of variables was 
curtailed, including the measurement of technology. For example, it would have 
been useful to broaden the concept of technology to include human capital. 
Finally, the selection of sensitive sectors was investigated using the actual data 
examined by officials in selecting such industries. It would be useful to undertake 
a survey of industries to obtain disaggregated data as used by other researchers, 
such as value added per worker, depth of industry processing, wages and 
distinctions between male and female workers. This would have allowed a more 
direct comparison of the studies and how those variables performed in relation to 
structure of protection in both developed and small developing economies. 
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COUNTRY DATA 
- 
BARBADOS 
AREA POPULATION RACE 
431 sq km 267,000 90% African: 4% European: 6% Asia or mixed 
LIFE EXPECTANCY HEALTH 
76 Years 84 hospital beds per 10,000 persons 
1,100 persons per doctor 
Infant mortality rate: 14 per 1000 
EDUCATION EMPLOYMENT 
Literacy Rate 97% Labour force: 130,000 
79 Primary Schools Unemployment: 9% (1999) 
21 Secondary schools and tertiary institutions 
1 University 
ACCESS TO PIPED WATER 
100% Urban 
100% Rural 
ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY 
99% Urban 
97% Rural 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS HOUSEHOLDS 
Main lines per 100 persons: 40.77 Number of households: 81,000 
Main lines per 100 households: 79.1 
Number of mobile phones per 100 persons: 3.0 
PER CAPITA INCOME 
US $ 7115 (1999) 
GDP 
growth (91-99) 2.4% 
growth (98-99) 2.1% 
INFLATION 
Inflation rate p. a. (1999) 1.0% 
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE 
Current Account/GDP (1999) 
-2.1% 
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APPENDIX 2 
TRADE POLICY QUESTIONNAIRE 
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND FOREIGN TRADE 
No. 1 Culloden Road, ST. MICHAEL 
TEL; (246) 436-2900 FAX: (246) 228-7840 
TRADE POLICY DEVELOPMENT EXERCISE 
[OBJECTIVE] 
To assist the Ministry to better develop and implement trade policies to ensure 
that local firms are not dis-advantaged as a result of new international trade 
agreements. 
[PLEASE NOTE] 
All information provided will be treated as CONFIDENTIAL. 
Please complete and return to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs And Foreign Trade. 
Please contact Mr. Louis Woodroffe, Chief Economist for any clarifications or 
for further information. 
CODE: 
............ 
PART (A) 
IMPORTANCE OF CURRENT PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
TO YOUR FIRM 
1. Date of Establishment of your Company 
................. 
2. Is your company associated with an overseas company: 
Yes () 
No () 
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3. If yes please indicate the type of association: 
a. Joint Venture () 
b. Joint Marketing () 
c. Franchise () 
d. Other (Please Indicate) 
....................... 
4. Category of product(s) produced by your company (please tick): 
CONSUMER () 
NON-CONSUMER () 
BOTH () 
5. Major area(s) exported to (please tick): 
CARICOM () 
OTHER CARIBBEAN () 
UNITED STATES () 
CANADA () 
EUROPE () 
LATIN AMERICA () 
OTHER () 
6. Do your exports receive preferential treatment under any of the following 
agreements (Please tick): 
CARICOM 
CARICOMNenezuela 
CARICOM/Colombia 
LOME 
CBI 
CARIBCAN 
GSP 
None of the above 
7. Total sales (export plus local market) for 1997: 
....................... 
$ 
8. Exports sales for 1997: 
........................... 
$ 
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9. Approximately what percentage of your product(s) is exported under 
preferential trade: 
............................ 
% 
10. Number of persons employed in 1997: 
............... 
11. Total wages paid in 1997: 
........................ 
$ 
12. Value of machinery currently in use: 
..................... 
$ 
13. Approximately what percentage of your capacity is not utilized: 
............ 
% 
14. Does management personnel in your firm have access to the INTERNET: 
Yes () 
No () 
15. Does your firm have a WEB PAGE: 
Yes () 
No () 
16. Without trade preferences would you expect your product(s) to be still 
competitive on export markets? 
Yes () 
No () 
17. If Barbados liberalised its trade by removing quantitative restrictions on 
imports and replaced them with tariffs would you expect your product(s) to 
be competitive on the local market: 
Yes () 
No () 
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18. Please indicate below how important the following factors are in limiting or 
preventing your firm from exporting. You should mark the importance on the 
scale ranging from 0 (no effect) to 10 (critically important). 
FACTORS AFFECTING 
EXPORTS 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Inadequate advertising or 
marketing 
2. Inadequate research and 
development 
3. Outdated equipment 
4. Small scale of operation 
5. High operating costs (e. g., 
energy) 
6. Lack of financing 
7. High cost of raw materials 
8. Poor quality of raw materials 
9. High labour costs 
10. Inadequate employee skills 
11. Exchange rate of the 
Barbados dollar 
12. High Government taxes 
generally 
13. High transportation costs 
14. High tariffs in export 
markets 
15. Non-tariff barriers in export 
markets 
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PART (B) 
YOUR VIEWS ON NEW INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
ARRANGEMENTS. 
The statements below describe Barbados' rights and obligations as a member of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). These rights and obligations will form the 
basis for negotiations to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and 
to revise the current LOME Convention. What is your opinion on each statement: 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
19. Any trade concession (for example, lower tariff rates) offered by Barbados 
to another country should also be offered to all other WTO member 
countries. 
In favour () Disagree () 
Strongly in favour () Strongly disagree () 
No Position () 
20. Apart from the Customs Tariff, any other taxes or duties levied on imported 
entering Barbados should also be levied on locally produced goods. 
In favour () Disagree () 
Strongly in favour () Strongly disagree () 
No Position () 
21. Barbados should ensure that its laws, regulations and administrative 
procedures relating to trade are made easily available to other countries 
which want to export to Barbados. 
In favour () Disagree () 
Strongly in favour () Strongly disagree () 
No Position () 
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MARKET ACCESS 
22. Barbados should eliminate import restrictions on all imports, including 
sectors in which local production exists (except for reasons of health and 
safety, or to protect public morals). 
In favour () Disagree () 
Strongly in favour () Strongly disagree () 
No Position () 
23. Upon removing import restrictions, Barbados should apply tariff rates which 
are high enough to protect locally made products. 
In favour () Disagree () 
Strongly in favour () Strongly disagree () 
No Position () 
24. Barbados should substantially reduce the higher tariffs it applied to protect 
locally made products overtime. 
In favour () 
Strongly in favour () 
No Position () 
Disagree () 
Strongly disagree () 
SAFEGUARDS 
25. Barbados should institute safeguard action to restrict imports when such 
imports are negatively affecting local production. 
In favour () Disagree () 
Strongly in favour () Strongly disagree () 
No Position () 
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26. Any safeguard action taken by Barbados to protect local production should 
be in the form of higher tariffs rather than banning imports. 
In favour () Disagree () 
Strongly in favour () Strongly disagree () 
No Position () 
27. Any safeguard action taken by Barbados should only be temporary. 
In favour () 
Strongly in favour () 
No Position () 
Disagree () 
Strongly disagree () 
ANTI-DUMPING 
28. Barbados should take action against products from another country it 
suspects are being "dumped" (i. e. being sold in Barbados at prices below 
prices in the home country). 
In favour () Disagree () 
Strongly in favour () Strongly disagree () 
No Position () 
29. Before Barbados takes anti-dumping action against products from another 
country, the local industry should prove injury as a result of the goods 
being dumped. 
In favour () Disagree () 
Strongly in favour () Strongly disagree () 
No Position () 
30. Before taking anti-dumping action against products from another country, 
Barbados should consult with the offending country. 
In favour () Disagree () 
Strongly in favour () Strongly disagree () 
No Position () 
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SUBSIDIES 
31. Barbados should take action against products from another country it 
suspects are being subsidised (receiving financial assistance from 
government). 
In favour () Disagree () 
Strongly in favour () Strongly disagree () 
No Position () 
32. Before Barbados takes countervailing action against products from 
another country, the local industry should prove injury as a result of the 
imported goods being subsidized. 
In favour () Disagree () 
Strongly in favour () Strongly disagree () 
No Position () 
33. Before taking countervailing action against subsidised products from 
another country, Barbados should consult with the offending country. 
In favour () 
Strongly in favour () 
No Position () 
Disagree () 
Strongly disagree () 
CUSTOMS PROCEDURES 
34. Barbados should adopt worldwide standards for valuing imported goods. 
In favour () Disagree () 
Strongly in favour () Strongly disagree () 
No Position () 
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RULES OF ORIGIN 
35. Barbados should ensure that rules applied to determine the origin of 
goods are not more stringent than is absolutely necessary (not to be a 
trade barrier). 
In favour () Disagree () 
Strongly in favour () Strongly disagree () 
No Position () 
IMPORT LICENSING PROCEDURES 
36. Barbados should ensure that its procedures for granting import licenses 
are clear and that licenses are granted quickly. 
In favour () Disagree () 
Strongly in favour () Strongly disagree () 
No Position () 
TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 
37. Barbados should use standards and technical regulations (e. g. labeling 
requirements) to ensure that imports are of an acceptable standard. 
In favour () Disagree () 
Strongly in favour () Strongly disagree () 
No Position () 
38. Barbados should ensure that the standards for products it implements 
(e. g. labelling) and other technical regulations do not impede the 
importation of goods unnecessarily. 
In favour () Disagree () 
Strongly in favour () Strongly disagree () 
No Position () 
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SANITARY AND PHYTO-SANITARY MEASURES 
39. Barbados should implement strict measures on imports to protect human, 
animal or plant, life and health. 
In favour () Disagree () 
Strongly in favour () Strongly disagree () 
No Position () 
40. Barbados should ensure that any measures used to protect human, 
animal or plant, life and health do not unnecessarily impede the 
importation of goods. 
In favour () 
Strongly in favour () 
No Position () 
Disagree () 
Strongly disagree () 
PRESHIPMENT INSPECTION 
41. Barbados should ensure that it has the necessary procedures in place for 
goods to be inspected before being exported, if the importing country 
requests such inspection. 
In favour () Disagree () 
Strongly in favour () Strongly disagree () 
No Position () 
TRADE RELATED INVESTMENT MEASURES 
42. The type of incentives granted by Barbados to investors should not 
depend on the amount of inputs which such investors purchase from local 
producers. 
In favour () Disagree () 
Strongly in favour () Strongly disagree () 
No Position () 
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TRADE RELATED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
43. Barbados should put intellectual property legislation in place to protect the 
inventions of local companies on the local market. 
In favour () Disagree () 
Strongly in favour () Strongly disagree () 
No Position () 
44. Barbados should put intellectual property legislation in place to protect the 
inventions of foreign companies on the local market. 
In favour () Disagree () 
Strongly in favour () Strongly disagree () 
No Position () 
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 
45. In any trade dispute matter, Barbados should not take unilateral action 
against another country. It should seek to resolve any trade dispute 
through consultation with other members of the WTO. 
In favour () Disagree () 
Strongly in favour () Strongly disagree () 
No Position () 
46. In any trade dispute matter, Barbados should adopt any decision taken by 
the WTO. 
In favour () Disagree () 
Strongly in favour () Strongly disagree () 
No Position () 
240 
Appendices 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 
47. Barbados should not implement measures which will restrict the buying 
and selling of goods over the internet. 
In favour () Disagree () 
Strongly in favour () Strongly disagree () 
No Position () 
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PLEASE NOTE THAT BARBADOS DOES NOT HAVE OBLIGATIONS IN 
RELATION TO THE FOLLOWING ISSUES. HOWEVER, THESE ARE 
ISSUES WHICH HAVE EITHER BEEN RAISED OR ARE BEING PURSUED 
WITH THE WTO AND THEREFORE ARE IMPORTANT. 
ENVIRONMENT POLICY 
48. Barbados should refrain from restricting the importation of goods for 
environmental reasons, until rules are developed in this area by the 
WTO. 
In favour () 
Strongly in favour () 
No Position () 
Disagree () 
Strongly disagree () 
COMPETITION POLICY 
49. The WTO should develop rules which would not allow businesses in any 
country to use pricing or other business strategies to prevent the 
establishment or growth of competing businesses. 
In favour () 
Strongly in favour () 
No Position () 
Disagree () 
Strongly disagree () 
INVESTMENT 
50. In keeping with the MFN principle, the WTO should develop rules which 
would require that any concessions granted by any country to 
investment from another country, should also be granted to similar 
investment from other countries. 
In favour () Disagree () 
Strongly in favour () Strongly disagree () 
No Position () 
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APPENDIX 3 
SURVEY DESIGN AND RESULTS 
A. 3.1 SURVEY OBJECTIVES 
The objective of the Trade Policy Survey was to obtain information to be used 
in analysing the trade policy preferences of manufacturing firms, and the impact 
of the removal of trade preferences on the manufacturing sector. 
A. 3.2 SURVEY DEVELOPMENT 
The design of the survey and the conduct of the exercise followed the 
guidelines of Robson (1993). 
- 
Questions were intended to be simple, non-technical. 
- 
Options for "yes" or "no" were provided. 
- 
Scales ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree were provided. 
- 
Specific question on sales, exports etc followed general questions. 
-A short time period (6 weeks approximately) was given for the return of 
the questionnaire. 
A. 3.3 METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION 
The Survey was distributed by post and fax to all 435 manufacturing enterprises 
listed in the data base of the Barbados Investment and Development 
Corporation in September 1998. The survey was distributed during on October 
9th, and manufacturers were requested to respond by December 1999. 
A follow-up letter was sent and calls made from November 15th to February 
15th 1999. Twenty four factory visits were also made during that period to 
further discuss aspects of the questionnaire and to obtain information on 
missing data. At the end of March 1999, there were 152 responses. Of these, 
117 were complete and these were used in the analysis. 
A. 3.4 REPRESENTATIVENESS 
Chi-square goodness of fit tests to determine representativeness by firms in 
sub-sectors and employment in sub-sectors were undertaken (see Attachment 
to this Appendix). Data on the population were obtained from the BIDC 
quarterly survey of firms. Data on other characteristics (sales, capital 
association, etc) were not available for the population. The null hypotheses are 
that the sample and the population have the same distribution over firms and 
employment in each sub-sector. In both cases, the null hypothesis is not 
rejected at the 5% level of significance. 
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ATTACHMENT TO APPENDIX 3 
FOOD 
TEXTILES 
WOOD 
PAPER 
CHEMICALS 
FABRICATED 
HANDICRAFT 
OTHER 
TOTAL 
REPRESENTATIVENESS BY FIRMS IN SUB-SECTORS 
BIDC' SURVEY 
(O)2 (E)3 
STATISTICS % STATISTICS EXPECTED O-E O-EA2/E 
89 20.45 35 23.93 11.06 5.11 
63 14.48 12 16.94 
-4.94 1.44 50 11.49 12 13.44 
-1.44 0.15 47 10.80 10 12.64 
-2.64 0.55 24 5.51 11 6.45 4.544 3.19 
37 8.50 12 9.95 2.048 0.42 
29 6.66 8 7.8 0.2 0.005 
96 22.06 17 25.82 
-8.820 3.01 435 117 
Chi-Square = 13.90 
Critical value at 5% sign ificance with 7 df = 14.06 
REPRESENTATIVENESS BY EMPLOYMENT IN SUB-SECTORS 
BIDC SURVEY 
(0) (E) 
STATISTICS % STATISTICS EXPECTED O-E O-E^2/E 
FOOD 4034 35.94 1930 1866.00 63.99 2.19 
TEXTILES 1162 10.35 493 537.37 
-44.37 3.66 WOOD 626 5.57 274 289.19 
-15.19 0.79 PAPER 1183 10.54 569 547.23 21.76 0.86 
CHEMICALS 570 5.07 260 263.23 
-3.23 0.03 FABRICATED 943 8.40 405 436.12 
-31.12 2.22 
HANDICRAFT 123 1.09 51 56.59 
-5.59 0.55 OTHER 2582 23.006 1210 1194.47 15.52 0.20 
TOTAL 11223 5192 
Ch-square = 10.53 
Critical value at 5% significance with 7 df = 14.06 
1 BIDC = Barbados Investment and Development Corporation. Quarterly Employment Survey. 
. 
September 1998 
20= observed frequencies 
3E= expected frequencies 
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APPENDIX 4 
QUNATITATIVE METHODS 
This appendix reviews regression techniques referred to in the studies. In all 
cases, LIMDEP 7.0 has been used to estimate the models (Green, 1998). In 
addition to ordinary least squares, the following techniques were used. 
4.1 Ordered Probit Model 
4.2 Tobit Model 
4.3 Probit Model 
4.4 Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity 
4.5 Heteroscedasticity Consistent Covariace Matrix 
4.6 Principal Components Analysis 
A. 4.1 ORDERED PROBIT MODEL 
The ordered probit model was developed by McElvey and Zavoina 
(1975). It can be applied to surveys in which the respondents express a 
preference which can be ordered along a scale. If the responses are coded 0, 
1,2,3,4, etc, OLS regression is not appropriate since the difference between 0 
and 1 for example is the same as the difference between 3 and 4, while the 
numbers in fact only represent rankings. Other techniques such as the 
multinomial probit and logic model, would also not take into account the 
information contained in the rankings. 
The model specifies that where: 
y*=m+E 
The variables y* is not observable what we observe is: 
Y=O if y*<O, 
=1 if 0<y*_< 
=2 if dU, <y*s, u2 
=J if P, 
_, 
<_ y* 
The p's are unknown threshold parameters which must be estimated along 
with ß. Estimation is undertaken by maximum likelihood. For example, the 
probability of obtaining observation y=2 is equal to: 
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prob(, u, <A+E<_, u2) 
Which is equal to: 
prob(p, 
- 
ßx <E <- p2 
- 
ßx ). 
Once the density is known for ea likelihood function is formed and estimation 
can be undertaken. The ordered probit model assumes that e is normally 
distributed with a mean of zero and a variance of one (Greene, 2000; Kennedy 
1998). 
A. 4.2 TOBIT MODEL 
The Tobit model (Kennedy, 1998) can be used where the dependent variable 
takes the value of 0 in some cases, for example where some firms export and 
others do not. Thus, in the regression model Y, =a+ ßx, + p,, the dependent 
variable is observed only when Y1 > 0. If Y is regressed against a constant and 
X, the residuals will not satisfy the condition of E(u, ) = 0, which is needed to 
obtain unbiased estimates. In this case, the Tobit model is used. 
In this model, there is asymmetry between positive and zero values of Y. The 
model becomes: 
a+, &t +, ut if Yt >0 or pt > 
-a- & Y 
0 if YS0 or /j <_-a-/k, 
In the model, ýc follows the normal distribution with a mean of zero and a 
variance of a2 
. 
The joint probability density for the values of Yt greater than 
zero is: 
_ý'-"' 
if Y- 
Q 
a- P- 
6X, 
1-1 Q 
Where 11 is the product and m is the number of positive values of Y. The 
distribution for which Y is zero is: 
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P2 
=FJPk :5 -a-ßX1 
j=l 
The joint probability for the entire set of observations for which Y is zero and 
positive is L=P1P2. As the parameters a and 8 are non-linear, OLS techniques 
cannot be used. The maximum likelihood procedure is used instead. 
(Ramanathan, 1995). The procedure for obtaining estimates of a and Q is to 
maximise L with respect to the parameters. 
A. 4.3 PROBIT MODEL 
The Probit model can be used where the dependent variable is dichotomous 
(Ramanathan, 1995). The assumption underlying this model is that there exist a 
function of the form: 
Y'=a+ßX, +p1 
Where Xt is observable but where Y, * is an unobservable variable. What is 
observed is Yt which has a value of 1 if Y, >0 and 0 otherwise. Thus 
Yt=1 if a+ßV +p, >0 
Yt=0 if a+, 8X1 +, u 
_<0 
If F(z) is denoted as the cumulative distribution function of the normal 
distribution, then: 
P(Y, =1)=P(u, >-a-ßX, )=1-F -a X, and 
P(Y, 
= 
0) 
= 
P(p, < 
-a - ßX, ) =F-a- 
ýYQ 
The non-linear joint probability density function which is to be maximised to 
obtain estimates of a and 6 is : 
L- rIF -a - 
QXt )fl 
1 
-F- 
a- /x, 
Y'. o (uY, 
=i u 
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A. 4.4 BREUSCH-PAGAN TEST FOR HETEROSCEDASTICITY 
This test is based on the lagrange multiplier principle (Gujarati, 1995). Given a 
linear model of the form: 
yt 
=/1+ i62X2 + .... +) kX i+ P( 
With an assumed variance of: 
cf2 = Aal + a2Z2; +... +a Zj 
Where Q; 2 is linearly related to the Z's, some or all of which might be the X's, 
and where the mean and error variance respectively are given by: 
Pt = Yt -Qr- ß2 X12 -... -Qk X(k and 
A 
A2 
a. =Pr where n is the sample size. 
n 
A2 
As p, is the maximum likelihood estimator of the variance a21 it is also 
expected that it will be related to the Z's in the form: 
A 
JU 
2r 
A =a, 
+a2Zt2 +a3Zr3 +"""+a, Z4, +Er 
a2 
With the Breusch-Pagan test, which is for large samples, one half of the 
explained sum of squares, 0=2 (ESS), has a chi-square distribution with p-1 
degrees of freedom. The null hypothesis is that there is no heteroscedasticity 
(or that there is homoscedasticity): 
Ho : a, =a2 ="""=ap =0 
The null hypothesis is rejected if the estimated value 0 exceeds the critical x2 
value at a given level of significance (Gujarati, 1995). 
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A. 4.5 HETEROSCEDASTICITY CONSISTENT 
COVARIANCE MATRIX 
Given the linear regression model: 
Yr =ßßx, +8; 
E[s; 
= 
0] 
Var[e; ] 
= UZ 
The usual covariance matrix estimated by V= SZ (X' X)-' 
, 
may not be 
consistent in the presence of heteroscedasticity. The White consistent 
estimator is given by (Green, 2000; Gugarati, 1995): 
Sw 
_ 
(X' X)-' f71ezX1X, 'IX' X)-' 
A. 4.6 PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS 
Principal components analysis (koutsoyiannis, 1977) is used to create one 
variable from a set of variables. The variable created is a linear combination of 
the set. 
Given a set of variables X, 's(j = 1,2 
....., 
K). The principal components is 
created as: 
Pi = ai, Xi =+ al2X2+ 
....... 
+alkXk 
P2 
= a2X1 =+ a22X2+ 
....... 
+a2kXk 
Pk 
= ak1X1 =+ ak2X2+ 
....... 
+akkXk 
The steps followed in calculating the P's were as follows: 
1. A table of simple correlations for the set of variables was generated 
(LIMDEP 7.0) 
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2. Each column of the correlation table was summed rxýý J=a, and a kk 
total sum of those value calculated ZI rxýxý J=b. The square root of 
the total sum was also calculated rx 
x=c. 
3. The factor loadings of the first variable P, were found by dividing the 
sum of each column by the square root of the grand total (a / c). 
4. The Principal P is the sum of each variable multiplied by its factor 
loading. 
5. The latent root (L) is the sum of the squares of (a / c). 
6. The amount of variation accounted for by the first principal component is 
the latent root divided by the number of columns in the correlation table 
(L/n). 
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APPENDIX 5 
WTO PRINCIPLES AGREEMENTS AND ISSUES 
A. 5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Uruguay Round Multilateral Trade Negotiations which commenced on 
September 1986, under the aegis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) was officially concluded on 15th April 1994 (WTO 1995a). 
The Round had been deemed by many experts, as the most ambitious ever 
embarked upon since GATT 1947. The main objective of the negotiations was to 
develop rules which would ensure that world trade was free, given the high level 
of protection which existed in the world economy at that time. It was suggested 
that this protection, which took both blatant and subtle forms, was not only 
affecting the growth of world trade, but also as a consequence, the living standard 
of millions of people in developing countries. 
The results of the Round are embodied in a document referred to as the Final Act. 
The Final Act includes the Agreement Establishing the WTO and six different 
accords which together form a cohesive package. Firstly, there are agreements 
relating to trade in goods (GATT). Secondly, there is a new agreement on trade in 
services (GATS). Outside of those two sets of agreements, there is a separate 
agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The 
fourth element of the package is an Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes. The fifth accord is a mechanism for 
reviewing trade policies. The sixth and final accord are plurilaterial agreements. 
In addition to the areas listed, there are also thirty Ministerial Declarations and 
Decisions, which speak to specific aspects of the agreements. 
This chapter reviews WTO agreements of direct relevance to this study, and 
comments on the international competitiveness implications of these agreements. 
This chapter also examines the new issues being discussed with a view towards 
negotiations. 
A. 5.2 WTO PRINCIPLES 
WTO agreements contain three basic rules regarded as principles which run 
throughout all agreements. These are the principle of non-discrimination, national 
treatment and transparency. 
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A. 5.2.1 Non-Discrimination Principle 
The non-discrimination principle or Most-Favoured Nation Treatment clause 
(Article I of GATT, Article II of GATS, and Article 4 TRIPS), requires that any 
concession granted by one member state to another member state, must 
immediately and unconditionally be granted to all other member states. 
This principle is regarded as a key cornerstone in the multilateral trade system. It 
requires that countries wishing to form strategic alliances through the formation of 
regional trade agreements, seek exemption from this principle. 
A. 5.2.2 National Treatment 
The principle of national treatment (Article III of GATT, Article XXVII of GATS, and 
Article 3 of TRIPS), requires that once a product or service has entered the 
domestic market, that good or service should be accorded the same "treatment" 
as goods produced locally. This means that once goods or services enter the 
domestic market, charges, duties or trade requirements not applicable to 
domestically produced goods or services should not be placed on imported goods 
or foreign services. 
A. 5.2.3 Transparency 
The transparency principle requires that policies implemented by member states 
which directly or indirectly affect the flow of international trade be available for the 
scrutiny of all member states. This is done through notification requirements 
embedded in all agreements, and through the Trade Policy Review Mechanism. 
A. 5.3 WTO AGREEMENTS 
This section summarizes the WTO agreements focusing on key components of 
relevance to this paper. The Final Act contains the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, to which the following agreements are 
annexed: 
Multilateral agreements on Trade in Goods including the following: 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
Agreement on Agriculture. 
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- 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary 
Measures. 
- 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. 
- 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. 
- 
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures. 
- 
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. 
- 
Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspection. 
- 
Agreement on Rules of Origin. 
- 
Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures. 
- 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
- 
Agreement on Safeguards. 
ii. General Agreement on Trade in Services. 
iii. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Right 
iv. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes. 
v. Trade Policy Review Mechanism. 
vii. Plurilateral Trade Agreements. 
A. 5.3.1 Agreement Establishing the WTO 
The Agreement Establishing the WTO outlines the role and structure of the 
organization, and the process for decision making. It creates the Ministerial 
Conference as the highest decision making body in the organisation, with a 
mandate to meet at least every two years. It also establishes the General Council 
to undertake the day to day decision on behalf of the Ministerial Conference. 
The agreement stipulates that generally, all agreements attached to the WTO 
must be accepted as a "single undertaking" by all members. The major 
exceptions are plurilaterial agreements. Acceptance of these is optional. 
Article IX of the agreement makes provision for waivers from their obligations to 
be granted to countries. This is important in the context of preferential trade 
arrangements, especially between developed and developing countries. 
A. 5.3.2 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
This agreement outlines the contents of GATT 1994. The agreement states that 
GATT 1994 will consist of GATT 1947 as amended through previous Rounds of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations as well as decisions taken during those Rounds. 
Included in GATT 1994 therefore, would be the decisions on Special and 
Differential treatment (the Enabling Clause), which provides exemptions from 
Article Ito developing countries in special cases. 
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GATT 1994 also includes the following: 
a. Understanding on the Interpretation of Article II: (b) of the General 
Agreement on Tariff and Trade 1994. 
This Understanding requires that countries include "other charges and 
duties" in their schedules of commitments. "Other duties and charges are 
to be those which existed at April 15 1994. It also makes provisions for 
countries to challenge levels recorded. 
b. Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. 
While WTO rules do not outlaw state trading enterprises, they do make 
provisions for ensuring that such entities operate in a transparent manner. 
This Understanding requires that state trading enterprises make 
notifications to the WTO for the scrutiny of all members. 
c. Understanding on Balance-of-Payments Provisions of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. 
The Understanding provides for countries to use trade restricting 
measures when they are faced with Balance of Payments difficulties. It 
urges members to use price based rather than quantitative restrictions to 
protect their balance of payments. Any measure taken in respect of 
balance of payments difficulties, must be notified for discussion by WTO 
members. This is especially the case when quantitative restrictions are 
used. 
d. Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. 
Article XXIV of the GATT sets out the requirements to be met by Customs 
Unions and Free Trade Areas to be compliant with WTO provisions. This 
Understanding seeks to clarify some of the provisions on how countries 
affected by the creation or expansion of a Customs Union or Free Trade 
Area are to be compensated. Compensation can be in the form of lower 
tariffs by the offending member or members. 
e. Understanding in Respect of Waivers and Obligations under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. 
This Understanding stipulates that requests for waivers from WTO 
obligations should include the type of waiver requested, the policy 
objective of the waiver, as well as reasons why WTO consistent measures 
would not achieve the policy objectives. (It requires the termination of the 
waiver unless granted under Article XI of the Agreement Establishing the 
WTO). 
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f. Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXVIII of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. 
Countries which have principal supplying interest or substantial interest in 
export of a product, will have initial negotiating rights if an obligation is 
changed or withdrawn, and compensation is being offered. Principal 
negotiating rights and substantial interest are to be determined by such 
factors as the percentage of exports to total exports of the affected country, 
production capacity and investment affected. 
g. Marrakesh Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1994. 
This Protocol requires that members implement their schedules of 
commitments in the areas of agricultural and non-agricultural goods. The 
start date for the reduction of tariffs is the establishment of the WTO. It also 
highlights the fact that in the event that schedules are modified or 
withdrawn, then procedures for compensation will apply. 
A. 5.3.3 Agreement on Agriculture 
The Agreement on Agriculture defines agricultural products as all products falling 
under HS Chapters 1- 24, less fish and fish products and a number of specific 
products in other HS Chapters included e. g. raw silk under Chapter 41.01 and 
41.03. This definition embraces a number of products which would usually be 
classified as manufactured goods such as beverages in Chapter 22, and 
processed cooking oils in Chapter 15. 
The primary goal of the agreement is the liberalisation of trade in this sector. The 
agreement has two important elements. These are market access and domestic 
support commitments. 
Under the market access commitments, members have agreed to the tariffication 
of import restrictions and to the reduction of these tariffs over time. For developed 
countries, tariffs are to be reduced by an average of 36 percent over a six-year 
period. For developing countries, duties are to be reduced by an average of 24 
percent over a ten year period. No reduction is required in the case of least 
developed countries (least developed countries are those with a per capita 
income of US $ 1000 or less). 
In terms of domestic support commitments, measures which have a "minimal" 
impact on trade are excluded from reduction commitments. However, all other 
types of support must be included in a programme for reduction. In the case of 
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developed countries the reduction required is 20 percent. In the case of 
developing countries, the reduction is 13.3 percent. No reduction is required for 
least developed countries. 
The agreement also requires that export subsidies be reduced to a level of 36 
percent below the 1986 
-1990 reference level over a six year period and that the 
quantity of subsidised exports be reduced by 21 percent over the same period. 
Developing countries are required to reduce their levels of subsidies and 
subsidised exports by two-thirds of that for developed countries. Again, no 
reductions apply in the case of least developed countries. 
Given the sensitive nature of this sector for many countries, a special safeguard 
provision is included which allows countries to increase the level of duties 
applicable by a third if local production is being adversely affected by imports 
above a trigger level, or by reduced prices for imports below a trigger level. 
A. 5.3.4 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phyto- 
Sanitary Measures 
This agreement seeks to establish rules to be followed by all members in 
implementing regulations to protect the life and health of human, animal or plant 
life. It essentially requires that members adopt international standards in this area 
or base country standards on scientific grounds. It also requires that the action of 
members be highly transparent in this area. 
A. 5.3.5 Agreement in Textiles and Clothing 
This agreement is listed as being among the major achievements of the Round. 
Since the mid-1970s, trade in clothing and textiles was largely conducted under 
the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA). Under this agreement, developed countries 
fixed quotas for trade in these products. This arrangement breached market 
access rules under the GATT. It was however allowed to continue. 
The WTO agreement requires members to phase out all quantitative restrictions 
on textiles and clothing over a ten-year period. Thus the MFA is to be phased out 
by 2004. In pursuit of this objective, each WTO member was required to submit 
its programme for phasing out restrictions on textiles and clothing to the WTO 
within six months of its establishment. 
A. 5.3.6 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
Technical barriers to trade refer to the use of technical regulations, standards or 
conformity assessment procedures to restrict the flow of international trade. The 
agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade sets out the guidelines for the use of 
256 
Appendices 
technical instruments. It requires that such measures should not be used to inhibit 
trade and it requires that, where possible, international codes in these areas be 
adopted. It further places an obligation on member states to provide justification 
for any application of a standard or measure which is trade inhibiting. 
A. 5.3.7 Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) 
Trade-Related Investment Measures referred to in this agreement relate to trade 
in goods only. The agreement requires member states to abolish existing 
measures which are inconsistent with their obligations, and to refrain from 
introducing any new ones. It also requires member states to grant national 
treatment to investors. Investment measures which are disallowed include the 
requirement that investors source some or all of their inputs locally and/or the 
linking of the value of imported inputs to the value of goods exported. 
A. 5.3.8 Agreement On Anti-Dumping Measures 
Countries whose industries are being adversely affected by "dumped" imports can 
use the provisions of this agreement to take anti-dumping action. Dumping is 
defined as the export of a product at a price below its "normal value". The 
agreement contains details on the calculation of "normal value", as well as the 
process for taking anti-dumping action. It also calls for prompt and detailed 
reporting to the WTO of all anti-dumping action taken by member states. 
A. 5.3.9 Agreement on Customs Valuation 
This agreement contains rules which seek to apply a fair, uniform and neutral 
system in the valuation of imports. It is intended to remove any arbitrary methods 
which Customs Authorities may apply that could adversely affect the free flow of 
trade. The agreement is explicit in the steps which must be applied to arrive at 
the value of goods. 
A. 5.3.10 Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspection 
Preshipment inspection occurs where an importing government entity hires a 
private company to inspect goods within the borders of the exporting country 
before importation. Governments may undertake such action for many reasons 
including national security, the prevention of commercial fraud and the 
determination of the correct valuation of goods. This agreement sets out the rules 
for conducting such inspections and the methods to be used in resolving disputes. 
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A. 5.3.11 Agreement on Rules of Origin 
Most trade agreements contain rules for determining the origin of goods. These 
rules vary across the many agreements. The WTO agreement on Rules of Origin 
contains a framework for the development of harmonised rules for its members. 
No specific rules are listed in the agreement. However, it provides the mandate 
and guidelines for the WTO Committee which is developing a system of 
harmonised rules. 
A. 5.3.12 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
This agreement provides disciplines on the granting of subsidies and also on 
procedures for taking action against the subsidies granted by other member 
states. In other words, it provides the framework within which an aggrieved 
member state can seek redress within the WTO in cases where subsidised goods 
produced in/or exported by another member state negatively affect its production. 
Under the agreement some subsidies are actionable and others are not 
actionable. The agreement defines three types of subsidies: prohibited subsidies, 
actionable subsidies and non-actionable subsidies. Prohibited subsidies are 
subsidies based on (i) export performance and (ii) import content requirements. 
Actionable subsidies are subsidies given to specific industries by a member state, 
which negatively impact on the domestic industry of another member state. Non- 
Actionable subsidies are non-specific in nature or are specific but insignificant. 
A. 5.3.13 Agreement on Safeguards 
This agreement makes provision for Member States whose industries are being 
negatively affected by imports from other Member States to protect those 
industries by imposing temporary trade restrictions under a stringent set of 
conditions. The criteria for the assessment of serious injury as well as the steps 
to be taken before the implementation of any restrictions are set out in the 
agreement. Prior to safeguard action being taken, approval must be obtained 
from the WTO Council for Trade in Goods. 
A. 5.3.14 Agreement on Services 
This agreement, in addition to bringing trade in services under multilateral 
disciplines for the first time, seeks to progressively liberalise trade in this 
multifaceted area. The agreement lays down certain basic disciplines and 
provides a framework for negotiations on the liberalisation between members 
(Most Favoured Nation Treatment), national treatment (non-discrimination as 
between foreign service supplier and domestic service supplier), and 
transparency in the conduct of trade. In addition, each member state of the WTO 
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had to commit itself to the liberalisation of trade in at least one service activity. 
Each member also undertook to progressively liberalise trade in other service 
sectors in future rounds of trade negotiations. 
A. 5.3.15 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights. (TRIPS) 
The agreement essentially protects intellectual property rights and lays down 
minimum standards of protection and enforcement which all member states must 
implement. The areas of intellectual property covered by the agreement are 
patents, copyrights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial 
designs, layout-designs of integrated circuits and undisclosed information. 
There is a distinct section (Part III) which sets out the objections of members to 
provide procedures for effective action against infringement of intellectual property 
rights. 
A. 5.4 UNDERSTANDING ON THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 
The agreement provides for an enhanced and more strengthened Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism within the WTO than existed under the GATT. Members 
are required to use this facility rather than taking unilateral action in the settlement 
of disputes. The first stage of dispute resolution calls for consultations on the part 
of the parties concerned. If the consultative process fails, one or both parties can 
request the WTO to establish a Panel to hear the dispute. The report of the 
Panel, together with its recommendations, can be appealed by either party. An 
Appellate Body will then consider the matter and parties are bound to adhere to 
its ruling. 
A. 5.5 TRADE REVIEW POLICY MECHANISM 
The Trade Policy Review Mechanism of the WTO provides for the investigation of, 
and reporting on, all trade and trade related policies and procedures of member 
states. The objectives of the reviews are to determine how members states are 
implementing their obligations, and to permit a greater transparency and 
understanding of trade policies and practices of member states. The report which 
is prepared by WTO staff is reviewed by all members in Council. The time-table 
for conducting these reviews is tied to member states' share in overall global 
trade. The top four member states 
- 
EU, USA, Japan and Canada 
- 
are 
examined every two years. The next 16 are reviewed every 4 years; and the rest 
every 6 years. Longer intervals may be fixed for least developed countries. 
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A. 5.6 PLURILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
Plurilateral agreements are optional agreements entered into by member states 
of the WTO. Three Plurilateral agreements are currently in force. These are: 
L the agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft which eliminates duties on all 
aircraft and related equipment (except military aircraft); 
ii. the Agreement on Government Procurement which seeks to streamline 
tendering procedures and to liberalise trade in this area; and 
iii. the agreement aimed at the elimination of tariffs on Information 
Technology Products. This agreement was established in Singapore in 
December 1996. 
A. 5.7 WTOISSUES 
At the time the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO was signed in 
1994, not all issues relating to the development of multilateral trade rules were 
resolved. Some agreements contained provisions for either a review, or for 
further negotiations to bring the outstanding issues to conclusion. This is 
referred to as the Built-In Agenda. 
In keeping with the Built-In Agenda, negotiations to conclude agreements in 
Financial Services, and Basic Telecommunications were completed in 1996. 
Negotiations in the areas of agriculture and services commenced in 2000 in 
keeping with the Built-In Agenda. 
Since 1996, some WTO members have been raising a number of issues which 
they considered should be examined by the WTO. These issues (referred to as 
the Singapore issues) include: 
Trade and the Environment; 
Trade and Labour Standards; 
Trade and Competition Policy; 
Trade and Investment; and 
Trade Facilitation. 
At the Ministerial Conference held in 2001 it was agreed that negotiations would 
be held in all of the above areas with the exception of labour standards. 
A. 5.7.1 Labour Issues 
At the first Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 1996, the USA initiated a 
proposal calling for a Working Group to be established on core labour 
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standards. The "core" labour standards which the group would examine would 
include: 
- 
Freedom of association 
- 
Right to organize and bargain collectively 
- 
Prohibition on forced labour 
- 
Elimination of exploitative forms of child labour 
- 
Non-discrimination in employment or occupation 
The argument for the establishment of the Working Group was that core labour 
standards would address the concerns of working people and demonstrate that 
trade is a path to tangible prosperity. 
The Singapore meeting however only decided that the WTO and the ILO would 
collaborate on the issue. 
At the Third Ministerial Conference, the USA proposed that a Working Group 
with a slightly broader mandate be established. The Working Group on Trade 
and Labour, would consider the following issues: 
(a) trade and employment 
- 
examination of effects of increased 
international trade and investment on levels and composition of 
country's employment; 
(b) trade and social protection 
- 
examination of the relationship 
between increased openness in trade and investment and the 
scope and the structure of basic social protections and safety nets 
in developed and developing countries; 
(c) trade and core labour standards 
- 
examination of relationship 
between economic development, international trade and 
investment, and the implementation of core labour standards; 
(d) positive trade policy incentives and core labour standards 
- 
examination of the scope for positive trade policy incentives to 
promote implementation of core labour standards; 
(e) trade and forced or exploitative child labour 
- 
examination of the 
extent of forced or exploitative child labour in industries engaged 
in international trade; and 
(f) trade and derogation from national labour standards 
- 
examination 
of the effects of derogation from national labour standards 
(including in export processing zones) on international trade, 
investment and economic development. 
The establishment of a Working Group to consider trade and labour issues 
however, continues to be opposed by developing countries who consider that 
this is a guise (mainly on the part of the USA) to protect domestic industries 
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from cheaper imports. A proposal by the EU for a joint WTO/ILO forum has also 
met with resistance. 
A. 5.7.2 Trade and the Environment 
On the occasion of the signing of the Final Act in 1994, Ministers agreed to the 
establishment of a Committee on Trade and the Environment. The Committee 
was initially given a life of two years and was requested to submit a report to 
the first Ministerial Conference, at which time its work and terms of reference 
would be reviewed. 
The terms of reference of the Committee include an examination of the: 
i). relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading 
system and trade measures for environmental purposes, 
particularly those which exist under Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements; 
ii) relationship between environmental policies relevant to trade and 
environmental measures with significant trade effects and the 
provisions of the multilateral trading system; 
iii) relationship between the provisions of the multilateral system and 
environmental taxes, standards and technical regulations, 
packaging and labelling and recycling; and 
iv) issue of exports of domestically prohibited goods. 
The Committee has been pursuing its mandate under two broad themes of 
issues related to market access, and the linkages between multilateral 
environment and trade agreements. 
A. 5.7.3 Trade and Investment 
The issue of developing international standards on investment was first jointly 
raised in the WTO by Canada and Japan. The issue has also received the 
support of the USA and the EU. In 1996, these countries requested that a 
working party be established to examine issues relating to trade and 
investment, and to develop multilateral rules in this area. 
Among the arguments for the development of multilateral rules on investment 
were: 
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iv 
the close and growing inter-linkages between trade and 
investment in a world economy which is becoming increasingly 
integrated; 
the positive contribution which foreign direct investment can make 
to the expansion of trade and enhancement of economic growth 
to all economies; 
that foreign direct investment is complementary to trade 
development in order to access foreign markets; and 
that the many bilateral, regional and sectoral treaties covering 
investment are creating an international climate which is not 
transparent, consistent nor fair. 
Supporters of the multilateralisation of investment standards have been careful 
to point out that the development of multilateral rules in relation to investment 
will not mean that countries will lose their sovereignty in determining 
development policies. They note that even the most liberal OECD countries 
maintain their restrictions on investment for many reasons, including national 
security and the need to achieve specific policy aims. 
A. 5.7.4 Trade and Competition Policy 
Competition policy issues, unlike labour standards and investment, seek 
directly to improve on already existing WTO agreements. The overall objective 
of this issue as introduced by Japan, the EU and Korea, is to " prevent 
competition restricting actions from reducing the market access opportunities 
acquired through the elimination or reduction in trade barriers". 
It is argued by these countries that a number of current WTO agreements, such 
as anti-dumping measures, safeguard measures, and subsidies and 
countervailing measures could be abused to the extent that they have 
competition restricting effects. In addition, there exist a number of practices in 
some countries, which undermine market access opportunities for other 
countries. These include cartels, collusive pricing, boycotts, and mergers 
designed to restrict competition. 
An international framework is therefore being advocated in order to: 
promote the existence of domestic competition structures in the 
jurisdiction of all WTO members; 
increase the effectiveness and coherence of the national 
competition policies of WTO members; 
avoid conflicts of law and jurisdiction between countries and 
promote a gradual convergence of competition laws. This would 
increase the legal security of firms operating in different 
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jurisdictions, as well as reduce their costs of compliance with 
competition laws; and 
strengthen the multilateral trading system and promote equal 
conditions of competition and market access worldwide. 
A. 5.7.5 Trade Facilitation 
Since 1996, the WTO has been examining trade facilitation procedures in 
member countries. It has been argued by some countries, that undue 
administrative procedures for clearing imports and exports, retard the growth of 
trade, and increase the cost of imports and exports. Some countries have 
therefore been calling for the development of rules which would simplify, 
modernise and harmonise documentation requirements and border-crossing 
procedures and systems. 
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APPENDIX 6 
DESCRIPTION OF PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
This section reviews the preferential trade arrangements under which 
Barbados' exports access the markets of other countries on a full or partial 
duty-free basis. The non-reciprocal arrangements are: 
1. Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) 
2. LOME Conventions I- IV 
3. Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) 
4. CARIBCAN 
5. CARICOMNenezuela Agreement on Trade and 
Investment 
6. CARICOM/Colombia Trade, Economic and 
Technical Cooperation Agreement'. 
The reciprocal arrangement to which Barbados is a party, and which will be 
reviewed in this section, is the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)2. 
A. 6.1 GENERALISED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES (GSP) 
The GSP programme was one of the major outcomes of UNCTAD II held in 
1968. Under the GSP programme, some developed countries grant preferential 
market access to developing countries on a reduced tariff rate or duty free 
basis. 
The main objectives of the GSP are to: 
- 
Increase the export earnings of the preference receiving countries. 
- 
Promote their industrialization. 
- 
Accelerate their rate of economic growth. 
There are at present 15 GSP schemes in operation, which are offered by 29 
preference giving or donor countries, including the 15 members of the EU. 
Barbados is a beneficiary of the schemes offered by Canada, European Union, 
Japan, Norway, Switzerland, USA, Australia and New Zealand. 
Non-reciprocal for the first four years only. 
Z CARICOM is in the process of finalising reciprocal trade agreements with the Dominican Republic and 
with Cuba. 
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Although the schemes fall within the same GSP framework, they differ in terms 
of their coverage, depth of tariff cuts, safeguard measures, and especially the 
rules of origin. Given the diversity of the various schemes, this section will 
describe the main elements of the GSP schemes of Barbados' major trading 
partners the EU, USA and Canada3. 
A. 6.1.1 Background and Country Coverage 
The GSP of the European Community was first introduced in 1971 on a ten 
year basis. The scheme was reviewed in 1981, and again in 1991 when an 
extension was made pending the outcome of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations. In 1995, the scheme was altered and three key features 
introduced namely, tariff modulation according to the sensitivity of the product, 
country-sector graduation and special incentive arrangements for countries 
which comply with such requirements as labour standards and environmental 
norms. The current scheme has been in operation since 1 July 1999 and will be 
reviewed in 31 December 2001. 
The Canadian GSP (referred to as General Preferential Tariff 
- 
GPT) was 
introduced on 1 July 1974 for a ten-year period. The scheme was reviewed in 
1984 when product coverage was expanded. Another review was undertaken in 
1994, and the scheme extended until 2004. The last review expanded product 
coverage and lowered tariff rates of duty to take into account the erosion of 
preference margins as a result of WTO commitments. 
The GSP of the USA was instituted in 1976 for a ten year period, and was 
eventually extended to 1993 after which the scheme has been reviewed every 
one or two years. A new scheme is to be implemented in 2000. 
All GSP schemes specify beneficiary countries. In general, countries are 
excluded for reasons of forced or child labour or failure to comply with 
international conventions on such issues as money laundering or the transit of 
narcotics. 
A. 6.1.2 Product Coverage and Depth of Tariff Cuts 
The EC scheme includes a large number of agricultural products falling under 
Chapters 1- 24 of the HS code, as well as processed and semi-processed 
industrial products and ferro-alloys falling under Chapters 25 
- 
97, excluding 
Chapter 93 (arms and ammunition and parts thereof). Additional concessions 
are granted to least developed countries identified by the EU. 
3 The information provided in this review is taken from the UNCTAD website //www. unctad. org/gsp/ 
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The scheme classifies products into four categories; non-sensitive products, 
semi-sensitive products, sensitive products, and very sensitive products. For 
these products the rate of duty applied are; 0%, 35%, 70% and 85% of the 
MFN rate respectively. The very sensitive industries are mainly garments and 
textiles, falling between HS Chapters 50 to 63. 
In the case of the USA, there are annual reviews of the list of products and 
countries covered under its GSP scheme. At these reviews, petitions submitted 
by countries for the inclusion of products are examined. The scheme is 
composed of 4,650 articles including manufactured, semi-manufactured, 
selected agricultural, fishery and primary industrial goods, not otherwise 
receiving duty-free concessions. In addition, from 1996, another 1,770 articles 
exported by least developed beneficiary countries received duty free treatment. 
Least developed beneficiary countries are those with a per capita income of US 
$786 or less4. 
All products eligible for preferential treatment under the GSP scheme enter the 
U. S. free of duty. Goods not eligible for GSP treatment include most textiles, 
watches, footwear, handbags, luggage, flat goods, work gloves and other 
leather apparel. 
The Canadian GSP is not as structured as that of the USA and EU. The rates 
of duty vary depending on the product. In addition, the products which benefit 
from the scheme are less categorized. In general however, products such as 
textiles, footwear, chemicals, plastic and allied industries, specialty steels and 
electron tubes are excluded from the scheme. 
In the case of Canada, 48 countries designated as LDCs benefit from duty-free 
access for all products eligible for GSP treatment (other GSP beneficiary 
countries in some instances receive a reduced rate of duty only). In addition, 
the value added criteria is lower for least developed countries. 
A. 6.1.3 Rules of Origin 
Rules of origin criteria generally fall into two categories; wholly produced and 
substantial transformation. The former definition refers to "products which have 
been entirely grown, extracted from the soil or harvested within the exporting 
country, or manufactured there exclusively from any of these products"5. The 
general rule for a substantial transformation is a change in tariff heading. 
However, other criteria may apply such as production from specific material 
and/or a specific value added. 
4 USTR (2000) "U. S. Generalized System of Preferences Guidebook". 
5 UNCTAD (2000d) Digest on GSP Rules of Origin: // www. unctad. org/en/techcop/trade0103. htm 
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Most GSP schemes require that many agricultural, fish and forestry products 
must be wholly produced. For the EU, USA and Canada, the value added to 
the product in the beneficiary country must be generally at least 60%, 35 % and 
60% respectively. 
A. 6.1.4 Safeguards and Graduation 
Safeguard provisions operate in GSP schemes to protect industries in donor 
countries from surges in competitive imports. Graduation schemes on the other 
hand operate to ensure that mostly countries with low per capita incomes 
benefit from the schemes. 
In terms of safeguards, the EC GSP contains a clause which allows MFN tariff 
rates to be re-introduced if imports of a product are causing injury or 
threatening the survival of an EC industry. Among the factors taken into 
account in determining injury or threat of injury are; low profitability, reduction in 
employment or capacity utilisation and increases in stock of the domestic 
industry. In the EC GSP system, countries are graduated based on an index 
calculated by the EC. The components of the index are export specialisation 
and development level. The development index includes export earnings and 
the per capita income of the country. 
Both the US and Canadian GSP schemes make provisions for the withdrawal 
of concessions if imports are causing injury to, or threatening the survival of a 
domestic industry. In addition, the US GSP also contains a clause on 
"competitive-need limitations" which states that GSP treatment for the exports 
of a country will be withdrawn if imports from that country account for more than 
50% of the value of total US imports of that product, or a certain dollar value is 
exceeded (in 1996 the limit set was US $ 75 million for 1996 with an annual 
increase of US$ 5 million). Graduation from the US GSP occurs if a country is 
classified as an upper income developing country as determined by the World 
Bank. 
A. 6.1.5 Concerns about GSP schemes 
A number of problems have been cited which have negatively affected the 
utilisation of GSP schemes. These include: insufficient knowledge of GSP 
schemes, lack of capacity in many developing countries to use GSP schemes, 
complexity of rules of origin and documentation requirements, and the 
uncertainty about the schemes as they are subject to change from year to year. 
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UNCTAD has made a number of recommendations aimed at improving the 
utilisation of these trading arrangements including6: 
i. industrial cooperation arrangements between importers and developing 
countries towards strengthening and diversifying the supply capabilities 
of the latter; 
ii. expanding product coverage; 
iii. relaxing and simplifying rules of origin requirements; 
iv. reducing the need for developing countries to comply with social, 
humanitarian and other conditions not related to trade; and 
v. ensuring that the schemes remain stable and predictable so investment 
can be planned. 
A. 6.2 THE LOME CONVENTIONS 
The LOME Convention is a trade and aid package offered by the European 
Economic Community (EC) to states in the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
region (ACP states) ý. The first LOME Convention was signed in 1975 by nine 
member states of the European Community and 46 African, Caribbean and 
Pacific States. The key objective of the convention was to promote and 
expedite the economic, cultural and social development of the ACP states and 
to consolidate and diversify their relations in a spirit of mutual solidarity. The 
main founding principle of the convention was the equality between partners, 
respect for their sovereignty, mutual interest and interdependence; the right of 
each state to determine its political, social, cultural and economic policy 
options; and security of relations based on the 'acquis' of their system of 
cooperation. 
The convention, which was renewed after negotiations in 1979,1984 and 1989 
with a mid term review in 1995, has the following components8: 
A. 6.2.1 Elements of the LOME Convention 
All LOME Conventions contained aid and trade elements. Successive rounds 
of negotiations to develop successor arrangements have sought to increase the 
size of the aid package and to secure more preferential trade arrangements for 
ACP countries. 
6 UNCTAD (1998) Ways And Means Of Enhancing The Utilisation of Trade Preferences By Developing 
Countries, In Particular LDCs, As Well As Further Ways Of Expanding Preferences. 
'Commission of the European Communities 
- 
(1986; 1990a; 1990b). 
8 Commission of the European Communities (1995). 
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A. 6.2.1.1 Aid 
The aid package which is administered through the financial protocol (Table 
2.4) contains the following elements: 
- 
Grant and risk capital. 
- 
Stabex funds: 
- 
cash payments to offset losses on agricultural 
exports. 
- 
Sysmin funds: 
- 
cash payments to assist mining industries facing 
difficulties. 
- 
Emergency aid: 
- 
for disaster relief. 
- 
Refugee aid: 
- 
for serious refugee situations. 
- 
Structural adjustment aid: 
- 
for countries undergoing economic reform. 
- 
Funds for trade promotion and development. 
A. 6.2.1.2 Trade 
The trade cooperation package includes: 
- 
preferential access to the EC market for most ACP industrial and 
agricultural products; and 
- 
guaranteed purchase by the EC of such commodities as sugar, 
rum and bananas. 
Appendix Table 6.1 highlights key elements of funding under the various 
Conventions. The table shows the increases from LOME I to IV. 
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APPENDIX TABLE 6.1 
LOME CONVENTION: FINANCIA L RESOURCES 
ECU MILLIONS 
LOMEI (1975-1980) 3 450 
LOME II 1980 
-1985) 5 700 
LOME III 1985-1990 8 500 
LOME IV (1990 
- 
2000) 
Financial Protocol (1990 
- 
1995) 12 000 
Financial Protocol (1995 
- 
2000) 14 625 
Made up as follows: 
European Development Fund (EDF) 6 262 
Grants for national and regional 
programmes 
Stabex 1 800 
Sysmin 575 
Structural adjustment 1 400 
Emergency refugee assistance 260 
Interest rate subsidies 370 
Regional Trade Cooperation 1 300 
Risk Capital 1 000 
European Investment Bank (EIB) 
Loans for national and regional 
projects 1 658 
Source: Commission of the European Communities 1995; 1990a; 1986. 
A. 6.2.1.2.1 Trade Cooperation and Commodity Protocol 
A. 6.2.1.2.1.1 Preferential Trade 
The major objective of trade cooperation is to promote trade between the ACP 
States and the Community, taking into account their respective levels of 
development. In pursuit of that objective, all ACP originating products are 
imported into the EC free of customs duties or charges having the equivalent 
effect. Agricultural products are however subject to the specific rules of the 
Common Agricultural Policy. The EU has given the undertaking that, wherever 
possible, it will "take the necessary measures to ensure more favourable 
treatment than that granted to third countries benefiting from the most- 
favoured-nation clause for the same product". 
Key elements of trade cooperation between the EU and ACP countries include: 
-A commitment not to apply quantitative restrictions or measures having 
an equivalent effect on ACP exports. 
- 
Restrictions are to be applied for reasons of health, safety or to protect 
public morals. 
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- 
Treatment granted to ACP exports may not be more favourable than that 
applied to trade among the member states of the Community. 
- 
The Community is to inform ACP states of any measures which affect 
their exports prior to such measures being adopted. 
- 
ACP states are not required to grant reciprocal treatment to exports of 
the Community. 
- 
Where trade cooperation concessions granted to ACP states result in 
"serious disturbances" in a sector of the economy of any member or 
members of the Community, the Community can take safeguard 
measures to protect the sector. 
- 
Given the importance of trade in services to ACP states, negotiations are 
to take place to develop provisions in this area. 
Rules of origin criteria include the following: 
agricultural, fishing and forestry products generally must be wholly 
produced; 
other products must generally undergo substantial transformation 
including a change of tariff heading, production from specified 
material, or must meet a value added criteria which is as high as 80% 
of the price (ex-works price) of the product; and 
rules allow for cumulation, where inputs from non-ACP states in the 
same geographical location are used to produce the final product. 
The inputs must however undergo substantial transformation. 
A. 6.2.1.2.1.2 Commodity Protocols 
The LOME IV Convention contains a number of Commodity Protocols on 
bananas, rum, beef and veal, sugar, coal and steel and forest resources. The 
Protocols which are of interest to Barbados given its exports, are sugar and 
rum. 
In terms of sugar, the Community has undertaken to purchase sugar from ACP 
states at guaranteed prices. These prices are above world market prices. 
The Protocol on rum allows for duty-free export of this product to the 
Community. A quota system which was in place until 31 December 1995 has 
been phased out in accordance with the Convention. 
Stevens et al (2001) estimates that a proposal by the EU to give duty free 
access to its markets to the majority of LDC exports will provide considerable 
competition for some commodities from many ACP states including Barbados. 
The 'Everything but Arms Deal' will especially negatively impact on the Sugar 
and Rum Protocols. 
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A. 6.2.3 Concerns about the LOME Convention 
Manufacturers in Barbados have cited a number of problems in attempting to 
export to Europe and so benefit from preferences offered under successive 
LOME Conventions. These include high transportation costs to the EU market 
from the Caribbean, competition from "cheap" producers in China and Asia and 
rules of origin requirements which in many cases would make production in the 
Caribbean region uneconomical. These concerns have not been addressed in 
the Cotonou Agreement (Appendix 7), and negotiations will have to include 
some of these issues. 
It should however be emphasised that unlike other one-way preferential trade 
arrangements, LOME Conventions are broader than trade preferences. 
Funding for trade development in such areas as product design and marketing, 
can aid a country in taking advantage of concessions offered under other 
preferential arrangements. In addition, it is expected that a new partnership 
agreement with Europe will include services which is estimated by CARICOM 
will be their main sector for earning foreign exchange. 
A. 6.3 CARIBBEAN BASIN ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT 
The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act9, commonly known as the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) was signed into law by the U. S. in 1983. The 
main objective of the Act was to expand productive capacity and open new 
markets to trade by combining foreign and indigenous private sector investment 
with the natural resource endowment of the Caribbean Basin. Preferences were 
to exist for a twelve year period originally. However, in 1990 the CBI was 
extended for an indefinite period. 
A. 6.3.1 Provisions of the Act 
The centre piece of the CBI is one-way free trade for the exports of beneficiary 
countries into the USA market, except for the following: 
- 
textiles and apparel; 
- 
petroleum and petroleum products; 
- 
footwear, luggage, flat goods and leather apparel (gloves, belts and wallets); 
- 
canned tuna; and 
9 (USTR, 2000; GATT (1993); US Congress, 1990) 
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watches and watch parts if they contain any material 
from non-MFN countries, principally the USSR and China. 
Countries must meet a number of non-trade criteria in order to benefit 
from the CBI. These are: 
1. Compensation for any expropriated US property. 
2. Cooperation in narcotics control, intellectual property rights, labour laws 
and the sharing of tax information. 
3. Non-Communist regime. 
Countries which benefit from the CBI are: 
- 
CARICOM countries 
- 
Aruba 
- 
Costa Rica 
- 
Dominican Republic 
- 
Netherlands Antilles 
- 
Cayman Island 
- 
El Salvador 
- 
Nicaragua 
- 
Turks and Caicos Islands 
- 
Panama 
- 
British Virgin Islands 
- 
Guatemala 
- 
Honduras 
- 
Haiti 
To qualify for duty free entry into the U. S. A, the product must be wholly 
produced or have a value added component of not less than 35%, or undergo 
substantial transformation 
- 
"simple combining or packaging or mere dilution 
with water or mere dilution with another substance that does not materially alter 
the characteristics of the article"10 does not constitute meaningful 
transformation. 
The Act provides for safeguard action to be taken if imports of any product are 
causing injury to domestic industries. The emergency action to be taken is 
reinstatement of the applicable MFN duty. 
A. 6.3.2 Concerns about the CB! 
The Caribbean region has criticised the CBI on a number of fronts including; not 
allowing free trade in many products in which the region has a production 
capacity such as garments, footwear and furniture, and not removing non-tariff 
barriers on key products such as rum which face many problems regarding 
labelling. 
10 US. Congress (1990) Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act, SEC 213. Eligible Articles p. (236). 
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A. 6.4 CARIBCAN 
CARIBCAN is an economic and trade development assistance programme 
offered by Canada to countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean. It represents 
a widening of the 1979 agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation 
Agreement between the government of Canada and governments of 
CARICOM. That agreement is general in nature and simply calls on Canada 
and CARICOM member states to " apply to goods originating in each other's 
territories the highest degree of liberalisation which they apply to third countries 
in general". " 
Unlike the earlier agreement which is still in force, CARIBCAN was signed into 
law in 1986 with more specific provisions. Its main objectives are to enhance 
Commonwealth Caribbean trade and export earnings, improve the trade and 
economic development prospects of the region, promote new investment 
opportunities and encourage enhanced economic integration and 
cooperation. 12 
The main feature of CARIBCAN is the provision of preferential one-way duty 
free access, with a number of exclusions. The main features of the programme 
are: 
- 
Duty-free access to the Canadian market for imports from all 
CARICOM countries, Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, 
Cayman Islands and Turks and Caicos Islands. 
- 
Duty-free access applies to all goods with the exception of 
products for which it has been determined that free entry would 
adversely affect certain sensitive economic sectors in Canada. 
Sensitive products which are excluded from the agreement are: 
- 
Textiles and clothing 
- 
Footwear 
- 
Luggage and handbags 
- 
Leather Garments 
- 
Lubricating oils 
- 
Methanol 
In order to qualify for duty-free entry under CARIBCAN, goods must be certified 
as being wholly produced in the Commonwealth Caribbean, or a minimum of 
60% of the ex-factory price of exported goods (which includes overheads and 
" Canada Department of External Affairs (1986) Canada 
- 
CARICOM Trade and Economic 
Cooperation Agreement 
- 
Article II. 
12 GATT (1986) CANADA 
- 
CARIBCAN. Report of the Government of Canada. 
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reasonable profits) must originate in any of the Commonwealth Caribbean 
countries or in Canada. 
The Canadian Tariff Board is mandated to receive and review requests from 
Canadian manufacturers for the suspension of duty free concessions on any 
product should imports cause injury or threat of injury to a Canadian industry. 
Countries to be affected by such action are allowed to make representation at 
these reviews. 
CARIBCAN also provides for trade development funding through the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA), and encourages the development of 
double taxation treaties between Canada and Commonwealth Caribbean 
Countries to facilitate investment. 
A. 6.4.1 Concerns about CARIBCAN 
The CARIBCAN arrangement like the CBI has been criticised for excluding key 
export items for the Caribbean region such as garments, footwear and 
handbags. In addition, non-tariff barriers have not been addressed under the 
agreement. Again, these barriers have especially posed difficulties for the 
export of Barbados rum to Canada. 
A. 6.5 CARICOM /VENEZUELA AGREEMENT 
The CARICOM/ Venezuela Agreement on Trade and Investment was signed in 
October 1992 and came into force on January 1 1993 (CARICOM Secretariat 
1993) 13. It was the first of its kind between CARICOM and a non-English 
speaking country. 
The agreement which is one-way in nature, has the objective of strengthening 
economic and trade relations between the two Parties. This is to be achieved 
through: 
i. promotion and expansion of sale of CARICOM originating 
goods in the Venezuela market; 
ii. stimulation of investments with a view to taking advantage 
of markets; 
iii. encouraging investment to improve competitiveness in 
world trade; 
13 Caribbean Community Secretariat (1993d) 
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iv. providing assistance in creating and operating regional joint ventures; and 
v. developing a mechanism for the promotion and protection 
of investment. 
The agreement allowed CARICOM duty free access to the Venezuelan 
market. In addition, it was agreed that both parties would study technical, 
industrial and commercial norms and take the action necessary to ensure that 
such norms do not constitute obstacles to trade between the parties through 
tariff reductions. 
The main elements of the agreement are: 
i. Duty free entry for 156 products (three and four digit 
classifications) from CARICOM countries from 1St January 
1993. 
ii. Phased reduction in duty for 159 products14. The 
reductions were 25% annually. 
The agreement also encouraged individual CARICOM Member States and 
Venezuela to conclude Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITS), and Double 
Taxation Agreements. The signing of a BIT is expected to facilitate the 
movement of capital, encourage the formation of joint ventures, allow for the 
repatriation of profits and allow for the possibility of CARICOM businesses 
obtaining loans from the Caribbean Development Bank to establish businesses 
in Venezuela. 
An Article on transportation was also included which recognised the need to 
improve transportation between CARICOM and Venezuela to assist trade flows 
between the parties. 
In general, products which are wholly produced, which are mainly primary 
agricultural, animal and mineral products, satisfy the rules of origin criteria. In 
the case of assembly products, the imported inputs should undergo substantial 
transformation, which means that the exported product should have a different 
tariff heading from any of the inputs. In addition, the value of inputs should not 
exceed 50% of the export price of the product. 
The agreement does not contain special provisions regarding unfair trade 
practices such as dumping and subsidies. Instead, it acknowledges that where 
unfair trade practice occurs, GATT rules would apply. 
14 As well as Chapter 8 of the Customs Tariff. 
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Safeguard clauses allow Venezuela to apply temporary safeguard measures 
when importation under the agreement is causing serious damage to national 
production of similar or directly competing goods, or where it is necessary for 
Venezuela to take corrective action to address balance of payments dis- 
equilibrium. Safeguard action can be applied for a period of one year. 
The agreement is administered by a Joint Venezuela/CARICOM Council, which 
is responsible for the settling of disputes. 
A. 6.5.1 Concerns about the CAR/COMNenezuela Agreement 
The agreement with Venezuela represented CARICOM's first effort to forge 
trade links with the Spanish speaking countries of Latin America. Differences in 
language and culture, as well as inadequate transportation have been cited by 
manufacturers as difficulties in utilising the agreement. 
A. 6.6 CARICOM/COLOMBIA AGREEMENT 
The CARICOM/Colombia Trade, Economic and Technical Cooperation 
Agreement was signed in July 1994 (CARICOM Secretariat 1994) 15. The 
agreement was designed to be a one-way preferential arrangement during the 
first four years of its operation. The objectives of the agreement are: 
i. the promotion and expansion of trade in goods 
between the two parties; 
ii. the promotion and protection of investment aimed at 
taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the 
markets of the parties and strengthening their 
competitiveness in the international market; 
iii. the facilitation of the creation and operation of 
regional joint ventures; 
iv. the development of technical and scientific 
cooperation activities between the parties; and 
v. the promotion of private sector activities including 
business exchanges between the parties. 
The objectives are all aimed at strengthening the trade and economic relations 
and technical cooperation between the Parties. 
15 Caribbean Community Secretariat (1994). 
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The main elements of the agreement include the following: 
An agreed list of products from CARICOM countries eligible for 
duty-free entry in the Colombian market from January 1 1995, the 
date of entry into force of the agreement. There are 649 mainly 
manufactured goods on this list (CARICOM four digit level) 
An agreed list of products from CARICOM countries granted duty 
free entry into the Colombian market on a phased basis. The 
tariffs were reduced in three equal phases beginning from 
January 1995. There are 207 items on this list. 
Lists of products from CARICOM countries which were 
considered for duty free entry four years after the agreement was 
in existence. There are 607 items on this list. 
The Rules of Origin criteria stipulate that goods must be wholly 
produced in CARICOM, have a regional content of at least 40% or 
must have undergone substantial transformation through a 
change of customs classification. 
At the beginning of the fourth year of the agreement, CARICOM 
MDCs (Barbados, the Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica 
and Guyana) agreed to eliminate or reduce tariffs on an agreed 
list of goods from Colombia, in keeping with the provisions of the 
agreement. 
The agreement was the first of its kind between CARICOM and a third party for 
two reasons. First, the MDCs are extending reciprocal treatment on an agreed 
list of products from Colombia. Secondly, the agreement is asymmetric in 
nature in that CARICOM LDCs are not offering the limited reciprocity. In signing 
the agreement, CARICOM countries also committed themselves not to apply 
any additional non-tariff barriers on products from Colombia, and to apply MFN 
duties. 
The Protocol Amending the agreement to give effect to reciprocity to goods 
from Colombia was signed in May 1998. The protocol contained the following 
elements: 
An additional 87 products (at the four digit level ) from CARICOM 
were granted duty free entry into the market of Colombia. 
Ninety three (93) products from Colombia were granted duty free 
entry into the Market of CARICOM MDCs from July 1998. 
Fifty five (55) products originating in Colombia are to be accorded 
four annual duty reductions in the markets of the CARICOM 
MDCs participating in the agreement at the rate of 25% each 
year effective from 1 January 1999 to 1 January 2002. 
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Ninety nine (99) products originating in CARICOM are to be 
accorded four annual duty reductions in the Colombian market, at 
the rate of 25% each year effective from 1 January 1999 to 
1January 2000. 
In keeping with stipulations in CARICOM that third countries 
should not be offered more favourable treatment than exists 
among CARICOM countries, the Rules of Origin in the agreement 
were amended. One significant change was that the value added 
requirement was changed from 40% to 50%, which is the general 
CARICOM level. 
A. 6.6.1 Concerns about the CARICOM/Colombia agreement 
As is the case with the agreement with Venezuela, manufacturers have 
cited inadequate transportation links, language and cultural differences as 
factors affecting the utilising of preferences under this agreement. In the 
case of Colombia, there is an additional problems of civil instability 
which has hampered growth in trade. 
A. 6.7 CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY AGREEMENT 
The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) was created in 1973 (CARICOM 
Secretariat 1973)16. As an integration movement, it has the following objectives: 
promotion of the economic integration of the region; 
coordination of foreign policies; and 
functional cooperation in social, cultural and technological 
matters. 
As far as trade is concerned, the WTO classifies CARICOM as a regional trade 
agreement. 
The founding members of CARICOM were; Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and 
Tobago and Guyana. Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and 
Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Belize joined in 1974. The Bahamas became a 
member in 1983, Suriname in 1995 and Haiti in 1997. 
The main trade policy instruments in the Caribbean Community are the 
16 Caribbean Community Secretariat (1973). 
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Common External Tariff, the Rules of Origin, and Safeguard provisions which 
stipulate under what circumstances and how domestically produced goods should 
be traded and protected. Apart from the CET, there are no CARICOM rules which 
provide guidelines on how extra-regional imports should be treated. 
A. 6.7.1 Common External Tariff 
The CET" was revised in 1992, to incorporate the recommendations of the World 
Bank that the tariff rates should be lower. Eight principles were taken into account 
in devising the CET. These included: 
International competitiveness 
- 
The Customs Tariff 
should be structured to encourage the production of 
internationally competitive goods. 
(ii) Efficient production at the regional level 
- 
Tariff rates should 
be structured to help keep production costs in the region low. 
(iii) Government revenue protection 
- 
The rates should take into 
account the reliance of Governments on tariff revenues. 
(iv) Cost of Living 
- 
The rates should not unduly increase the 
cost of living in member states. 
(v) Removal of Duty Exemption regime 
- 
The rates should be 
set at levels to reduce the need for member states to request 
derogations from the tariff. 
(vi) Avoidance of Commodity-based tariffs 
- 
The application of 
different rates for the same item depending on its economic 
use should be avoided. 
(vii) Special measures for the Less Developed Countries (LDCs) 
- 
In designing the structure of levels of rates, the 
circumstances of CARICOM LDCs were taken into account. 
These countries generally have lower rates. 
(viii) Simplification and transparency 
- 
The simplification of the 
Customs Tariff structure, minimisation of the number of rate 
bands and reduction of the need for discretionary application 
in the day-to-day administration of the Tariff were taken into 
account. 
Based on the above objectives, (as well as external pressures described in 
Chapter 2), it was decided that CET rates which were sometimes higher than 
70% would be phased down to a maximum of 20% for both agricultural and 
manufactured goods, between 1993 and 1998. As a result of lobbying efforts on 
the part of the agricultural sector in the Community, the rates on agricultural 
products were reduced to 40% and not 20% as planned. 
17 Caribbean Community Secretariat (1993a). 
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As it therefore stands, the margin of preference for the Community is 20% in the 
case of manufactured goods and 40% in the case of agricultural goods (It should 
however be noted, that Barbados and Dominica have applied the WTO bound 
rates for some commodities, mainly agricultural commodities, and these rates are 
well over 100% in some cases). 
A. 6.7.2 Rules of Origin 
Goods which meet the CARICOM Rules of Origin criteria are exempt from the 
payment of Customs duties18. To be deemed a product of CARICOM origin, 
goods must be either: 
i. wholly produced; or 
ii. must undergo substantial transformation. 
Several tests exist to determine whether or not a product has undergone 
substantial transformation. These include: 
a. the change of tariff heading rule, where the final 
product must have a Customs classification which is 
different from any of its inputs; 
b. the product must be produced from certain regional 
materials; 
c. the product must be produced from materials of 
specified HS Headings or in some cases produced from 
certain materials not included in a specified HS 
Heading; 
e. the product must be produced by a specific process; and 
f. the product must meet a certain value added criteria 
where the value of imported inputs must not exceed 
the value of the final product. Generally, the value 
added criteria for MDCs is that imported inputs must 
not exceed 50% of the export price. The general rule 
for LDCs is that imported inputs must not exceed 60% 
of the export price of the product. There are of course 
instances where the value of imported inputs is either 
higher or lower than the values highlighted. 
Where inputs are not available within the Community, member states are allowed 
to import from extra-regional sources free of duty. If other member states agree, 
the final product not meeting the rules may also be treated as being of CARICOM 
origin. 
18 Caribbean Community Secretariat (1993b). 
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A. 6.7.3 Safeguard Provisions 
Safeguard articles in CARICOM allow member states, both MDCs and LDCs, to 
restrict imports of goods if such imports are causing injury to domestic industries. 
Article 29 of the Treaty makes provision for member states to restrict imports "to a 
rate not less than the rate of such imports during a period of 12 months which 
ended within 12 months of the date on which the restrictions came into force19i. 
The provisions also require that the restrictions should not continue in place for a 
period longer than 18 months, unless permission is granted by other Member 
States. 
Article 56 of the CARICOM Treaty allows LDCs to impose quantitative restrictions 
on MDCs exports for an indefinite period, in order to promote the development of 
industries. Currently, LDCs restrict ten products under this arrangement. 
Barbados, because of the special position it held during the time of signing the 
Treaty in 1973, can suspend imports from LDCs which are protected by those 
countries under Article 56. Barbados has never utilised this provision. 
A. 6.7.4 Concerns about CARICOM arrangements 
During the 1980s there were numerous breaches of the CARICOM Treaty 
which led to a contraction in intra-regional trade20. During the 1990s however, 
infractions of the Treaty became less numerous as countries liberalised their 
trade regimes. One of the longest standing breaches of the Treaty was 
Barbados' protection of the areated beverages market. This breach was 
corrected in 1999 when Barbados removed restrictions on CARICOM exports 
of those products. There are currently no longstanding infractions of the 
CARICOM Treaty as reported by exporters. 
"Caribbean Community Secretariat (1973) P. 36. 
20 Caribbean Community Secretariat (1993c) 
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APPENDIX 7 
WTO RULES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 
Negotiations to create the FTAA and to revise the LOME Convention have not 
been completed. While it is not yet known what the specific provisions of the 
new agreements will be, all parties have agreed that the provisions should seek 
to be WTO compatible. This essentially means that they require member 
countries to liberalise their markets within the framework outlined in those rules. 
This section will review WTO requirements for compatibility of regional trade 
agreements, as well as FTAA and ACP-EU negotiations to date. 
A. 7.1 WTO PROVISIONS ON RECIPROCAL TRADE 
ARRANGEMENTS 
Article I of the GATT 
- 
the most-favoured-nation principle 
- 
stipulates that any 
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any WTO Member to any 
product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for 
the territories of all other WTO Members21. 
Various WTO provisions allow for a departure from that principle. Chapter 2 
highlighted the exemption provisions relevant to non-reciprocal trade 
agreements. Exemption provisions relevant to reciprocal trade agreements - as 
the FTAA and partnership agreements are expected to be 
- 
are contained in 
Article XXIV of GATT 199422. Notifications made to the WTO under this Article, 
are subject to examination by WTO Members and this serves two purposes. 
First, it ensures that the provisions of an agreement are fully transparent. 
Secondly, it enables Members to evaluate whether or not the agreement is 
compatible with WTO rules and disciplines. 
A reciprocal trade agreement is required to meet the four substantive provisions 
of Article XXIV. These are: 
1. Customs unions, free trade agreements or interim agreements 
should facilitate trade between the parties and not raise barriers 
(duties and other regulations of commerce) to the trade of third 
parties (paragraph 4). 
2. With the exception of a few stated exceptions, duties and other 
restrictive regulations of commerce are to be eliminated with 
respect to "substantially all trade" between the parties to an 
agreement. Parties to a customs union are also required to apply 
21 WTO (1995a) p. 486. 
22 Article V of GATS contains relevant provisions in the case of trade in services. Both Article XXIV and 
Article V provisions are similar in their intention. Given the focus of this paper, only Article XXIV will 
be discussed. 
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"substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce" 
in respect of the trade of third parties (para. 8). 
3. The duties and other regulations of commerce imposed on third 
parties at the formation of a free trade agreement (or interim 
agreement to create a free trade area) are not to be higher or 
more restrictive than those existing prior to its formation. In the 
case of a customs union (or interim agreement to create a 
customs union), the duties and other regulations of commerce are 
not on the whole to be higher or more restrictive than the general 
incidence of the duties and other regulations of commerce applied 
prior to its formation (paragraph 5). Regarding tariffs imposed on 
third-parties, the Understanding on the Interpretation of this Article 
states that the comparison of the level of protection is to be 
based on an overall assessment of the weighted average of the 
applied tariffs prior to, and at the time of the creation of the 
custom union. 
4. An interim agreement is to include a plan and a schedule leading 
to the full creation of a customs union or free trade area within a 
"reasonable length of time" (paragraph 5c). The Understanding on 
the interpretation of this Article states the reasonable length of 
time as 10 years. Only in exceptional cases are longer periods 
allowed. 
Although specific provisions exist in the GATT agreement laying down the 
conditions under which customs unions and free trade areas will be WTO 
compatible, considerable differences exist regarding the interpretation of those 
provisions. One such disagreement relates to the "substantially all trade" rule23 
Here, differences of opinion exist as to whether the concept is qualitative, in 
which no sector is to be excluded from the agreement, or quantitative in which 
a certain volume of trade must be involved, irrespective of the number of 
sectors or products. Even if the quantitative interpretation is accepted, there is 
still some disagreement over the volume of trade which should be involved. 
One proposal put forward by the European Economic Community is that the 
volume of trade liberalised should be at least 80 percent of total trade ( current 
discussion in the WTO Committee on Regional Trade Arrangements seem to 
favour 90% of total trade as the benchmark). Other areas which are still being 
debated in the WTO relate to whether or not the scope of liberalisation applies 
to tariffs only or to non-tariff measures also, and how should safeguard action 
taken under an agreement be treated in relation to the rule. 
23 WTO (1995c) Regionalism and the World Trading System. 
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To date, the many differences of opinion on the interpretation of the provisions 
of Article XXIV have led to no decision on conformity in respect of the vast 
number of regional trade agreements. A decision of conformity with the 
provisions of Articles XXIV has been decidedly given to only two existing 
agreements. These are CARICOM, and the Customs union between the 
Czech and Slovak Republics. 
Despite the difficulties in reaching a consensus on what exactly regional trade 
agreements should contain to pass the WTO compatibility test, there are at 
least five implications for the protection of domestic industries under such 
agreements: 
i. First, a substantial proportion of trade must be involved. 
This will require that governments make a judicious 
selection of the industrial activities which will be excluded 
from the agreement. 
ii. Secondly, most if not all forms of trade barriers, must be 
removed. This limits the number of measures which 
governments can employ to protect domestic industries. 
iii. Thirdly, unlike the case of the Enabling Clause which 
requires a reduction or elimination of duties and non-tariff 
measures among developing countries, such measures are 
to be eliminated in the case of agreements under Article 
XXIV. 
iv. Fourthly, the maximum time period for full implementation 
of the agreement is 10 years (unless otherwise agreed to 
by WTO Members). This means that the removal of 
protection of domestic industries cannot be delayed 
indefinitely, or the phase-in process cannot be at a very 
slow rate. 
v. Fifthly, there are no provisions in the Article for 
granting special and differential treatment to any group or 
groups of countries such as small economies. Special 
treatment can however be granted within the parameters of 
the limits set by the Article. 
Those implications will guide negotiations to create the FTAA, and to forge a 
new partnership between the ACP countries and the EU (negotiations 
mandated at the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference will seek to clarify these 
rules). 
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A. 7.2 FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS 
At the first Summit of the Americas Meeting in 1994, Heads of Governments of 
34 countries in the western hemisphere agreed to create the Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA) by the end of 2005. The general objectives of the 
FTAA24 are to: 
i. promote prosperity through increased economic integration and 
free trade among the countries of the hemisphere which are key 
factors for raising standards of living, improving the working 
conditions of people in the Americas and better protecting the 
environment; 
ii. establish a Free Trade Area in which barriers to trade in goods, 
services and investment are progressively eliminated; 
iii. maximise market openness through high levels of disciplines 
through a balanced and comprehensive agreement; 
iv. provide opportunities to facilitate the integration of the smaller 
economies in the FTAA process in order to realize their 
opportunities and increase their levels of development; 
v. strive to make trade liberalisation and environmental policies 
mutually supportive, taking into account work undertaken by the 
WTO and other international organizations; and 
vi. further secure, in accordance with respective laws and 
regulations, the observance and promotion of worker rights, 
renewing commitment to the observance of internationally 
recognised core labour standards and acknowledging that the ILO 
is the competent body to set and deal with those core labour 
standards. 
These general objectives have been further concretised in a set of general and 
specific principles. Among other things, the general principles call for decisions 
in the negotiating process to be made through consensus, for consistency with 
WTO rules, and for the process to go further than is provided for in WTO rules. 
Three of the 12 general principles speak specifically to smaller economies. 
They state that: 
special attention would be given to the needs, economic conditions 
(including transition costs and possible internal dislocations) and 
opportunities of smaller economies, to ensure their full participation in 
the FTAA process; 
Z° Summit of the Americas (1994) Ministerial Declaration. 
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the rights and obligations of the FTAA would be shared by all countries. 
In the negotiation of the various thematic areas, measures such as 
technical assistance in specific areas and longer periods for 
implementing the obligations could be included on a case by case basis, 
in order to facilitate the adjustment of smaller economies and the full 
participation of all countries in the FTAA; and 
the measures agreed upon to facilitate the integration of smaller 
economies in the FTAA process shall be transparent, simple and easily 
applicable, recognizing the degree of heterogeneity among them25. 
These provisions form the basis for small economies to be given special and 
differential treatment within the FTAA. Nine groups were established in 1998 to 
undertake negotiations in the following areas: 
- 
Market Access. 
- 
Investment. 
- 
Services. 
- 
Government Procurement. 
- 
Dispute Settlement. 
- 
Agriculture. 
- 
Intellectual Property Rights. 
- 
Subsidies, Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties. 
- 
Competition Policy. 
In addition, three consultative groups have been established. These are: 
Consultative Group on Smaller Economies. 
Committee of Government Representatives on the Participation of Civil 
Society. 
Joint Government-Private Sector Committee of Experts on Electronic 
Commerce. 
The Consultative Group on Smaller Economies is intended to be a reservoir for 
the concerns of this group and a catalyst for ensuring that all negotiating 
entities take those concerns and suggestions fully into account when drafting 
the provisions of the FTAA agreement. 
To date, a number of concerns and suggestions have been put forward for 
consideration (Chapter 2). The impact which these will have on the text of the 
agreement is still very much unclear. What is however clear is the intention to 
25 Summit of the Americas (1998) Ministerial Declaration. 
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make the provisions WTO compatible despite uncertainty over GATT Article 
XXIV. 
Given that the focus of this study is to examine the protection of industries from 
market access requirements, it would be useful to briefly examine the mandate 
of the negotiating group on market access. The mandate calls for; 
a. provisions which are consistent with WTO rules, including Article 
XXIV of the GATT 1994, and its Understanding on the 
Interpretation of Article XXIV, to progressively eliminate tariffs and 
non-tariffs barriers, as well as other measures with equivalent 
effect which restrict trade between participating countries; 
b. the inclusion of all sectors in negotiations; 
c. options for different trade liberalisation time tables; and 
d. provisions to facilitate the integration of smaller economies in the 
FTAA negotiations. 
The mandate is actually more stringent than the provisions of Article XXIV. 
First, it calls for all tariffs to be involved in the negotiations and secondly, it 
requires that non-tariff barriers be removed. If the mandate is taken literally, 
then there will be very little lead way to grant special and differential treatment 
to smaller economies outside of a longer transition period, and perhaps 
technical assistance. 
In practice, free trade agreements, including NAFTA, do allow for the exclusion 
of some sensitive products from liberalisation. It is likely that for smaller 
economies at least, some items will be excluded, if only initially. However, 
based on WTO rules, it is clear that most production sectors will have to be 
liberalised. 
A. 7.3 COTONOU AGREEMENT 
Discussions on the renewal of ACP-EU LOME Convention commenced in 1996 
after the EU published its "Green Paper on Relations Between The European 
Union And The ACP Countries On The Eve Of The 21st Century"26. The EU 
has maintained through discussions, that any new arrangement with ACP 
26 European Commission (1997) 
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states should take account of the performance of the Convention to date and 
the new global environment especially as it relates to WTO compatibility. 
In June 2000, a framework for a new partnership agreement between the ACP 
states and the EC was finalised (Cotonou agreement)27. The agreement which 
addresses political, social and economic issues has as its objectives: 
enhancing the economic, cultural and social development of ACP 
States; 
reducing and eventually eradicating poverty consistent with the 
objectives of sustainable development and the gradual integration 
of the ACP countries into the world economy; and 
promoting sustained economic growth, developing the private 
sector, increasing employment and improving access to 
productive resources. 
The duration of the overall agreement is for twenty years, with a revision clause 
every five years and a new financial protocol every five years. 
Important features of the framework agreement include: 
The overall amount of the Community's financial 
assistance to ACP States for the next five year period is 
Ecu 15 200 million moving from Ecu 14 625 under LOME 
IV. 
ii. Greater emphasis is to be placed on political dialogue, the 
participation of civil society and social development, 
especially poverty reduction. Some emphasis in ACP 
- 
EU 
cooperation is to be placed on gender equality, 
environmental sustainability, institutional development and 
capacity building in ACP states. 
iii. A new framework on trade cooperation is to be 
developed which will entail elements of reciprocity. 
The over-riding focus of the new trade cooperation arrangement is compatibility 
with WTO rules. Its modalities require the progressive removal of trade barriers 
between the parties and enhancing co-operation in all areas of trade. 
The arrangement calls for the negotiation of economic partnership agreements 
between 2002 and 2007, with the new arrangements coming into effect from 1 
January 2008. The phase-in process is to commence on that date. During this 
preparatory period, assistance is to be given in the areas of capacity building, 
Z' Commission of the European Communities (2000). The agreement was signed in Cotonou, Benin on 
23rd June 2000. 
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enhancing international competitiveness and institutional strengthening. In 2006 
a comprehensive review of the negotiations is to be undertaken. 
It is note worthy that the agreement allows for some flexibility for ACP countries 
which consider themselves not in a position to enter into a partnership 
arrangement with the EC. In these cases, alternative arrangements are to be 
explored. Again, however, any alternative arrangement will be bounded by the 
stipulation of compatibility with WTO rules. 
Article 37: 7 of the agreement notes that the negotiations will take into account 
the level of development of ACP states, and their capacity to adapt and adjust 
their economies to the liberalisation process. It further notes 
negotiations will therefore be as flexible as possible in establishing the duration 
of a sufficient transitional period, the final product coverage, taking into account 
sensitive sectors, and the degree of asymmetry in terms of timetable for tariff 
dismantlement, while remaining in conformity with WTO rules then prevailing28. 
In recognition of some of the failures of previous LOME Conventions, duty free 
access is to be allowed for essentially all products from LDCs, and the rules of 
origin are to be reviewed and simplified. 
In terms of the commodity protocols, the banana protocol has been reviewed 
and there is now a second protocol which does not provide for trade 
preferences for this product29. The protocols on sugar, beef and veal are to be 
reviewed in light of negotiations for new trading arrangements. 
Regarding small economies, the agreement contains broad provisions on island 
states in the ACP group. These provisions relate to such issues as 
environmental protection and sustainable utilisation of natural resources (Article 
32), special and differential treatment in economic and trade cooperation 
(Article 35) and support in cases of short-term fluctuations in export earnings. 
These references, however, also refer to least developed and landlocked states 
as well. Given that ACP states fall into one of these categories, it is difficult to 
determine what "special" treatment will be given to any one group of states. 
The treatment maybe different in terms of the characteristic problems of the 
different groups, but it cannot be said that any group 
- 
especially smaller 
economies 
- 
will be given "special" treatment. 
The new partnership agreement was finalised against the pressures of the 
expiration of LOME IV Convention on February 29,2000. It is no doubt that for 
this reason the text of the agreement speaks to alternative possibilities if a 
country cannot go ahead with a partnership arrangement (Article 37: 6 and 7). 
28 ACP-EC Partnership Agreement (2000). 
29 WTO (2000) Request for a WTO Waiver: New ACP-EU Partnership Agreement. G/C/W/187. 
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However, the overriding objective of the new arrangement is to achieve WTO 
compatibility, especially Article XXIV compatibility and the room for alternative 
arrangements is very limited. Again, as is the case of FTAA negotiations, 
alternative arrangements are likely to translate into a longer transitional period 
with elements of technical assistance. 
Stevens of al (1998) made a number of recommendations regarding the 
structure of the future trade relationship between CARICOM, the Dominican 
Republic and the EU. These include (1) that any partnership agreement should 
be within the context of the wider hemispheric integration, (2) exclusion of 
sensitive industries, and (3) the provision of financial and technical support to 
CARICOM countries. 
A. 7.4 ASSESSMENT 
Both FTAA negotiations and the upcoming ACP-EC negotiations for economic 
partnership agreements will undoubtedly be focused on WTO compatible 
provisions, and especially Article XXIV provisions. Given this, there is not much 
room for smaller economies to negotiate special and differential treatment. An 
objective of these countries has therefore been to request some flexibility in the 
interpretation of this particular rule to at least recognise and make some 
accommodation for their concerns within the provisions of the Article. Given the 
resistance which the small economies have been meeting so far, this will be a 
most difficult task. 
Based on the provisions of Article XXIV, the mandate of the FTAA and the 
stated intentions of the ACP framework agreement with the EU, it is likely that a 
substantial portion of domestic production will not be protected from trade 
liberalisation. There is therefore need for a judicious selection of sectors to be 
deemed "sensitive" and therefore eligible to benefit from continued protection. 
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